'From Birmingham to Bulawayo': the Labour government, race and decolonisation, 1964-1970 by O'Leary, KP
1 
 
 
 
‘From Birmingham to Bulawayo’: The Labour Government, 
Race and Decolonisation, 1964-1970 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of MPhil. 
 
 
Kieran O’Leary 
University College London 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
I, Kieran O’Leary, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where 
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been 
indicated in the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines how Harold Wilson’s Labour government of 1964-1970 
addressed the issues of race and decolonisation both internationally and 
domestically. Internationally, the thesis is primarily concerned with the Wilson 
government’s policies and attitudes towards the former non-settler empire. The early 
1960s saw most of Britain’s remaining non-white colonies gain their independence, 
the so-called ‘winds of change’. Despite this loss of empire, many senior Labour 
figures believed that Britain still had a key role to play with regards to its former 
colonial subjects. This was evident in the Wilson government’s commitment to the 
Commonwealth and the creation of the new Ministry of Overseas Development. 
Although grounded in apparently noble intentions, these policies were laden with 
racist assumptions of Britain as a paternal figure responsible to the supposedly 
backward races, particularly in Africa, a legacy of the ‘civilising mission’.  
Domestically, the thesis will explore the Wilson government’s approach to 
another legacy of empire: the issue of Commonwealth immigration. The post-war 
period saw thousands of non-white migrants arrive into Britain from the 
Commonwealth, predominantly from the West Indies, India and Pakistan. These 
migrants were permitted unrestricted entry into Britain through the British Nationality 
Act of 1948. However, the 1960s saw the introduction of legislation to curtail this 
migration. Although the Labour Party initially opposed the inaugural Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act of 1962, the Wilson government upheld the Act and later introduced 
tougher controls. The thesis will examine the links between the Wilson government’s 
approach to these two issues, drawing on the recent scholarly trend which has 
argued for the synthesis of Britain’s domestic and imperial histories. Above all, the 
thesis will argue that the Wilson government’s approach to race, both internationally 
and domestically, was shaped by a lingering imperial ideology that cast non-white 
peoples as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘backward’. 
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Introduction 
“The battle against racialism here in Britain knows no boundaries, 
no limits. Its boundaries are not the civic limits of Birmingham or 
Bradford; they extend to Africa, south as well as north of the 
Zambezi, to Asia, to all the continents of the world. 
I am not prepared to stand aside and see this country engulfed by 
the racial conflict which calculated orators or ignorant prejudice 
can create. Nor in the great world confrontation on race or colour, 
where this country must declare where it stands, am I prepared to 
be neutral, whether the confrontation is in Birmingham or 
Bulawayo”.1 
(Harold Wilson, 5th May 1968)     
 
On 20th April 1968, Enoch Powell, a senior Conservative politician and writer, 
delivered a controversial speech on immigration to a meeting of the West Midlands 
Conservative Political Centre, the so-called ‘rivers of blood’ speech. Powell lamented 
the arrival of thousands of non-white Commonwealth immigrants, predominantly 
from the West Indies, India and Pakistan, to Britain since the end of the Second 
World War. These migrants were permitted unrestricted entry into Britain until the 
introduction of legislative restrictions in the 1960s. The speech provoked much 
criticism due to its racialist language and evocative symbolism—Powell described 
non-white immigrant children as ‘wide-grinning piccaninnies’ and warned that if the 
current rate of immigration continued, ‘in 15 or 20 years’ time, the black man will 
have the whip hand over the white man’. The speech has often been cited as a 
seminal example of racism as an issue in British politics.2 
                                                          
1 Harold Wilson’s speech in response to Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech. Published in Harold 
Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-70: A Personal Record (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 
524–528. 
2 There are several texts concerning the life of Enoch Powell and the significance of his ‘rivers of 
blood’ speech. See Simon Heffer, Like the Roman: the Life of Enoch Powell (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1998); Roy Lewis, Enoch Powell: Principle in Politics (London: Cassell, 1979); Robert 
Shepherd, Enoch Powell (London: Hutchinson, 1996) and Camilla Schofield, Enoch Powell and the 
Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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On 5th May 1968, Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister, gave a speech in 
response to Powell. Significantly, this speech also took place in Birmingham, thus 
reflecting Wilson’s determination to meet the issue head-on. Wilson criticised the 
racist rhetoric used by ‘calculated orators’ such as Powell. While Wilson’s strong 
condemnation of Powell was itself noteworthy, the speech was even more intriguing 
given Wilson’s declaration of a ‘battle against racialism’ that stretched from 
‘Birmingham to Bulawayo’, thereby offering the ‘rivers of blood’ affair an international 
as well as domestic setting.3 Wilson referred to Birmingham as this was an area 
where the issue of race often reared its ugly head during this period. Birmingham 
had the second largest population of non-white immigrants after London; it was 
where the Birmingham Immigration Control Association, one of the main supporters 
of immigration controls, formed in 1961 and it was in neighbouring Smethwick where 
Patrick Gordon Walker, a senior Labour figure, lost his seat at the 1964 election 
following a controversial campaign by the Conservative candidate, Peter Griffiths, 
which focused almost exclusively on non-white immigration.4  
Wilson’s reference to Bulawayo—the second largest city in Rhodesia—
alluded to the colonial crisis that faced the Labour government when Ian Smith’s 
government announced its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.5 
The late 1950s and early 1960s saw several African colonies gain independence 
from Britain under majority rule. However, Rhodesia, which was governed by a white 
minority regime, rejected independence under such terms.6 While the Wilson 
government insisted there could be no independence before majority rule (NIBMAR), 
                                                          
3 Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-70: A Personal Record, 524-528. 
4 Phillip Jones, “Some Aspects of the Changing Distribution of Coloured Immigrants in Birmingham, 
1961-66,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 50 (1970): 199–219. For the Smethwick 
campaign see Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965); 
Dhani R. Prem, The Parliamentary Leper: A History of Colour Prejudice in Britain (Aligarh, India: 
Metric Publications, 1965); Michael Hartley-Brewer, ‘Smethwick’ in Nicholas Deakin, Colour and the 
British Electorate, 1964: Six Case Studies (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965). For Griffiths’ personal 
account of the campaign, see Peter Griffiths, A Question of Colour? (London: Leslie Frewin, 1966).  
5 See Carl Peter Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History, 
1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia (New York: Knopf, 
1978); Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 
1978). For Smith’s personal account of the crisis, see Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: the 
Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith (London: Blake Pub, 1997). For the Wilson government’s policy, see 
Richard Coggins, ‘Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy towards Africa’, Contemporary British 
History, 20, no. 3 (2006): 363-381. 
6 The white population of Rhodesia at its peak was 270,000, which represented about 5 per cent of 
the total population. Barry Schutz, “European Population Patterns, Cultural Persistence, and Political 
Change in Rhodesia,” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 7, no. 1 (1973): 5–6. 
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the Smith regime sought to retain white rule in perpetuity. Although Wilson was 
personally repulsed by the Smith regime—according to Wilson’s private secretary, 
Oliver Wright, the only time Wilson really lost his temper was over the settler 
regime’s treatment of imprisoned black political leaders—the Labour government 
found itself in a difficult position on this issue.7 To bring down the rebellion by force 
carried economic costs, especially at a time when Britain faced a huge deficit on its 
Balance of Payments. Also, the government was faced with the uncomfortable 
question of whether it could fight against its white ‘kith and kin’, a common term used 
to describe the Rhodesian settlers.8 Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, described 
the prospect of fighting Rhodesians of British origin as ‘a most repugnant task of our 
forces’.9 The Wilson government instead opted for an ineffectual sanctions campaign 
which failed to bring down the Smith regime despite Wilson’s promise to end the 
rebellion ‘within a matter of weeks rather than months’.10 
Wilson’s linking of the issue of race at home and the colonial crisis in 
Rhodesia is intriguing given the way historians have traditionally approached these 
issues. Historians have tended to compartmentalise these two issues into separate 
histories—the issue of race at home within the sphere of British history and the 
history of race in Britain,11 and the Rhodesia crisis within the sphere of imperial 
history and the history of decolonisation.12 However, the emergence of the New 
Imperial History, which has argued for the interconnectedness of Britain’s domestic 
and imperial histories, has challenged this separation.13 Although most of the New 
                                                          
7 Steven Fielding and John W Young, The Labour government’s 1964-70, vol. 2 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), 169. 
8 Carl Peter Watts, “Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-
5,” Twentieth Century British History 16, no. 4 (2005): 382–415. 
9 CAB 130/206 MISC 4/2, Unilateral Declaration of Independence: Defence Implications, 
Memorandum by Denis Healey, 27th October 1964, National Archives (NA), London. Published in S.R. 
Ashton and William Roger Louis, eds., East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964-1971, vol. 1, British 
Documents on the End of Empire (London: TSO, 2004), 179. 
10 J R T Wood, A Matter of Weeks Rather Than Months: The Impasse Between Harold Wilson and Ian 
Smith Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War 1965-1969 ([S.l.]: Trafford On Demand Pub, 2012). 
11 See Colin Holmes, John Bull’s Island: Immigration and British society, 1871-1971 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1988) and Peter Fryer and Paul Gilroy, Staying Power: The History of Black People in 
Britain (London: Pluto Press, 2010).  
12 See Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: the Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical 
Debate (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1991); L. J Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial 
World (London: I.B. Taurus, 2002). 
13 See Catherine Hall, Cultures of empire: Colonisers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries: a Reader (New York: Routledge, 2000); Kathleen Wilson, A New Imperial 
History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Imperial History literature has focused on the nineteenth century, some scholars, 
most notably Stuart Ward and more recently Bill Schwarz, Jordanna Bailkin and 
Wendy Webster, have extended the literature into the twentieth century by arguing 
for the enduring impact of empire on British culture.14  
This thesis will draw on this historiographical trend by examining the links 
between the Wilson government’s approach to race in the international and domestic 
spheres. Internationally, the thesis is primarily concerned with the Labour elite’s 
policy towards Britain’s former non-white colonies, principally through the workings of 
the Commonwealth association. The early 1960s saw most of Britain’s remaining 
colonies gain their independence and join an expanded, multi-racial Commonwealth. 
The thesis will explore how senior Labour figures responded to this imperial decline 
by championing the Commonwealth as a means of ensuring Britain’s continued 
influence over its former colonial subjects and its continued influence on world 
affairs. The thesis will claim that while this policy was grounded in apparently good 
intentions, it was nevertheless laden with racist assumptions of Britain as a paternal 
figure responsible to the supposedly ‘backward races’, particularly in Africa, this 
being a legacy of the ‘civilising mission’. Crucially, the thesis will show that once it 
became clear that Britain could no longer control its former subjects and dominate 
the association, the Labour elite’s interest in the Commonwealth quickly diminished.   
Domestically, the thesis will focus on the Wilson government’s approach to 
non-white immigration. Although the literature on race in British politics in the 1960s 
is dominated by Powell and the ‘rivers of blood’ speech, this thesis will instead 
examine a key period before 1968 when the Labour Party changed its stance on 
immigration. The Labour Party under Hugh Gaitskell’s leadership strongly opposed 
the first Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced by Harold Macmillan’s 
Conservative government in 1962. However, shortly after taking office in 1964 the 
Wilson government renewed the Act and later introduced tougher restrictions 
through the 1965 White Paper, Immigration from the Commonwealth, and the 
                                                          
University Press, 2004) and Stephen Howe, New Imperial Histories Reader (New York: Routledge, 
2009). 
14 Stuart Ward, ed., British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2001); Bill Schwarz, The White Man’s World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jordanna 
Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Wendy Webster, 
Englishness and Empire, 1939-1965 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005.  
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Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968. While this U-turn on immigration has usually 
been characterised by scholars as a bow to the pressures of a supposedly hostile 
and prejudiced British public, this thesis will instead situate it within the broader 
context of Labour’s changing attitude towards the Commonwealth in this period. 
Before outlining the thesis methodology and structure, this introductory chapter will 
briefly review the most relevant literature that addresses the themes of this thesis. 
The New Imperial History in the Post-War Period   
As this thesis looks to connect two issues that have traditionally been divided 
into the domestic and imperial spheres of history, the relatively limited number of 
scholars that have argued for the enduring impact of empire in Britain in the 1960s 
are especially important. The most well-known example is Stuart Ward’s British 
Culture and the End of Empire.15 Ward challenges what he terms the ‘minimal 
impact’ thesis—namely, the view that Britain's imperial experience made little or no 
impression on British society and culture.16 For Ward, ‘while the demise of the British 
Empire is a theme that has been well traversed in studies of post-war British politics, 
economics and foreign relations, there has been strikingly little attention to the 
question of how these dramatic changes were reflected in British culture.’17 This text 
uses an array of cultural sources such as films, television and literature to show that 
‘far from being a matter of indifference, the fall of the British Empire came as a 
profound shock to the British national imagination, and resonated widely in British 
popular culture’.18 In Englishness and Empire, Wendy Webster similarly uses cultural 
sources, principally film, to highlight the enduring impact of empire on English 
identity and culture.19   
 Bill Schwarz’s The White Man’s World has also examined the impact of the 
loss of empire on British culture, using the example of the Rhodesia crisis. Schwarz 
claims that ‘the coincidence of this colonial crisis, on one hand, with an emergent 
domestic crisis triggered by non-white immigration, created circumstances in which, 
symbolically and politically, the two became superimposed’.20 Schwarz argues that 
                                                          
15 Ward, British Culture and the End of Empire. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 1-5. 
18 Ibid, 6. 
19 Webster, Englishness and Empire, 1939-1965. 
20 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 396. 
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despite the loss of empire, old imperial notions of white authority over other races 
endured and influenced the British public’s attitude towards non-white immigrants.21 
Schwarz places Powell, in particular, as a central figure in this ‘reawakening of 
colonial memories in the postcolonial metropole’.22 He cites a moment during a 
march by London dockers on Westminster, in support of Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ 
speech, where one docker pointed at the Palace of Westminster and proclaimed 
Powell as ‘the only white man in there’.23 For Schwarz, this comment captured the 
prevailing sentiment among the marchers that immigration was a betrayal of ‘the 
white man’. He thus sees a parallel between the language employed by Powell with 
regards to immigration and the language used by the Smith regime to justify its 
rebellion. While one London docker proclaimed Powell as the only white man in 
Westminster, Ian Smith liked to portray himself as ‘the last white man’ betrayed by 
politicians in Britain.24 Schwarz, though, says little about Powell’s views towards 
Rhodesia. The extent to which Powell played on this parallel is a question that could 
be further explored.    
However, the claims put forward by these scholars are the subject of much 
debate among historians. In The Absent-Minded Imperialists, Bernard Porter has 
challenged the view that British society was deeply affected by empire.25 He argues 
that recent works have seen imperialism everywhere, using the analogy that cultural 
scholars, when ‘glimpsing a flash of the dolphin’s fin in the water, have assumed it 
belonged to an imperial shark’.26 This analogy typifies a common critique of the 
methodology employed by scholars such as Schwarz, Webster and Ward: that they 
lack the empirical evidence to support their claims. John Mackenzie has claimed that 
there has been little attempt among recent scholars to ‘anchor their work in the 
empirical depth of the imperial experience, resulting in vagueness and 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 11. 
22 Ibid, 29–30.  
23 Ibid, 49–51. 
24 Ibid, 438. 
25 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). For a survey of this debate, see Andrew S. Thompson, The Empire 
Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain From the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1st ed (Harlow: 
Pearson Longman, 2005).  
26 Bernard Porter, “Edward Elgar and Empire,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
29, no. 1 (2001): 7.  
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oversimplification’.27 Schwarz, though, has responded to this criticism by arguing that 
‘an exclusively empirical method alone cannot reveal those many elements hidden 
from the naked eye’, for example, the abstract notion of ‘whiteness’ that he refers 
to.28 He criticises what he describes as Porter’s ‘intransigently literal reading of the 
evidence’ and counters that it is ‘unlikely that identities are ever as transparent and 
conscious as this’.29  
Nevertheless, some scholars have attempted to overcome this 
methodological quandary by using an empirical framework to supplement these 
cultural sources. A notable example is Jordanna Bailkin’s The Afterlife of Empire, 
which looks to bring together two traditionally separate historical themes—the loss of 
empire and the creation of the welfare state.30 Whereas Webster, Schwarz, and 
Ward use cultural sources to demonstrate the enduring influence of empire in the 
metropole, Bailkin takes a different approach. She uses sources within the National 
Archives such as papers from the Department of Health, which she claims have 
been overlooked by political historians who have tended to focus on the departments 
usually associated with imperial matters such as the Colonial Office. In so doing, 
Bailkin demonstrates connections between metropole and colony while 
circumventing the criticism that the New Imperial History literature lacks empirical 
depth.     
These texts have offered new ways of thinking about the relationship between 
British domestic and imperial history. They have posed vital questions regarding the 
impact of the loss of empire on the metropole, and at the same time have extended 
the wider debate concerning the relationship between colony and metropole into the 
1960s. Schwarz’s work is especially relevant to this thesis as he links the Rhodesia 
crisis with the issue of non-white immigration, two key problems relating to the 
question of race that faced the Wilson government in this period. However, it is not 
just within the confines of the New Imperial History that these themes have been 
addressed. The issues touched on in this thesis pervade many historiographical 
                                                          
27 John Mackenzie quoted in Robert Gildea and Anne Simonin, Writing Contemporary History 
(London: Hodder Education, 2008), 154–155. 
28 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 14. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire, 1–2. 
12 
 
domains, including the wider literature on decolonisation and the political history of 
the Wilson government.  
Decolonisation  
Within the literature on decolonisation, there is a dominant school of thought 
which asserts that the loss of empire left scarcely any visible trace in Britain.31 Larry 
Butler argues that compared to other colonial powers such as France and Belgium, 
which faced ‘quagmires’ during the end of empire in Algeria and Congo respectively, 
Britain’s experience of decolonisation was relatively trouble-free and ‘had a less 
direct impact on domestic politics’.32 John Darwin describes Britain’s experience of 
decolonisation through the following analogy: “It was like a man in the dentist’s chair, 
soothed by smiling nurses and laced with painkillers while a dentist with a manic grin 
probed his jaw. Only later does he find that all his teeth have gone”.33 A commonly 
cited source used in support of this thesis is the Social Survey of Public Opinion in 
Britain on Colonial Affairs in 1948.34 The survey found that only 49 per cent of those 
questioned could name one colony while 3 per cent named America as a British 
colony, thus revealing the supposed ignorance of the British public towards imperial 
matters.  
In terms of the Labour Party, more attention could be given to its role in the 
end of empire. Much of the literature has focused on Macmillan’s Conservative 
administration of 1959-1963, which had granted independence to most of Britain’s 
remaining colonies before the Wilson government came to power.35 Above all, it is 
Macmillan’s ‘winds of change’ speech that is usually seen as the landmark moment 
in the decline of the British Empire. In a speech to the South African parliament in 
Cape Town in February 1960, Macmillan indicated that Britain would soon grant 
independence to its African colonies. As Macmillan famously put it, ‘the wind of 
                                                          
31 Butler, Britain and Empire; Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: Harper Collins, 1992); Hyam, 
Britain’s Declining Empire.  
32 Butler, Britain and Empire, 196. 
33 Darwin quoted in Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire, 11–12. 
34 G.K. Evans, Public Opinion on Colonial Affairs: A Survey Made for the Colonial Office (Great 
Britain: Central Office of Information. Social Survey Division, 1948). 
35 See W.R. Louis and Ronald Hyam, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1957-
1964, 1, High Policy, Political and Constitutional Change (London: The Stationery Office, 2000) and 
Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee, Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1996). 
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change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of 
national consciousness is a political fact’.36  
However, the incoming Wilson government in 1964 still faced the question of 
Britain’s imperial role East of Suez and still faced a colonial crisis in Rhodesia.37 
Significantly, the two best-known texts dealing with the Labour Party—Stephen 
Howe’s Anticolonialism in British Politics and P.S. Gupta’s Imperialism and the 
British Labour Movement—both end their narratives in 1964.38 Howe claimed that by 
the time the Wilson government assumed office ‘most of the bitterly contested 
colonial issues of the 1950s had been disposed of’.39 Howe cites John Hatch, the 
Secretary of the Labour Party’s Commonwealth Department, who claimed that it was 
Iain Macleod’s ‘enlightened policies’ as Colonial Secretary (1959-1961), which 
enabled him to leave his post in 1961 with ‘a feeling that the job was largely done’.40 
Gupta similarly argued that ‘by 1964, with the formal empire practically at an end, the 
question really was whether there was any role beyond trying to build an equal and 
just society in Britain’.41       
If decolonisation is defined in its narrowest sense as the process in which 
previously colonised territories attained their political independence, then such a 
periodisation is logical as most of Britain’s colonies had already been granted or 
were on their way to independence before 1964. However, if decolonisation is 
defined more broadly to include the social, economic and cultural effects of this 
process both in the former colonies and in the metropole, then the Wilson 
government’s role certainly merits more attention. Despite the loss of empire, senior 
Labour figures believed that Britain still had a key role to play with regards to its 
former colonies, particularly in Africa. This was evident in the Wilson government’s 
commitment to the Commonwealth and overseas development. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
36 L. J. Butler and S. E. Stockwell, eds., The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British 
Decolonisation, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
37 See P. L. Pham, Ending “East of Suez”: The British Decision to Withdraw From Malaysia and 
Singapore, 1964-1968, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from 
East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World?, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
38 Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics: the Left and the End of Empire, 1918-1964 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour 
Movement, 1914-1964 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002). 
39 Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics, 307. 
40 Hatch’s views reported in interview with author in Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics, 307. 
41 Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, 386. 
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Wilson government had to address a domestic legacy of empire—the presence of 
non-white Commonwealth immigrants in Britain.    
The Wilson Government and Race  
Within the broader literature of the Wilson Government of 1964-1970, there 
are a number of texts that are critical of its approach to race, both domestically and 
internationally.42 In The Politics of Harold Wilson, Paul Foot argued that the period 
1964-1970 saw ‘the death of Harold Wilson, Yorkshire socialist and moral crusader’ 
as ‘every one of his priorities had been reversed or abandoned’.43 He claimed that on 
the issues of immigration and Rhodesia there was a wide gap between Wilson’s anti-
racialist rhetoric and actual political activity. In terms of immigration, Foot cited a 
speech given by Wilson to the anti-Apartheid rally in Trafalgar Square on 18th March 
1963, in which Wilson praised Gaitskell’s opposition to the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act of 1962, describing it as ‘one of his many inspiring acts’. However, 
Foot remarked that the ‘cheering crowd in Trafalgar Square could hardly have been 
aware that the same man would administer this Act with more severity and 
unconcern for the human beings involved than its Tory initiators would ever have 
dared, and then initiate a second Act in 1968 more racialist in motive and effect than 
its predecessor’.44    
In terms of Rhodesia, Foot cited a television broadcast on 21st December 
1965, in which Wilson promised to not negotiate with the Smith regime, borrowing 
from Dante in suggesting that ‘the hottest place in hell is reserved for those who are 
neutral in a moral crisis’. Wilson argued that ‘some are prepared to negotiate with a 
burglar on the basis that they would allow him to retain his illegal gains, by changing 
the theft into a gift’.45 This was in reference to the small group of Conservative MPs 
who opposed sanctions on Rhodesia and supported a compromise with the Smith 
regime. However, in 1966, Wilson held talks with Smith on HMS Tiger in which he 
offered concessions that would have broken all but one of his six principles for 
                                                          
42 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World, Volume 2: Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1951-2009 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); John Callaghan, Steven Fielding, and Steve 
Ludlam, Interpreting the Labour Party: Approaches to Labour Politics and History, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003); Paul Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1968). 
43 Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson, 326. 
44 Ibid, 249–253. 
45 Ibid, 261. 
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independence. Leo Baron, a white Rhodesian lawyer jailed by the Smith regime for 
defending Africans, described these concessions as ‘the blackest page in the whole 
of British colonial history’.46 Foot thus declared that ‘if Wilson’s use of Dante was 
accurate, he had booked himself a reservation in the hottest place in hell’.47    
Some scholars, though, have sought to revise this negative appraisal of the 
Wilson government. In his biography of Wilson, Ben Pimlott argued that critics such 
as Foot do not take into account the difficult problems that Wilson faced upon 
assuming office, most notably the £800million deficit on Britain’s Balance of 
Payments. According to Pimlott, Wilson ‘came to office in 1964 with serious national 
and international problems unresolved and left it with a number of difficult decisions 
taken’, for instance, the end of the East of Suez role and the crucial steps taken 
towards membership of the European Economic Community.48 He claimed that on 
issues such as Rhodesia, Wilson often had to strike a balance between differing 
forces. While Wilson’s decision not to use military force was condemned, most 
notably by Commonwealth leaders and members of the Labour left, at the same time 
he was criticised by some politicians, particularly on the Conservative right, for 
betraying British ‘kith and kin’ by applying sanctions on Rhodesia. Pimlott argued 
that Wilson had to find an acceptable balance between these ‘contradictory 
pressures’, and, when considered together, these criticisms of Wilson’s policy 
‘cancel each other out’.49      
In The Labour Governments 1964-70, Steven Fielding and John Young look 
to revise what they describe as ‘the overly grim reputation of the Wilson 
administration as the black sheep of Labour history’.50 In terms of immigration policy, 
Fielding challenges the view that the Wilson government abandoned Labour’s 
principles by extending controls on non-white immigrants. He claims that this view 
‘overlooks the differential understanding of the Labour Party's purpose’.51 According 
to Fielding, for many Labour activists, ‘restricting black entry contradicted no 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 285. 
48 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 563–564.  
49 Ibid, 25. 
50  Steven Fielding and John W. Young, The Labour Governments, 1964-70. Vol. 1, Labour and 
Cultural Change, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003): Preface.  
51 Steven Fielding, “Brotherhood and the Brothers: Responses to ‘coloured’ Immigration in the British 
Labour Party C. 1951–1965,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 3, no. 1 (1998): 79–80. 
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principle because, so far as they were concerned, the party’s compelling purpose 
was to defend the material interests of the indigenous white proletariat’.52 He cited an 
appendage to the Labour Party constitution in 1960 that declared the party’s central 
ideal to be ‘the brotherhood of man’, thus rejecting discrimination on racial grounds.53 
However, Fielding claimed that this ‘brotherhood of man’ principle was challenged by 
those who thought that non-white immigration undermined the material improvement 
of the working population’.54 Fielding cited, in particular, George Pargiter, the Labour 
MP for Southall, who in calling for ‘a complete ban on immigration to Southall’, 
avowed that 'we are entitled to look after our own people'.55   
Fielding poses some key questions: ‘whom or what did the Labour Party 
represent? Was it the perceived material interests of the white working class majority 
that voted Labour? Or was it, instead, a set of universal principles and values to 
which such people had to be led’?56 While George Brown, Labour’s Deputy Leader, 
rejected immigration controls because he could not accept that 'we only represent 
our constituents', Fielding claims that this was not how most party members felt.57 
Even the most ardent anti-racialists in the party did not necessarily consider the 
Wilson government’s immigration policy as a betrayal of Labour’s principles. 
Reginald Sorensen, a Labour MP who drafted legislation in the 1950s to tackle racial 
discrimination, argued that the case against controls was fuelled by an ‘intoxicated 
idealism’.58 Fielding’s account typifies a common narrative in the wider literature 
which characterises Labour’s changing position on immigration as a bow to the 
pressures of its own traditional working class electorate who were supposedly hostile 
towards non-white newcomers. 
This thesis will differ from this view, though, by focusing on factors internal to 
the Labour policy-making elite. Senior Labour figures, like their constituents, were 
just as susceptible to racist assumptions regarding non-white immigrants, having 
grown up in a world where the white imperial powers subjugated other races. As Jodi 
Burkett put it in Constructing Post-Imperial Britain, ‘members of the left too had gone 
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to school in places where the map of the empire was pinned on the wall and were 
told, both implicitly and explicitly, that white Britons were somehow superior to 
others…They too had to come to terms with wide-ranging changes in their 
understanding of the world and Britain’s place within it’.59 Above all, this thesis will 
argue that the Wilson government’s approach to race, both internationally and 
domestically, was shaped by a long-standing imperial ideology that cast non-white 
peoples as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘backward’. While recent scholars have looked at the 
enduring ties between colony and metropole in the 1960s through the prism of British 
society and culture, this thesis will examine these connections through the policies of 
the Wilson government, especially on matters relating to race. 
Methodology, Sources and Structure 
In terms of methodology, this thesis will primarily be a political history, 
focusing on the attitudes of key figures at the high-political level of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. The thesis will therefore utilise mostly political archival sources such 
as the National Archives, the Labour Party archives, the parliamentary minutes of 
Hansard as well as the private papers of senior Labour figures such as Patrick 
Gordon Walker and Arthur Bottomley. The thesis will also use polling data and oral 
interviews to gain a sense of how some Britons thought about these issues. In so 
doing, this thesis will challenge the narrative of the hostile and racist working class 
Briton and argue that the ‘race problem’ in 1960s Britain was as much driven by the 
fears of an unduly anxious Labour elite. In terms of structure, the thesis will be 
divided into three main chapters. The first chapter will provide a historical 
background to the Wilson government by exploring how senior Labour figures have 
approached the issues of race and empire earlier in the twentieth century. The 
chapter will argue that the Wilson government’s policy towards race, both 
internationally and domestically, was a legacy of these earlier Labour approaches, in 
particular the idea of a ‘civilising mission’.  
The second chapter will hone in on the Wilson government, tracing its growing 
disillusionment with the Commonwealth in the period 1964-1967. The chapter will 
argue that although the Wilson government entered office in 1964 with high hopes 
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for the Commonwealth, this was contingent on Britain retaining a special role as the 
‘mother country’. However, as this position was challenged by the increasingly 
assertive non-white members, the Wilson government’s support for the 
Commonwealth soon waned. Crucially, this rupture in Labour’s Commonwealth 
vision coincided with the Wilson government’s application to join the European 
Economic Community in 1967.  
The final chapter will examine the Labour Party’s changing approach to 
immigration in the period 1964-1968. The chapter will argue that the public pressures 
that supposedly drove this policy change have been overstated as the issue of 
immigration figured in only a few constituencies and seemingly had little impact on 
the British electorate as a whole. The chapter will instead situate this U-turn on 
immigration within the context of the Labour elite’s broader turn away from the 
Commonwealth in this period. This chapter will also argue that the issue of 
immigration was symptomatic of a wider problem concerning the meaning of 
Britishness in the 1960s. While the Wilson government, in theory, promoted a ‘new’ 
vision of Britain that was multi-racial and inclusive, in reality its approach to 
immigration suggested the enduring sway of an older, more restrictive idea of Britain 
based on ‘whiteness’, which drew heavily on the legacies of empire. 
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Chapter One: The Labour Party, Race and Empire: A Historical Background 
The Labour Party was originally founded in 1900 with the specific aim of 
providing representation for the British working class and trade union movement in 
parliament. This was reflected in its original name, the Labour Representation 
Committee, before it adopted the name the Labour Party in 1906. Despite its origins, 
grounded on the seemingly narrow domestic issue of working class representation, 
the Labour Party, especially its leaders at the parliamentary level, had a long history 
of involvement in imperial affairs. Although the Conservative Party has traditionally 
been characterised as the party of empire, Labour leaders throughout the twentieth 
century have played a key role in shaping the British Empire in terms of both policy 
and ideology.60 This chapter will provide a historical background to the Wilson 
government by examining how senior Labour figures have approached the issues of 
race and empire across the twentieth century. The chapter will focus on key thinkers 
at the high political level such as Keir Hardie, Ramsay MacDonald, Clement Attlee 
and Arthur Creech Jones. 
The chapter will argue that while these senior Labour figures were seldom 
overtly racist in their approach towards imperial affairs, they nevertheless drew on a 
long-standing liberal approach to empire that justified the subjugation of non-white 
peoples.61 The characterisation of empire as a ‘civilising mission’, which was popular 
with nineteenth century liberal thinkers, informed the early Labour leadership’s 
outlook towards imperial affairs. Rather than advocate the dismantlement of empire, 
leaders such as Hardie and MacDonald believed that imperial rule could be reformed 
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for nobler ends. These Labour figures were influenced by a prevailing civilisational 
discourse which asserted that advanced nations such as Britain had a responsibility 
to help develop the more ‘backward’ regions of the world. However, the concept of 
race played a central role in this discursive framework. As these so-called backward 
regions were mostly populated by non-white peoples they formed part of a racialised 
hierarchy, which determined the extent to which the colonies could advance towards 
self-rule. This was reflected in the alternative approach adopted towards the white 
settler colonies of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, which, in 
contrast to the non-settler colonies, enjoyed a privileged position in the empire as 
Dominions with a large degree of self-government.62 
This notion of a civilising mission still influenced Labour leaders even as the 
non-settler empire began to break up after the Second World War. Although Clement 
Attlee’s post-war Labour government granted independence to India, Pakistan, 
Ceylon and Burma, the remaining colonies, particularly in Africa, were still perceived 
by senior Labour figures as uncivilised and in need of continued imperial rule. In 
Africa, the Attlee government increased the scale of the British imperial presence 
with the arrival of hundreds of new colonial administrators, the so-called ‘Second 
Colonial Occupation’.63 Moreover, the concept of colonial development, which rose to 
prominence during Arthur Creech Jones’ tenure as Secretary of State for the 
Colonies from 1946 to 1950, was in large part an extension of this civilisational 
tradition. Despite its apparently benign motives, the idea of colonial development 
was laden with racist stereotypes of non-white peoples as tribal and politically 
immature.  
Significantly for this thesis, this fire of a civilising mission continued to burn in 
senior Labour circles even after the empire was largely dismantled in the 1960s. 
Although most of Britain’s remaining colonies had achieved their independence by 
1964, key figures in the Wilson government such as Arthur Bottomley, Barbara 
Castle, Patrick Gordon Walker and Wilson himself still believed that Britain had a 
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special role to play with regards to its former colonies. This was evident in the Wilson 
government’s commitment to the Commonwealth and the creation in 1964 of the 
Ministry of Overseas Development. These policies, though based on good intentions, 
were imbued with an enduring notion of Britain as a paternal, benevolent force 
responsible to its former non-white colonial subjects. The chapter will argue that 
these policies were a legacy of the approach to race and empire adopted by Labour 
leaders earlier in the twentieth century. Before outlining this historical background, 
this chapter will offer a brief survey of the crucial but complex relationship between 
imperialism and racism.     
Imperialism and Racism: Broader Perspectives 
The relationship between imperialism—the policy of extending power, 
especially by direct territorial acquisition—and racism—the ideology that humans are 
divided into separate biological entities called races, and that some races are 
superior to others—has been addressed by scholars in several fields, including 
historical research.64 The ideology of racism is often but not exclusively associated 
with European imperial powers such as Britain, which drew on the notion of white 
racial superiority to rationalise the continued subjugation of non-white peoples in the 
post-Enlightenment age. Many historians in recent years have argued that the 
ideologies of racism and imperialism were interlinked.65 The New Imperial History 
literature has claimed that the construction of racial differences was a vital aspect of 
the British imperial experience both in the metropole and periphery.66 Catherine Hall 
has argued that while the marking of difference across the empire was never only 
about race, ‘it was nevertheless critical to imperial power because empires were 
constituted of diverse peoples, living in varied sites, some of whom ruled others’.67 
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Anne Stoler has defined race as ‘a foundational colonial sorting technique’.68 Some 
historians have argued that imperial racism endured long after the formal end of 
empire and that the prejudice experienced by non-white immigrants to Britain in the 
1950s and 1960s was primarily a legacy of empire.69  
The relationship between imperialism and racism is also a central theme in 
postcolonial literature. Although postcolonialism as an academic sub-discipline has 
tackled a range of issues, one persistent tenet is the idea that colonialism was not 
just a political phenomenon but an ideological formation.70 Postcolonial scholars 
have argued that alongside the typical methods used to control people, namely 
military force and direct political rule, imperial powers also repressed subjects 
through an array of cultural devices such as literature, advertising and education. 
These cultural devices helped construct binaries between the coloniser and 
colonised such as civilised/savage and black/white, which affirmed the supposed 
inferiority of non-white peoples. This form of control was addressed in Edward Said’s 
seminal Orientalism, which examined how European literary representations of the 
Orient helped shape the myth of white racial superiority. Said defined Orientalism as 
‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’.71 
He claimed that such literature formed a depiction of Oriental peoples as ‘under-
humanised, antidemocratic, backward and barbaric’.72 Abdul R. JanMohamed has 
also stressed the importance of literature as a method of cultural control and an 
effective instrument in fixing non-white peoples under the designation of the ‘other’.73 
According to JanMohamed, ‘the dominant model of power in all colonial societies is 
the Manichean opposition between the putative superiority of the European and the 
supposed inferiority of the native’.74  
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However, this association between imperialism and racism has been 
questioned by some scholars. Porter, the most vocal critic of the New Imperial 
History, has claimed that ‘imperialism has furnished a convenient scapegoat in 
recent years to explain social phenomena such as racism’.75 According to Porter, 
‘British racial attitudes are so often attributed to or connected with imperialism as to 
almost identify them together in some people’s minds’.76 Andrew Thompson has also 
questioned whether too much emphasis has been placed on empire as a causal 
explanation for racism. Thompson has claimed that there has been ‘a recent fashion 
for scapegoating the empire for much of what we dislike about ourselves’, including 
racism.77 Thompson noted numerous examples throughout British history of racism in 
which ‘colonial mentalities’ supposedly played a minor role, such as the prejudice 
faced by Jewish and Irish immigrants in Britain.78   
Some scholars have pointed out examples when imperialism and racism were 
in conflict. In Racism in the Modern World, Berg and Wendt argued that racism could 
sometimes act as a barrier against imperialism, most notably in the United States, 
where the ‘guardians of white supremacy were opposed to incorporating additional 
non-whites into the body politic’.79 Conversely, although priding itself on its 
egalitarian and anti-imperial roots, the new nation sanctioned slavery until the Civil 
War, and arguably ‘condoned racist violence, segregation, and disfranchisement’ in 
ways that at least matched the European colonial powers.80 Gerald Horne has 
claimed, provocatively, that the American revolt against British rule in 1776, ‘though 
festooned in the ﬁnery of freedom’, was ‘basically a revolt by racist settlers, who 
were motivated in no small part by the fact that abolitionism was growing in 
London’.81 While the American Revolution has traditionally been portrayed as a fight 
for liberty, Horne instead characterised it as a ‘counter-revolution fought by the 
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founding fathers to preserve their liberty to enslave others’.82 He even compares the 
American Revolution to the Rhodesian rebellion against British rule in 1965, arguing 
that ‘just as Ian Smith and his comrades sought to escape the logic of 
decolonisation, the American rebels sought to escape the logic of abolitionism’.83 
Although Horne’s argument is by no means the orthodox view, it nevertheless adds a 
vital American component to the issue of racism. Clearly, it was not just within 
European empires that the ideology of race featured.   
Linda Colley has asked if race and empire were so intrinsically linked, ‘why 
was it Germany, which invested in overseas empire much later and to a lesser extent 
than Britain, which exhibited in the twentieth century a greater volume of explicitly 
racial politics’.84 For Colley, while the concept of race may have helped justify empire, 
it does not on its own supply a comprehensive explanation for the scale of British 
imperial power. As Colley puts it, ‘the British were not witchdoctors who could use 
racist ideas magically to summon up global dominion’.85 Colley therefore suggests a 
broader array of factors that explain why Britain was able to exert control over non-
white peoples such as materialism and local collaboration.86 Certainly, it is important 
not to overstate racism as an aspect of imperial control to such an extent that we 
eschew other factors. Also, it is arguable that racism played as much, if not more, of 
a pernicious role in countries with less extensive imperial backgrounds, such as 
Germany, as the horror of the Holocaust testifies. 
Still, as recent scholars have argued, even Nazi racism can be linked to 
Germany’s supposedly limited imperial experience. Many historians have stressed 
continuities between the Holocaust against European Jews during the Second World 
War and earlier genocidal practices in the colonies, most notably against the Herero 
people in German South-West Africa.87 Recent research has also suggested that 
racist practices exhibited outside the German Empire, particularly in the Americas, 
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influenced the development of racist ideologies in Germany. Claudia Bruns has used 
the life of Wilhelm Marr, a German intellectual and ‘founding father’ of German anti-
Semitism, as an example of how racism against non-white peoples in America 
impacted on German racial thinking.88 As a young man, Marr was a radical 
Democrat. However, after the failure of the Revolutions of 1848, he moved to the 
New World and spent over a decade in the US. According to Bruns, Marr’s turn to 
anti-Semitism after his return to Germany was greatly influenced by his experience in 
America.89 This example highlights the importance of a transnational perspective 
when analysing the relationship between race and empire.90  
There is also a danger when examining the link between imperialism and 
racism to see race as a purely Western construct imposed by the European powers 
and the United States onto the rest of the world. Although the Western powers have 
undoubtedly been the chief instigators of racial ideologies in the modern period, it is 
important to recognise that racism also featured in non-Western cultures. As Berg 
and Wendt argue, ‘the notion that the West simply imposed racism on the rest of the 
world may well reflect a Eurocentric interpretation of a Eurocentric ideology’.91 Berg 
and Wendt look to challenge this dominant paradigm by offering a broader history of 
racism that incorporates non-Western cultures. One contributor to the Berg and 
Wendt volume, Frank Dikötter, has cited research on Native American cultures, 
which suggests that skin colour as a racial marker was not simply a European import 
but fitted in with pre-existing traditions.92 In ‘How Indians got to be Red’, Nancy 
Shoemaker has questioned the view that Europeans alone defined Native Americans 
as ‘red’. According to Shoemaker, Native Americans, particularly in the Southeast, 
called themselves ‘red’ well before the arrival of Europeans and it was ‘Native colour 
symbolism rather than European terminology’ that primarily determined its usage.93    
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While the relationship between race and empire is certainly more complex 
than some scholars have assumed, this should not diminish the important role that 
imperialism played in the conceptualisation of race in both the European metropole 
and colonial periphery. Although Britain largely avoided the extreme forms of racism 
typified by the Nazi regime, the concept of race still figured prominently, albeit in a 
different form. The notion of a ‘civilising mission’, for example, which was popular 
with liberal philosophers in the nineteenth century, had a significant impact on British 
racial thought. Crucially, this civilisational doctrine influenced the way senior Labour 
figures approached imperial affairs throughout the twentieth century. Labour leaders 
regularly drew on this liberal view of empire as a necessary step in the advancement 
of the non-white peoples to the supposed ideal of Western civilisation. Before 
examining this liberal tradition, this chapter will briefly explore the empire’s 
relationship with ‘scientific’ racism in the late nineteenth century, arguably the 
moment when imperialism and racism were most closely linked. 
‘Scientific’ Racism and Empire 
In the late nineteenth century, the idea of race as a biological construct 
enjoyed popular support from the scientific community across Europe, including in 
Britain. Charles Darwin’s ground-breaking theory of evolution, though concerned 
exclusively with plant and animal life, was influential in the development of what was 
termed ‘scientific racism’.94 Scientists such as Francis Galton, one of the principal 
founders of the eugenics movement, claimed that if living organisms could evolve 
over time according to natural laws then so could humans. In Hereditary Genius 
(1869), Galton argued that, as in animals, desirable human traits were hereditary.95 
Even Darwin, who probably would not have approved of the later misappropriation of 
his theory by Social Darwinists, occasionally applied his theory to humanity.96 In The 
Descent of Man (1871), Darwin predicted that in the not too distant future, ‘the 
civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage 
races throughout the world’.97 By giving scientific legitimacy to racist notions of white 
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supremacy, scientific racism helped establish race as an almost universally accepted 
concept. As Jane Samson put it, ‘the need to accept the inevitable extinction of 
inferior races was proclaimed to be self-evident and “common sense”’.98 Catherine 
Hall and Sonya Rose argued that the idea of white supremacy became so 
widespread in the late nineteenth century that it was almost ‘taken for granted’, and 
that the growing authority of scientific racism was critical to this process.99 According 
to Hall and Rose, ‘racism and the “scientific” authority behind the notion of 
biologically based difference were co-constitutive’.100    
Although scientific racism was used to justify a number of different imperial 
projects, many scholars have cited the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth 
century as a prime example of the symbiotic relationship between race and empire. 
Paul Rich has argued that scientific racism ‘enhanced the claims of racial superiority 
over black and brown races in the critical period of the 1860s before the last phase 
of imperial expansion into Africa’.101 Samson has claimed that the European 
colonisation of Africa ‘arose in conjunction with an increasingly biological emphasis 
in racism’.102 Before the 1880s, only a small portion of the African continent was 
under European imperial control. However, within twenty years, almost all of Africa 
had been colonised, with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia.103 This ‘scramble’ 
marked the most intense period of empire-building since the European colonisation 
of the Americas. Although Britain was just one of several imperial powers involved, it 
emerged with the most significant gains, with new colonies in West, East, Central 
and Southern Africa.104 The extent of the British involvement in this process was 
symbolised by Cecil Rhodes’ iconic vision of an empire that stretched from the Cape 
to Cairo.105  
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While scientific racism undoubtedly played a part in the scramble for Africa, 
there are a broad array of factors that also help to explain this phenomenon. Jane 
Burbank and Frederick Cooper argue that ‘the explanation for this “scramble” can be 
found in the competitive world of empires’.106 The 1870s saw the emergence of 
Germany as a new imperial power that rivalled the traditional powers of France and 
Britain. As the old frontiers of expansion—namely the Americas, Australasia and 
Asia—were closed off, Africa remained the last continent left to be colonised. 
Burbank and Cooper claimed that each imperial power ‘sought to prevent the other’s 
monopoly over a shrinking pool of global resources’.107 Alongside these imperial 
rivalries, the late nineteenth century saw the development of new technologies that 
made the idea of colonising Africa more feasible.108 The advent of steam technology 
provided Europeans with access to previously inaccessible regions. Henry Morton 
Stanley’s exploration up the Congo River, for example, was instrumental in securing 
King Leopold II of Belgium’s control over Congo.109 Also, the development of new 
weapons such as the Maxim machine gun gave the European powers a significant 
advantage whenever they encountered African resistance.110  
Charles Maier has argued that the ‘scramble for Africa’ was just one part of a 
broader historical process that took shape from around the 1860s.111 Maier defines 
this as the period of ‘territoriality’, ‘where the control of bordered political space 
created the framework for national and often ethnic identity’.112 During this period, 
national societies were created in the United States, Germany, Italy, Canada, Mexico 
and elsewhere. At the same time, technological innovations such as the telegraph, 
steamboats and the railways meant that more areas were opened to economic 
exploitation. According to Maier, these developments were tied together by ‘an 
enhanced concept of territory’.113 Hence, it could be argued that it was this concept of 
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‘territoriality’ rather than scientific racism that provided the main context for 
understanding Britain’s late imperial conquests, particularly in Africa.  
In any case, the British Empire’s association with scientific racism was short-
lived as biological theories of race came under attack in the early twentieth century, 
most notably from within anthropology. This phenomenon is traced in Elazar 
Barkan’s The Retreat of Scientific Racism.114 One of the most notable critics was 
Franz Boas, a pioneer of modern anthropology. In The Mind of Primitive Man (1911), 
Boas argued that it was cultural differences rather than biological characteristics that 
primarily determined human behaviour.115 Boas argued that so-called primitive 
societies had just as much history as civilised ones and the idea that Europeans 
were more advanced was ethnocentric. Scientific racism was also challenged by 
early anti-colonial activists. In Colour and Democracy, W.E.B. Du Bois, a sociologist 
and Pan-African activist, claimed that recent anthropological research was beginning 
to disprove the idea that ‘colonies are filled with peoples who were never abreast 
with civilisation and never can be’.116 Du Bois cited research which suggested that 
non-white colonies were, historically, ‘seats of ancient cultures where human 
civilisation began’, thus undermining the myth of white racial superiority.117 This 
challenge to scientific racism was manifested on a global scale at the inaugural Pan-
African Conference chaired by Du Bois in 1900. The Conference brought together 
activists from Africa, Europe, the United States and the West Indies to discuss 
issues such as racism and imperialism.118   
However, this intellectual refutation of scientific racism did not mean the end 
of white imperial rule over non-white peoples, far from it. In response to questions 
regarding the legitimacy of race in the early twentieth century, British statesmen, 
including senior Labour figures, drew on a civilisational doctrine that endorsed 
empire as a means of securing the development of backward cultures towards the 
apparent ideal of Western civilisation, the so-called ‘civilising mission’. Although 
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superficially colour-blind, this doctrine was heavily imbued with racist stereotypes 
regarding non-white cultures and ethnocentric assumptions regarding the supposed 
supremacy of Western culture. Significantly, this idea of a civilising mission was 
endorsed by many of Britain’s most renowned liberal thinkers, who provided an 
ideological framework for the Labour elite’s later approach towards imperial affairs.  
Liberalism and Empire  
 One intriguing aspect of many of Britain’s most famous liberal thinkers that is 
now gaining more scholarly attention is their extensive involvement in imperial affairs 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. British liberal thinkers such as John 
Locke and John Stuart Mill, who helped establish the principles of individual liberty, 
natural rights and equality also endorsed an empire that exercised authoritarian 
control over colonial subjects.119 John Locke, an influential thinker whose ideas 
concerning the natural rights of man outlined in his landmark Two Treatises of 
Government (1689) arguably laid the foundation of modern liberalism, played an 
active role in English colonial policy.120 In 1669, Locke wrote the Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina, which legalised the preservation of slavery in the American 
colony. The Constitution declared that ‘every freeman of Carolina shall have 
absolute power and authority over his negro slaves’.121 John Stuart Mill wrote 
numerous reports on imperial matters, particularly India, and worked at the East 
India Company for thirty-five years.122    
On the face of it, this liberal participation in empire might seem contradictory. 
After all, how could supporters of natural rights and ‘liberty’ endorse a structure that 
withheld these rights for certain subjects? However, as David Armitage and Miles 
Taylor have argued, liberalism and empire were far from incompatible. Taylor has 
claimed that ‘eighteenth century liberals had no difficulty in supporting the growth of 
an Atlantic empire based on British naval prowess, the settlement of freeborn 
Englishmen and the expansion of trade’.123 For him, the question of whether empire 
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was compatible with liberty only arose with the emergence in the mid-eighteenth 
century of a different kind of empire based on conquest in India and elsewhere.124 
Armitage has argued that the assumed character of this later empire—an empire 
distinct in its racial composition, and dependent upon, rather than formally equal 
with, Britain—rendered it incompatible with metropolitan norms of liberty.125  
However, this view has been challenged by some scholars. In Liberalism and 
Empire, Uday Singh Mehta argues that ‘imperialism, far from contradicting liberal 
tenets, in part stemmed from liberal assumptions about reason and historical 
progress’.126 According to Mehta, ‘the epistemological commitments of liberalism to 
rationality and progress constantly trumped its commitments to democracy, 
consensual government and limitations on the power of the state’.127 British liberal 
thinkers drew upon a stadial theory of human history, which asserted that all human 
societies progressed through a series of stages and that some societies were at a 
more advanced stage than others.128 Crucially, this notion of universal human 
progress was divided along racial lines, with European civilisation at the most 
advanced stage and the non-white peoples of Asia and Africa at a more primitive 
stage. Liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill frequently drew on this concept to 
justify imperial rule. Mill argued that the so-called backward peoples ‘have not got 
beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be 
conquered and held in subjection by foreigners’.129 In the case of India, Mill described 
British rule as a ‘government of leading strings’ that would ‘gradually train the people 
to walk alone’.130 Thomas Babington Macaulay, a British historian and Whig 
politician, characterised the empire in India as ‘like a father who must be just and 
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unjust, moderate and rapacious’.131 These quotes typified the paternal approach that 
British liberal thinkers adopted towards non-white colonial subjects.    
Peter Mandler has stressed the importance of what he has termed the 
‘civilisational perspective’ in underpinning this liberal approach to empire. Mandler 
claims that it was the idea of ‘civilisation’—namely, the British or European standard 
to which other peoples were supposed to work towards—rather than a belief in the 
biological superiority of the white race that provided the main intellectual justification 
for empire during this period. According to Mandler, the vitality of this belief in 
civilisation as a universal human potential ‘inhibited the development of biological 
racism in Britain’.132 He thus challenges the view put forward by historians such as 
Hall that imperial crises in India, Jamaica and elsewhere had a ‘racialising’ impact on 
British political thought in the mid-nineteenth century. For Hall, the violence 
demonstrated during the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Governor Eyre controversy in 
Jamaica in the late 1860s revealed ‘a more aggressive biological racism’ that 
‘encoded an Englishness which celebrated hierarchy and difference’.133 Mandler 
counters that ‘it was perfectly possible, and common, to argue that Negroes or 
Indians were simply so primitive that they required paternal repression now to make 
future doses of civilisation possible’.134 As Mandler puts it, ‘the ladder of civilisation, 
rather than the branching tree of peoples and nations, remained the dominant 
metaphor’.135         
In his recent book The Liberal Defence of Murder, Richard Seymour outlines a 
long history of liberal justifications for empire based on the notions of civilisation and 
progress. He argues that although liberal philosophers such as John Stuart Mill were 
not biological racists, they still ‘partook of a cultural supremacism and a self-
congratulatory civilisational discourse that authorised colonial domination’.136 
Although this liberal approach to empire rejected race as a scientific phenomenon, 
the racist assumptions at its heart were often quite explicit. This was epitomised by 
Rudyard Kipling, the Anglo-Indian writer, who argued in his famous 1899 poem, The 
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White Man's Burden, that it was the duty of the white man to bring civilisation to non-
white peoples through benign imperialism.137 This notion of a ‘white man's burden’ 
thus provided a liberal rationale for what was a fundamentally illiberal enterprise. 
This was particularly evident during the European colonisation of Africa in the late 
nineteenth century. As Burbank and Cooper argue, ‘representations of Africa as a 
place of slave trading and tyranny, overcame much of the reluctance of European 
publics to get involved in what could seem too vicious an enterprise for 
democracies’.138 The extent to which this civilising mission drew on racial stereotypes 
was further evidenced by the contrasting approach adopted towards Britain’s white 
settler colonies.      
‘White Man’s Countries’: The Settler Empire  
Despite the existence of sizable non-white native populations—in the case of 
South Africa, a substantial non-white native majority— the British settler colonies of 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa were often characterised by their 
leaders and by British statesmen as ‘white man’s countries’.139 In contrast to the non-
settler colonies, these countries enjoyed a privileged position in the empire as 
Dominions with a large degree of self-government. These Dominions all 
implemented, to varying degrees, policies of racial discrimination. In Australia and 
Canada, the aboriginal population was separated from the settler community through 
the creation of native reserves. In some cases, mixed-race children were forcibly 
removed from these reserves and ‘assimilated’ into the white population.140 In South 
Africa, all of the provinces except for the Cape employed a racist franchise that 
excluded non-white voters.141 Though New Zealand had a more inclusive system that 
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reserved parliamentary seats for the Maori population, the white settlers still enjoyed 
a dominant political, social, cultural and economic role in the country.142  
These policies coincided with a period from the end of the nineteenth century 
when the idea of ‘whiteness’ as a form of racial identity was popular with statesmen 
in the Dominions.143 This phenomenon is traced in Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds’ 
Drawing the Global Colour Line. Lake and Reynolds argue that the racial policies of 
Australasia, British Columbia, South Africa and California were interconnected parts 
of this transnational spread of whiteness.144 They cite, for example, the literacy test, 
which was first used to disenfranchise black voters in Mississippi in 1890 and later 
served as a model for Natal, British Columbia and other white settlements.145 In 
Replenishing the Earth, James Belich unearths a ‘Settler Revolution’ that took shape 
from the early nineteenth century, which included the explosive settlement of the 
American West and its forgotten twin, the British West. Belich argued that ‘one 
consistent marker of this Anglo newland under recolonisation was a racially 
exclusive immigration policy’.146 From the 1880s onwards, the British Dominions set 
up and maintained ‘great white walls’ through their immigration policies.147 This was 
most evident in Australia, which from its inception in 1901, actively sought to 
maintain an exclusively white identity.148 Two of the first acts of the first Australian 
government were the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1901, which expelled 
thousands of Pacific Islanders who had worked in Queensland’s sugar cane fields, 
and the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which limited the settlement of non-
white peoples. Alfred Deakin, the Attorney General, described these measures as a 
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‘necessary complement of a single policy–-the policy of securing a “white 
Australia’’’.149     
Crucially, this ‘white Australia’ policy was influenced by the civilisational 
doctrine advanced by liberal thinkers in the nineteenth century. In American 
Commonwealth (1888), James Bryce, a British politician and writer, warned that the 
increased contact between the civilised and backward races made possible by new 
transport technologies ‘marked a crisis in the history of the world’.150 Although Bryce 
focused primarily on the United States and the legacies of post-civil war 
reconstruction, his ideas informed early Australian statesmen. According to Lake and 
Reynolds, Australian leaders adopted American Commonwealth as their ‘bible’.151 In 
reference to Bryce’s book, Deakin declared that Australia ‘should not be false to the 
never-to-be-forgotten teachings from the experience of the United States’.152 In 
National Life and Character (1893), Charles Pearson, an Australian politician and 
writer, warned that ‘the day is not too far distant when the European observer will 
look around to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of black and yellow 
races’.153 According to Pearson, ‘we shall find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and 
perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile’.154 His 
book clearly influenced the Australian Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, who read a 
passage from National Life and Character during his speech in support of the 
Immigration Restriction Bill.155 
Alongside this notion of whiteness was the vision of a ‘British World’ that 
comprised Britain and the Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa. From the 1850s to the outbreak of the First World War, about 13.5 million 
people emigrated from Britain, the majority of whom settled in the old Dominions.156 
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Several scholars have argued that alongside the obvious ‘push’ of unemployment 
and poverty, these migrants were motivated by the idea of an expanded Britain. In 
The British World, Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich claim that ‘blinded by national 
historiographies, and mesmerised by the exotic colonial ‘other’, we have lost contact 
with what was always the heart of the imperial enterprise—the expansion of Britain 
and the peopling and building of a transoceanic British World’.157 This theme is also 
addressed in Robert Young’s The Idea of English Ethnicity, which looks at how 
‘Englishness’ developed a broader identity in the nineteenth century.158 Young 
argued that ‘Englishness was defined less as a set of internal cultural characteristics 
attached to a particular place, than as a transportable set of values which could be 
transplanted, translated and recreated anywhere on the globe’.159 
This concept of a British World was endorsed by British liberal writers such as 
Sir Charles Dilke, J. R. Green and Sir John Seeley.160 In Greater Britain (1868), Dilke 
declared that it was the destiny of the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ to conquer the so-called 
‘cheaper races’.161 In A Short History of the English People (1874), Green proclaimed 
that ‘England is only a small part of the outcome of English history. Its greater issues 
lie not within the narrow limits of the mother island, but in the destinies of nations yet 
to be’.162 According to Green, ‘her settlers were to dispute Africa with the Kaffir, to 
wrest New Zealand from the Maori and to sow on the shores of Australia the seeds 
of great nations’.163 This vision of a British World was reinforced by the technological 
advancements that took place during this period. The advent of steam travel and the 
telegraph, in particular, helped establish tangible networks between Britain and the 
settler colonies that made the idea of an expanded Britain more viable.164 As Seeley 
argued in The Expansion of England, ‘in the last century, there could be no Greater 
Britain in the true sense of the word, because of the distance between the mother 
country and its colonies…This impediment exists no longer as science has given to 
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the political organism a new circulation, which is steam, and a new nervous system, 
which is electricity’.165 
This idea of a British World arguably influenced the racial policies of the 
Dominion countries. Belich claimed that the Dominions ‘cherished their racialist 
immigration barriers because they believed it kept them British, not just white’.166 As 
he puts it, policies such as a white Australia ‘underwrote a sense of kinship with old 
Britain, creating a further web of crimson threads to hold the Greater British system 
together’.167 As late as 1948, Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, 
proclaimed that ‘the boundaries of Great Britain are not on the Kentish coast but at 
Cape York and Invercargill’.168 Crucially, by affirming their white British identity, these 
settler colonies effectively put themselves on a separate path to the rest of the 
empire. While these ‘white man’s countries’ enjoyed a relatively serene pathway 
from colony to dominion to independent nation, the non-settler colonies found their 
progress thwarted. As Taylor has argued, a sharp distinction was made between ‘a 
white liberal empire composed of self-governing settlement colonies and a non-
European territorial empire, precariously dependent on the rule of imperial 
authority’.169 This racialised separation of the Empire thus provided the dominant 
ideological paradigm into which the Labour Party emerged at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  
The Labour Party and Empire in the Early Twentieth Century 
 The Labour Party and, more broadly, the British labour movement’s role in 
imperial affairs has been relatively underexamined by historians. Gupta’s Imperialism 
and the British Labour Movement and Billy Frank, Craig Horner and David Stewart’s 
The British Labour Movement and Imperialism present the only general surveys of 
the British labour movement’s relationship with empire.170 Although Howe’s 
Anticolonialism in British Politics examines the attitudes of some Labour figures 
towards colonial issues, its analysis is restricted to critics of empire from inside and 
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outside the party, thus eschewing the significant pro-imperial sympathies, particularly 
among senior parliamentary figures.171 While Rhiannon Vickers’ The Labour Party 
and the World and John Callaghan’s The Labour Party and Foreign Policy provide 
extensive reviews of Labour’s approach towards the wider world, imperialism only 
forms one of many themes within these studies.172 Vickers has argued that ‘the 
dearth of material on Labour’s foreign policy has contributed to the ‘myth’ that the 
Labour Party was not much interested in international affairs’.173 Nye Bevan, Labour’s 
Minister of Health (1945-1951), alluded to this problem in a speech in 1958. Bevan 
claimed that when he first entered Parliament in 1929 there was ‘a myth which was 
prevalent that there were two subjects on which Labour MPs were completely 
ignorant: foreign affairs and how to make war’.174 According to Bevan, it was always 
understood that those subjects ‘were the special prerogatives of the Tories’ and ‘that 
attitude still had not changed very much’ even though the post-war years 
represented an active period for Labour in terms of foreign policy and empire.175  
An analysis of Labour’s imperial policy is also complicated by the complex 
structure of the party, with different groups representing different interests and 
priorities. From its inception in the 1900s, the Labour Party was a broad coalition of 
trade unionists and socialist societies such as the Independent Labour Party. These 
groups produced ideas about imperial affairs that were often contradictory. 
According to Vickers, the trade unionists tended to have a more ‘materialistic’ 
viewpoint in that they were aware of the importance of empire in protecting British 
jobs and providing Britain’s export-based economy with access to overseas 
markets.176 The Independent Labour Party members, in contrast, favoured 
international working class solidarity and were often critical of empire. Gupta claims 
there was ‘a latent tension between the pragmatic trade union MPs and the more 
ideologically orientated MPs coming from an Independent Labour Party 
background’.177 According to Gupta, critics of empire within the Labour Party 
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‘struggled with the interest of trade unions in Britain’s export-based staple 
industries’.178   
However, the notion that trade unionists were more supportive of empire has 
been questioned by some scholars. Nicholas Owen is critical of what he has termed 
the ‘social imperialist’ explanation for the absence of anti‐imperialism in the Labour 
Party—namely, the idea that Labour was committed to an empire that delivered 
economic benefits to the British working class.179 He argues that this view was ‘based 
on the assumption that the economic benefits of empire were clearly understood’.180 
According to Owen, these economic benefits were, in fact, contested and hard to 
predict. Owen cites George Orwell, the English writer, who wrote in 1946: ‘I know of 
people who can prove to me that we should be just as well off, or perhaps better, if 
all our colonial possessions were lost to us; and I know others who can prove that if 
we had no colonies to exploit our standard of living would slump catastrophically’.181 
Although Owen possibly underplays the importance of material interests, he 
nevertheless highlights the complex nature of the Labour Party’s approach to 
imperial affairs. Clearly, it is too simplistic to say that the British labour movement 
supported imperialism purely out of economic self-interest.  
Alongside material factors, ideology also played a key role in Labour’s 
approach to empire. Vickers argued that while Labour’s foreign policy was often 
confused, ‘with different progenitors bringing their own particular influence over 
policy’, there were still ‘certain meta-principles of Labour’s ideology’ that were 
fundamental.182 For Vickers, ‘these were a belief in teleological progress and change, 
influenced by the Enlightenment tradition’.183 The concept of the civilising mission, in 
particular, influenced the way Labour leaders addressed imperial affairs. Callaghan 
has claimed that nineteenth century liberalism ‘supplied early Labour leaders with 
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ideas about the government of empire’.184 For Callaghan, the Labour Party was ‘the 
legatee of that progressive element’, which supported empire as a means of 
‘civilising’ the backward races.185 Seymour similarly claimed that ‘socialists, like their 
liberal antecedents, drew upon Enlightenment ideals of progress, social engineering 
and humanitarianism to legitimise, rather than criticise, empire’.186 
Seymour argued that ‘the heirs of liberal imperialism can be found in the 
Fabian Society’, a socialist organisation tied to the Labour Party that advocated 
reform through gradual means.187 The influence of the Fabian Society on Labour’s 
imperial policy was reflected in the earliest Labour Party statement on empire, 
Fabianism and the Empire, a pamphlet written in 1900 by George Bernard Shaw, a 
leading Fabian member. The pamphlet justified empire on the grounds that states 
with a ‘higher’ civilisation had a right to take over primitive states.188 The impact of the 
liberal tradition on Labour thought was alluded to by Rita Hinden, co-founder of the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau, a department of the Fabian Society formed in 1940 to 
facilitate research on colonial policy. Hinden cited a humanitarian tradition ‘of ancient 
lineage’, which typified the reactions of British socialists to empire.189 She claimed 
that humanitarian ideas regarding the treatment of ‘helpless black, brown and yellow 
men overseas’ were originally voiced by liberal philosophers such as Jeremy 
Bentham and were quickly taken up by socialists in the twentieth century.190 This 
liberal tradition in part explains why Labour leaders advocated the reformation rather 
than the dismantlement of empire. As Hinden put it, ‘they saw their duty not to 
escape from imperial responsibility, but to reform the empire to nobler ends’.191    
The liberal tradition was evident during Labour’s first foray into government in 
1924. Although the Labour Party failed to win most seats at the General Election of 
December 1923, it was able to form a minority government with unofficial support 
from the Liberal Party. Upon assuming office, James Thomas, the Colonial 
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Secretary, told his new staff that ‘I’ve been sent here to see that there’s no mucking 
about with the British Empire’.192 In a message for Empire Day later that year, he 
declared, ‘I know there are many people who assume that Labour Party leaders are 
against the development of Empire. It is because I am a Labour man that I believe 
with all my heart in that great brotherhood of free and democratic people which is 
building the British Empire’.193 Ramsay MacDonald, Labour’s first Prime Minister, 
supported the preservation of empire but believed that it should be reformed. He 
called for an ‘imperial standard’ based on ‘qualities of justice, honour and 
administration to which all parts of the Empire should conform’.194   
Despite this rhetoric, the MacDonald governments of 1924 and 1929-1931 
achieved little in terms of imperial reform. According to Howe, MacDonald’s idea of 
an ‘imperial standard’ set the tone for the Labour Party— ‘moral indignation at 
exploitation in the colonies, but with very little attempt to propose strategies for their 
removal’.195 The fact that both governments enjoyed only brief spells in power as 
minority administrations undermined any attempts at reform. Moreover, the desire to 
appear to be a responsible party of government dampened any radical plans. As 
Callaghan put it, ‘the Labour Party entered a world in which the British public had 
grown accustomed to the right of Britain to intervene in the affairs of backward 
peoples’.196 As a result, ‘Labour’s credentials as a credible prospect for government 
were thought to depend on a responsible approach to foreign policy’.197 Howe 
claimed that an approach to empire that ‘validated Labour’s claims to be a 
responsible party of government became paramount, to the detriment if not the 
exclusion of plans for colonial reform’.198   
MacDonald’s ‘imperial standard’ fell especially short on the issue of race. As 
Gupta has argued, ‘given the sovereign rights of the Dominions, an “imperial 
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standard” on race relations was doomed to failure’.199 In the case of South Africa, the 
MacDonald government failed to revoke a racist franchise that excluded non-white 
voters. In Southern Rhodesia, where Britain held a veto over any constitutional 
change, the MacDonald government failed to revoke the Land Apportionment Act of 
1930, which segregated land rights unfairly in favour of the white settlers. Gupta 
noted that the Labour Party’s Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions gave no 
thought to this problem and the only group in Britain to register protest was the Anti-
Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society.200 According to Gupta, senior Labour 
figures such as Sidney Webb, the Secretary of State for the Dominions, ‘could not 
shake off a hierarchical view of the human races’.201        
The Labour Party and India 
However, one major imperial issue where the Labour Party could claim a 
distinctive voice was India. From the early twentieth century to the granting of 
independence in 1947, senior Labour figures took a keen interest in Indian affairs 
and played a supporting role in advancing the cause of Indian nationalism.202 Tony 
Benn, a key figure in the Labour left, claimed that the general move towards 
independence was ‘made possible because of the links that the British labour 
movement and socialists had established with colonial liberation movements’.203 
Labour’s earliest leaders, Keir Hardie and MacDonald, both visited India and wrote 
accounts of their findings. In 1909, Hardie published India: Impressions and 
Suggestions and in 1910 MacDonald published The Awakening of India. Both 
accounts made sympathetic remarks concerning the prospect of Indian self-rule.204 
According to Vickers, both publications were ‘widely read and raised awareness of 
the less positive aspects of British rule in India’.205 Kenneth Morgan has argued that 
these publications ‘began the process of giving Labour a viable imperial policy, one 
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which bore fruit in 1947’.206 At the Labour Party’s Annual Conference of 1949, Jim 
Griffiths, the Labour Party Chairman, described the post-war Attlee government’s 
decision to grant India its independence as ‘the greatest of its many contributions to 
world progress’.207          
Nevertheless, even in India where the Labour leadership could claim success, 
its policy was still imbued with ethnocentric assumptions regarding the ability of non-
white peoples to advance towards self-rule. In India: Impressions and Suggestions, 
Hardie proclaimed that ‘the Indian people are of the same Aryan stock as ourselves. 
Remove their picturesque costumes, clothe them in coat and trousers and wash the 
sun out of their skins, and then a stranger would have difficulty in saying whether he 
was in Manchester or Madras’.208 He argued that this ‘fact’ had an important bearing 
on whether India could be trusted with self-government.209 In The British Left and 
India, Owen charts the Labour Party’s long struggle to form an alliance with the 
Indian nationalists. Owen argued that senior Labour figures only supported forms of 
anti-imperialism that fitted comfortably with their existing beliefs of how progressive 
movements should work. He claimed that India’s political leaders were judged solely 
by their capacity to ‘foster Western conceptions of progress’.210 According to Owen, 
even though the Indian Congress Party was founded fifteen years before the Labour 
Party, Labour figures still regarded it as a junior partner.211 
Consequently, as Congress under Gandhi’s leadership experimented with a 
more indigenous anti-imperialism that rejected the supposed supremacy of Western 
political forms, the Labour Party’s relationship with the Indian nationalists became 
strained. In 1929, Gandhi declared that while there was much he admired in British 
political institutions, he did not believe that they were ‘the paragon of perfection’.212 
Gandhi claimed that ‘whatever is worth adopting for India must come to her through 
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the process of assimilation, not forcible superimposition’.213 Labour’s relationship with 
Congress was further damaged by the Quit India Movement of 1942, a campaign of 
civil disobedience launched by Gandhi to hasten British withdrawal from India. In 
1943, Attlee claimed that the Quit India campaign revealed a ‘totalitarian outlook’ in 
the nationalist movement that was ‘foreign’ to Britain.214 He argued that unless the 
nationalists returned to the ‘older, more liberal tradition of the earlier Congress 
leaders’ then Britain should ‘stand firm’ on the Indian question.215  
Owen argued that even though the Attlee government honoured its 
commitment to end British rule, it would be ‘wishful thinking to pretend that 
independence amounted to anything less than a defeat for most of the Labour 
Party's pre‐war objectives’.216 For Owen, ‘Labour hopes of reforming Indian 
nationalism in a more socially and politically progressive direction were stillborn’.217 
Attlee himself acknowledged on the eve of independence that he was doubtful ‘if 
things will go awfully easily now as the Indian leaders know little of administration’.218 
This comment typified the lingering paternalism that lay at the heart of Labour’s 
approach to India. Senior Labour figures from Hardie to Attlee seemingly only 
accepted Indian self-rule if the nationalists moved towards a Western and, more 
specifically, British ‘standard’ of civilisation.219 This example thus signified the 
enduring influence of the civilising mission on Labour Party thinking. The clearest 
example of the persistence of this civilisational doctrine, though, was in the Labour 
elite’s approach to colonial development. 
Colonial Development Before 1945 
Although the idea of colonial development rose to prominence during the 
post-war period, its origins lay in the principle of trusteeship, which was popular with 
British statesmen in the 1920s. The principle of trusteeship was outlined by Frederick 
Lugard, a colonial administrator, in his 1922 book, The Dual Mandate in British 
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Tropical Africa.220 Lugard claimed that advanced imperial powers such as Britain had 
a duty to extract resources in Africa that supposedly ‘lay wasted and ungarnered’ by 
primitive peoples who did not possess the requisite knowledge to develop them.221 
As guardians of these resources, though, Britain also had a duty to help develop the 
indigenous peoples. Lugard thus characterised Britain as a trustee of its African 
possessions until the colonial peoples reached an accepted ‘standard’ of civilisation. 
He argued that this dual mandate should be administered through indirect rule, a 
system whereby external affairs were operated by the British and day-to-day 
governmental activities were left to local chieftains. According to Lugard, denying 
Africans a share in their own government would ‘forgo the high ideal of leading the 
backward races, by their own efforts, in their own way, to raise themselves to a 
higher plane of social organisation’.222 However, Lugard believed that only the more 
advanced peoples could be trusted with self-rule. As he put it, ‘the extent to which 
native races are capable of controlling their own affairs must vary in proportion to 
their degree of development and progress in social organisation’.223 
This notion of trusteeship was manifested in the League of Nations, an 
international organisation formed after the First World War to promote world peace 
and security. The Covenant of the League of Nations declared that ‘to those colonies 
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves, there should be applied 
the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred 
trust of civilisation’.224 This ‘sacred trust’ referred specifically to the German colonies 
and Ottoman provinces that fell into Allied hands at the end of the war. At the Paris 
Peace conference of 1919, it was decided that these territories would be governed 
by the imperial powers under a mandate from the League of Nations. However, as 
Susan Pedersen has argued in The Guardians, the mandate territories, in practice, 
‘were no better governed than colonies across the board’ and claims by non-white 
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populations under mandate rule for political rights ‘were often met with 
repression’.225 According to Pedersen, the mandate system ‘served largely to 
promulgate a paternalistic definition of trusteeship’.226 
In the mandate territories and the non-settler colonies, imperial powers such 
as Britain did little to help ‘develop’ the colonial peoples. Frederick Cooper has 
claimed that prior to 1940 the European colonial powers in Africa ‘rejected any 
development plans that would have required the significant use of metropolitan 
funding’.227 The limited investment that was provided tended to go towards 
infrastructure such as railways and roads, which benefited the economic exploitation 
of Africa’s natural resources.228 In How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter 
Rodney questioned whether the European imperial powers had ever contributed to 
the development of Africa. He claimed that ‘the vast majority of Africans went into 
colonialism with a hoe and came out with a hoe’.229 Burbank and Cooper argue that 
despite talk of a civilising mission, the imperial powers in Africa invested very little in 
services that would help develop the native population.230 As they put it, ‘while 
empires had never treated their subjects equally, the juxtaposition of racial divides 
with European rhetoric of democracy and progress was volatile’.231          
Significantly, it was a Labour government led by MacDonald that made the 
first steps in redressing this problem by introducing the Colonial Development Act of 
1929. The Act made provision for the funding of development projects in the 
colonies, albeit with a limited budget of just £1 million per annum.232 However, the 
measure was arguably aimed more at easing unemployment at home rather than 
improving conditions in the colonies. Sidney Webb acknowledged that the policy was 
‘connected with the lamentable condition of unemployment in this country and this is 
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an attempt to stimulate the British export trade’.233 This Act was followed by the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which increased the budget to £5 
million per annum and included provision for welfare services. Although the Act was 
introduced during the Conservative-led war ministry of the Second World War, it was 
a ‘National Labour’ Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, who brought the bill to 
parliament.234 In defending the new measure, MacDonald drew heavily on the notion 
of trusteeship. He argued that while development mostly concerned the growth of 
economic resources, it also covered ‘everything which ministers to the physical, 
mental or moral development of the colonial peoples to whom we are trustees’.235 
The effectiveness of the Act, though, was impaired by the obvious preoccupation of 
the Second World War. Hence, it was after the war when Labour’s colonial 
development programme really came to prominence.    
Colonial Development in the Post-War Period  
The link between race and empire was increasingly called into question after 
the war. The horrific racial policies implemented by the Nazi regime undermined the 
continued acceptability of racist attitudes. In The Idea of Race in Science, Nancy 
Stepan claimed that Nazi racism ‘virtually destroyed the credibility of race’.236 In 
1950, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) published a statement, signed by a number of leading scientists, which 
rejected any scientific basis to racism. The statement described race ‘not so much a 
biological phenomenon as a social myth’.237 This backlash against racism had 
implications for the future of empire. Burbank and Cooper argue that ‘the 
complacency with which governments before the war accepted “white man’s rule” 
was badly shaken by Hitler’s racist empire’.238  
Moreover, the contribution made by non-white colonial soldiers to the war 
effort helped convince British statesmen to put more effort into colonial 
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development.239 In Which People's War?, Sonya Rose challenges the idea that was 
prevalent in British popular culture at the time, and continues to inform post-war 
nostalgia, that the British were a united, standalone people fighting a people’s war.240 
Rose emphasises the differences of class and gender as well as the significance of 
British imperialism and racial difference. In terms of empire, she argues that the non-
white colonies were ‘thoroughly imbricated’ in Britain’s wartime national identity as 
they provided vital ‘military, industrial, and diplomatic support to Britain’ and 
strengthened Britain’s ‘self-image as a virtuous imperial power’.241 This contribution 
was referenced in the famous World War II ‘Together’ poster which showed soldiers 
from different parts of the Empire marching alongside the Union Jack.242 Creech 
Jones argued that since the colonial peoples had answered ‘the war cry of “freedom” 
and “democracy”’ and forewent ‘many of their immediate wants’ to help the war 
effort, ‘it would now be hypocritical and embarrassing for any British government to 
show indifference to colonial progress’.243  
This commitment to colonial progress was reflected in the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1945. The Act increased the budget to £120 million 
over ten years, thus allowing longer-term planning for development schemes. The 
Attlee government also established two new public corporations, the Colonial 
Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation, which were tasked 
with encouraging the development of colonial products for export.244 However, this 
policy was motivated as much by metropolitan demands as by concerns about 
colonial welfare. The production of colonial products for export was clearly 
advantageous to a British economy facing the strains of a post-war dollar gap and 
consumer product shortage. By increasing the supply of colonial products, Britain 
could access much-needed consumer imports and, at the same time, save dollars by 
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purchasing these products in sterling.245 This motive was alluded to by Ernest Bevin, 
the Foreign Secretary, who argued in 1948 that ‘if we only pushed on and developed 
Africa, we could have the US dependent on us and eating out of our hand in four or 
five years’.246     
This motive was evident in the infamous Tanganyika groundnuts scheme.247 In 
1946, Frank Samuel, the managing director of the United Africa Company, proposed 
that a vast area of Tanganyika, a British colony in East Africa, be used to cultivate 
groundnuts for the production of vegetable oil, which was in short supply in Britain. 
John Strachey, Labour’s Minister of Food, authorised £25 million to clear 150,000 
acres of scrubland for the scheme.248 However, the scheme faced many difficulties. 
The Overseas Food Corporation, which oversaw the project, struggled to provide 
adequate machinery to clear the scrubland and much of the land selected was 
unsuitable.249 In 1951, when it finally became clear that the project was not going to 
be profitable, the scheme was abandoned. This scheme has been characterised by 
some as a symbol of the failure of the post-war Labour government’s development 
policy in general. Michael Newman argued that the Conservative opposition ‘made 
vast political capital out of the affair’.250 According to Newman, the Conservatives 
treated the scheme as a lesson in the perils of ‘socialist waste and the supremacy of 
private enterprise’.251 Wilson claimed that ‘the groundnuts scheme, through its 
political and press misrepresentation, has become almost synonymous with colonial 
development in general, and its failure has been used by some as an excuse for 
advocating a reduction in colonial development plans’.252 
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the Tanganyika groundnuts 
scheme epitomised the conflicting motives at the heart of Labour’s post-war colonial 
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policy. Newman claimed that there was a lack of clarity regarding the original 
purpose of the project: ‘was it a development project which would help pave the way 
for independence, or was it primarily a commercial venture for the benefit of the 
British domestic economy’?253 According to Newman, ‘while Creech Jones saw it in 
the first sense, the Cabinet as a whole were only interested in the narrow British 
angle’.254 Gupta has argued that there was a latent conflict between the Overseas 
Food Corporation, ‘which thought chiefly of the British housewife’, and the Colonial 
Office, ‘whose concern was development and welfare’.255 The scheme also 
highlighted the enduring stereotype of Africa as a place untouched by civilisation and 
filled with immense resources that could be extracted for the benefit of all mankind. 
In 1951, Samuel complained that there was ‘a great deal of wishful thinking on the 
part of many writers who have since the war created an impression that Tropical 
Africa is an El Dorado of wealth sorely neglected in the past and capable of being 
developed rapidly on a grand scale’.256 
Fabianism and Development 
While domestic interests were undoubtedly vital, this should not diminish the 
ideological aspects of Labour’s post-war development policy. The Fabian doctrine of 
economic and social development as a prerequisite to political independence 
arguably underpinned this policy. Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton argue that 
Labour’s colonial development policy can be located in Fabian thinking.257 According 
to them, Fabianism helped formulate ‘a doctrine of development which met the 
claims of liberalism within the contours of a socialist version of trusteeship’.258 Paul 
Kelemen claimed that ‘Fabianism provided the ideological ballast for the post-war 
Labour government’s new institutional arrangement in Africa’.259 Significantly, it was a 
senior Fabian member, Creech Jones, who served as Colonial Secretary for most of 
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this period. In 1940, Creech Jones together with Rita Hinden established the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau. According to Kelemen, ‘through its network of contacts with colonial 
nationalists and a collaborative relation with the Colonial Office, the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau helped crystallise a consensus among colonial specialists in favour of the 
imperial state initiating social and economic improvements in Africa, in preparation 
for self-government’.260 Gupta has argued that this Fabian ideology of ‘modernising 
imperialism’ was ‘the chief explanation for the slowness with which the Labour Party 
abandoned the concept of imperial rule’.261  
This Fabian approach to empire drew on both the nineteenth century notion of 
the civilising mission and the early twentieth century concept of trusteeship. As 
Joseph Morgan Hodge has argued, the post-war development drive was ‘the 
culmination of a much deeper history whose beginning stretches back to the 
civilising mission doctrine of the late nineteenth century’.262 The language used by 
Creech Jones to promote colonial development echoed the civilisational rhetoric 
advanced by liberal philosophers in the nineteenth century. At a Fabian Conference 
in 1950, Creech Jones declared: ‘the colonial people are set on the road; we have 
helped to build for them the machines for their progress. It is a good beginning–-but 
it is only a beginning and we shall press on with pride in our hearts that we are 
extending the boundaries of freedom and enlightenment’.263 Crucially, this Fabian 
doctrine drew heavily on racist stereotypes regarding the non-white peoples, 
particularly in Africa. In a 1959 essay, Creech Jones claimed that much of what is 
wrong in Africa comes from ‘the poverty of nature and the backwardness of people’ 
who have been ‘tied by tradition and oppressed by ignorance and superstition’.264 
According to Creech Jones, these problems are ‘not due to rapacious capitalism or 
modern exploiting colonialism, tragic and appalling as they have been’.265 Hinden 
similarly argued that the African territories were ‘poor and economically backward’ 
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even before the arrival of the European powers and if the British left, ‘the result 
would only be a reversion to political barbarism and economic chaos’.266  
This negative stereotype of Africans was particularly evident in Creech Jones 
and Hinden’s approach to the colonies in East and Central Africa with minority settler 
populations. Creech Jones argued that progress towards independence ‘may be 
hampered where it is necessary to reconcile different races, at different stages of 
political and social maturity’.267 According to him, in cases such as Rhodesia and 
Kenya where a white minority community holds power, ‘communal representation in 
the legislatures must be regarded as an inevitable device for politically immature 
racial groups until conditions permit a more widely spread feeling of racial security 
and political stability’.268 Hinden also referred to the difficulties of bringing to an end 
imperial rule in ‘plural societies where different races live side by side and refuse to 
mix’.269 In such cases, she claimed that British rule was necessary in order to ‘keep 
the ring and help forge a nation out of what is still no more than a collection of 
warring and suspicious tribes’.270 
This approach was manifested in the creation of the Central African 
Federation by the Conservative government in 1953. The Central African Federation 
merged the self-governing settler colony of Southern Rhodesia with the colonies 
of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. While the concept of racial ‘partnership’ 
supposedly formed the basis of the scheme, in reality the federation ensured 
continued white supremacy in Central Africa. Significantly, the Attlee government, 
led by Patrick Gordon Walker as Commonwealth Secretary, was connected to the 
idea.271 Michael Collins has cited the Attlee government’s role in the plan for 
federation as an example of ‘an important moment in the decolonisation process in 
which both trusteeship and a new civilising mission make a return’.272 Murray Steele 
has argued the Labour Party’s inability to adopt an anti-imperialist posture despite 
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the evident lack of progress towards racial partnership in the Federation typified its 
paternalistic approach towards development in Africa.273  
Anti-Imperialism in the Labour Party  
While there was certainly a dominant school of thought among senior Labour 
figures in this period that favoured the prolongation of imperial rule, this view was by 
no means widely held within the party as a whole. On the Labour left, for example, 
there was a significant body of opinion that was critical of empire and supportive of 
decolonisation.274 Howe addresses this tendency in Anticolonialism in British Politics. 
Howe argues that while studies of the impact of decolonisation on British politics 
‘have tended to focus on the governing elite, parliament and party leaders’, many of 
the most impassioned arguments concerning empire were, in fact, ‘within rather than 
between the parties’.275 He claims that within the Labour Party ‘anti-colonialism was 
perhaps the only issue on which the left seemed to score unequivocal victories 
during the 1950s and 1960s’.276 In 1954, an alternative to Fabianism emerged with 
the creation of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), a pressure group 
supported by many Labour MPs, which campaigned for the swift liberation of colonial 
subjects from imperial rule. The MCF was founded following a split in the party over 
the British Guiana crisis of 1953. In May 1953, the People’s Progressive Party, led 
by Cheddi Jagan, won a general election in British Guiana, a British colony in South 
America. However, within five months, the Conservative government had suspended 
the constitution, claiming that the People’s Progressive Party was a crypto-
Communist party. While figures on the Labour left such as Fenner Brockway, the 
chairman of the MCF, supported the dismissed ministers, the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau, led by Hinden, urged Labour MPs to support the government’s actions.277  
Howe describes the creation of the MCF as the point at which the anti-colonial 
movement in Britain found its ‘most unified, coherent, and forceful organisational 
expression’.278 According to Howe, ‘the MCF was, in terms of range of supporters 
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and scope of activities, among the most important post-war British political pressure 
groups’.279 The growing influence of the MCF on the Labour Party was reflected in 
the make-up of the Shadow Cabinet of 1955-1957. Three members, Wilson, Bevan 
and Anthony Greenwood, were MCF sponsors and only one member, James 
Griffiths, was a Fabian.280 In 1957, Brockway claimed that while the Labour right had 
‘won the internal battles on most policy fronts, the left had the high ground on 
colonial affairs’.281 The growth of the MCF chronologically coincided with a rapid 
speed-up in the decolonisation process as several African colonies gained their 
independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. While the extent to which the MCF 
contributed to this phenomenon is questionable, its development nevertheless 
symbolised a decline in the Fabian approach to empire among Labour leaders. 
Gupta argued that ‘while the part the Labour opposition played in emancipating the 
colonies remains a matter of dispute, what cannot be disputed is that it had 
emancipated itself from the hierarchical view of the human races inherited from 
some early Fabians’.282  
However, as Jodi Burkett has argued, even left-wing critics of empire were still 
susceptible to imperial or racist ideologies. In Constructing Post-Imperial Britain, 
Burkett has examined how the so-called ‘radical left’ in Britain in the 1960s struggled 
to come to terms with the end of empire.283 She uses the example of pressure groups 
such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which although outwardly anti-imperial, ‘often 
relied unthinkingly on the “realities” of British superiority to articulate the world 
around them and their place within it’.284 According to Burkett, by calling for Britain to 
establish direct political control in Rhodesia in preparation for majority rule in 1966, 
the Anti-Apartheid Movement, along with a number of other left wing organisations, 
‘assumed a certain degree of British power and imperial benevolence that was not 
easily reconciled with their anti-imperial attitudes’.285 This example demonstrates how 
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the ideologies of race and empire could permeate the whole political spectrum, even 
groups who classified themselves as anti-racist and anti-imperialist.   
Crucially for this thesis, these ideologies of race and empire were still evident 
when Labour returned to power in 1964. Despite the formal end of empire, many 
senior figures in the Wilson government still believed that Britain had a leadership 
role to play with regards to its former colonies. One of Wilson’s first acts upon 
assuming office was the creation of the new Ministry of Overseas Development, the 
first ministry dedicated exclusively to international development and independent of 
the Foreign Office. This new ministry thus affirmed Britain’s continued commitment to 
the civilising mission. As this chapter has shown, although the idea of race as a 
biological phenomenon was largely discredited in the twentieth century, this did not 
mean the end of white domination over other races. Instead, such racial discourses 
morphed into a discourse of civilisation and culture which, although superficially 
colour-blind, still projected racialised, hierarchical ideas. As Howe puts it, ‘in most 
imperial systems the distinction between dominant and dominated was not just one 
of physical location, political power, or economic clout: it was also seen in terms of 
cultural difference’.286 Specifically, the belief that ‘the dominant core people were 
clearly culturally different from, and superior to, the politically subordinate ones’ 
underpinned the endurance of empire in the twentieth century.287 The following 
chapters will explore the persistence of this discursive framework in the Wilson 
government’s approach towards race, both internationally and domestically. Far from 
emancipating themselves from the hierarchical view of the human races, as Gupta 
has suggested, the following chapters will demonstrate how old imperial notions of 
white authority endured in the policies of the Wilson government. 
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Chapter Two: ‘Vipers Clutching to Britain’s Bosom’: The Labour Party and the 
Commonwealth, 1964-1967 
 The Wilson government entered office in 1964 with a firm commitment to the 
Commonwealth. This commitment was striking as it occurred at a time of uncertainty 
regarding Britain’s role in the world following the relinquishment of most of its empire. 
This uncertainty was epitomised by Dean Acheson, the former US Secretary of 
State, who argued in 1962 that ‘Britain had lost an empire and had not yet found a 
role’. He believed that ‘a role based on being the head of a Commonwealth which 
has no political structure, unity or strength, and enjoys a fragile and precarious 
economic relationship is about played out’.288 Nevertheless, for the Wilson 
government, particularly senior figures such as Patrick Gordon Walker, Arthur 
Bottomley, Barbara Castle and Wilson himself, the Commonwealth still had 
significant value for Britain. For these figures, the Commonwealth in its new multi-
racial guise, following the addition of a number of newly independent non-white 
countries in the early 1960s, provided an opportunity for the Labour Party to continue 
to promote social and economic progress on an international scale.  
Allied to this support for the Commonwealth was a commitment to 
international development. In 1964, a new Ministry of Overseas Development was 
established, headed by Barbara Castle.289 This new ministry was a long-held 
ambition for Wilson as demonstrated by his 1953 book, The War on World Poverty. 
Wilson argued in this text that although ‘the days of imperialism are over’, this ‘does 
not mean the end of Britain’s influence in world affairs’.290 He claimed that while the 
first half of the twentieth century saw independence for the South Asian colonies and 
advances towards self-government in Africa, the challenge in the second half of the 
twentieth century will be whether ‘we can match political progress with the harder 
and less glamorous task of economic advance’.291 According to Wilson, the ‘war on 
world poverty, which must be Britain’s historic mission, is the only way in which we in 
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the more favoured countries can fulfil our obligations to people all over the world’.292 
He thus believed that Britain still had an important role to play with regards to its 
former colonies, despite the end of formal empire. This sentiment was echoed by 
Castle who, in calling for an independent development ministry, argued that ‘the wind 
of change is not only blowing politically, it is also blowing economically, and it is for 
this potentially influential country to give the lead’.293  
This commitment to international development, though, was imbued with an 
enduring notion of Britain as a paternal figure responsible to its former colonial 
subjects. In August 1965, the Overseas Development Ministry published a paper 
outlining the purpose of the new department. It argued that development was not 
only about reducing poverty, it also meant ‘fulfilling aspirations towards continued 
social and economic progress’ and ‘the transformation of traditional societies into 
modern ones’.294 This statement thus signified the persistence of the civilising 
mission in the Labour elite’s approach towards the former empire. Foot claimed that 
although Labour arguments in favour of the Commonwealth were often phrased ‘in 
terms of “a bridge between the rich and poor nations” and other apparently 
admirable sentiments, it is impossible to avoid their chauvinist content’.295 According 
to Foot, ‘citizens of a country which has been conquered by Britain are, in the eyes 
of many well-meaning Labour parliamentarians, superior in some way to citizens of 
countries conquered by foreigners’.296 This ‘inverted chauvinism’ was reflected in the 
allocation of the overseas aid budget. In 1965, Castle informed Wilson that ‘for 
historical reasons and because of their great needs the main volume of our effort is 
bound to go to Commonwealth countries’.297 Although the Overseas Development 
Ministry was responsible for distributing aid throughout the world, about 90 per cent 
of bilateral aid in this period went to the Commonwealth.298 The Wilson government’s 
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development policy, therefore, went hand in hand with its commitment to the 
Commonwealth.   
Crucially, this vision of development within the contours of the Commonwealth 
was contingent on Britain retaining a special role as the ‘mother country’, a legacy of 
the imperial period. Consequently, as Britain found its authority increasingly 
challenged by the new non-white members, particularly over the Rhodesia crisis, the 
Wilson government’s commitment to the Commonwealth soon waned. The 
Commonwealth, previously seen as an institution that ensured Britain’s continued 
influence on world affairs, was quickly deemed a nuisance. In 1967, the non-white 
members were branded by Herbert Bowden, the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, as ‘vipers clutching on to Britain’s bosom’.299     
This chapter traces the Wilson government’s growing disillusionment with the 
Commonwealth in the period 1964-1967. The chapter will show how senior Labour 
figures regularly drew on a self-congratulatory and Anglo-centric narrative that cast 
British statesmen, particularly in the post-war Attlee government, as the chief 
catalysts behind the development of the multi-racial Commonwealth. This narrative, 
though, masked the reality in which the leaders of the non-white nations had to 
assert themselves in order to force the pace of decolonisation and reshape the 
Commonwealth association. The chapter will argue that the persistence of this 
narrative among senior Labour figures helps explain the Wilson government’s 
negative response to the political challenges it faced from the Commonwealth—
namely, the backlash over Britain’s Rhodesia policy at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ meetings of 1966 and the influence of the new Commonwealth Secretariat, 
which was formed in 1965. The chapter will also show how economic problems such 
as Britain’s Balance of Payments deficit would have serious implications for Labour’s 
Commonwealth vision, particularly in regards to development. The chapter will argue 
that these economic problems, coupled with the political challenges, contributed to 
Labour’s diminishing interest in the Commonwealth, which coincided with Britain’s 
second application to join the European Economic Community in 1967.300    
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While the next chapter will examine the Wilson government’s approach to 
race through the domestic ‘problem’ of non-white immigration, this chapter will 
instead focus on the international dimensions. Specifically, it will look at how senior 
Labour figures initially responded to the loss of empire by championing the 
Commonwealth; an institution they believed would ensure Britain’s continued 
influence over its former colonies and its continued influence on world affairs. The 
chapter will argue that while this support for the Commonwealth may have been 
based on good intentions, it was nevertheless laden with imperialist overtones, 
particularly in relation to Africa, hence the Wilson government’s contempt when 
faced with criticism from Britain’s former non-white colonial subjects over the 
Rhodesia crisis. Firstly, this chapter will trace the transformation of the 
Commonwealth from a small ‘white man’s club’ to a multi-racial association spanning 
many continents. 
The Transformation of the Commonwealth: From ‘Old’ to ‘New’  
The Commonwealth was originally comprised of Britain and the white 
Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State and 
Newfoundland. These Dominions were granted an ‘equal status’ with Britain through 
the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which stated that Britain and her Dominions were ‘in 
no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, 
though united by common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’.301 This Declaration was ratified by 
the Statute of Westminster of 1931, which renounced Britain’s legislative authority 
over the Dominions. The Statute of Westminster also introduced the term 
‘Commonwealth of Nations’ into official function, thereby signifying the beginning of 
the Commonwealth association. After the Second World War, the Commonwealth 
was expanded as India, Pakistan and Ceylon became full members following their 
independence from Britain.302 This development not only marked the end of the 
Commonwealth as an exclusively ‘white man’s club’, it also meant the end of 
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allegiance to the Crown as a criterion of membership. The London Declaration of 
1949 permitted India’s membership despite her intention to become a republic. 
Although the Crown would have no constitutional authority over India, the Indian 
government accepted the Crown as ‘the symbol of the free association of its 
independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth’.303 This 
Declaration thus established the principle that republicanism was compatible with 
membership.304 
In 1957, the Commonwealth was further expanded as Ghana and Malaysia 
joined as republican members. Also, from 1960 to 1964, a number of newly 
independent African republics joined.305 This meant that the non-white countries 
became a majority in the association for the first time. These predominantly 
republican countries were branded the ‘New’ Commonwealth, thereby differentiated 
from the Dominion countries, which were labelled the ‘Old’ Commonwealth.306 This 
rapid expansion was not welcomed by everyone. Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister 
of Australia from 1949 to 1966, described the ‘New’ Commonwealth as ‘a cluster of 
republics that were spiritually more akin to Moscow than to London’.307 According to 
Menzies, the end of the Crown Commonwealth ‘finished the intimate association’. 
Thereafter, the Commonwealth became, in his view, an association that was ‘now 
only functional and occasional’.308 Enoch Powell, who would later become a vocal 
critic of non-white immigration, argued in 1964 that the Commonwealth had become 
‘a gigantic farce’.309 He claimed that ‘not merely the non-European members, 
increasing at a rate of six or a dozen a year, but the so-called “old Dominions” have 
no present real ties with Britain other than such as history might have left between 
any two foreign nations’.310   
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Nevertheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was an abundance of texts that 
celebrated the transformation of the Commonwealth into a multi-racial association.311 
According to these accounts, the end of formal empire was not a failure for Britain as 
it was always the intention of British statesmen to lead the colonies to independence 
and to a continued relationship with Britain through the Commonwealth. In his 
Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Keith Hancock argued that ‘it is best to 
regard the British Commonwealth as the nature of the British Empire defined, in 
Aristotelian fashion, by its end’.312 In The Name and Nature of the British 
Commonwealth, Nicholas Mansergh claimed that ‘if the nature of the Commonwealth 
may be described teleologically, its end is conceived to be the widening of a circle of 
self-governing peoples of differing cultural and racial origins with a community or a 
brotherhood of equal nations, linked by history, sharing some common interests and 
loyalties’.313 In The Commonwealth in the World, Bruce Miller declared that ‘a country 
becomes a Commonwealth member partly by an act of will, but mainly as a 
culmination of a process of growth and adaptation, the end of which is the status of a 
sovereign state’.314 These writers thus saw Commonwealth membership as the 
culmination of the civilising mission. As Miller put it, Commonwealth membership 
was ‘the mark of political maturity’.315 
The Labour Party and the Transformation of the Commonwealth 
A recurrent theme in these accounts is the praise given to the Attlee 
government’s role in the creation of the modern Commonwealth. In Making the New 
Commonwealth, Robin James Moore argued that ‘the retention of South Asia to the 
Commonwealth has been regarded as the Labour government’s greatest 
contribution to civilisation’.316 Moore noted that following the London Declaration of 
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1949, ‘the Labour government basked in the warmth of press and public approval’.317 
The Times praised Attlee’s ‘great achievement of far and away the most civilised 
grouping of sovereign states which the world has known’.318 At the Labour Party’s 
Annual Conference of 1949, Jim Griffiths, the Labour Party Chairman, described the 
government’s handling of the Indian problem as ‘the greatest of its many 
contributions to world progress’.319 Alongside this scholarly literature, there were a 
number of texts by senior Labour figures in this period that celebrated the 
transformation of the Commonwealth.320 In The End of Empire, John Strachey 
challenged the view that Britain was ‘done for’ and was ‘committing national suicide’ 
by relinquishing her imperial possessions.321 For Strachey, Britain still had a role to 
play in assisting in the economic and social development of her former colonies. He 
believed that it was the Commonwealth, above all, that provided the institutional 
mechanism for Britain to achieve this. As he put it, ‘in this field Britain is called upon 
to lead the world, for she has succeeded in creating an institution which gives the 
promise of providing the necessary institutional and emotional links to fulfil her 
destiny: the Commonwealth’.322    
One of the most vocal Labour supporters of the Commonwealth in this period 
was Patrick Gordon Walker. As Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations (1947-1950), Gordon Walker played a key role in the decision to grant 
membership to the South Asian countries. Gordon Walker claimed that he originally 
devised the formula for India’s membership that was adopted at the 1949 
Conference.323 Robert Pearce argued that Gordon Walker’s contribution to this 
settlement ‘earned his elevation to the position of Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations’.324 In The Commonwealth, Gordon Walker argued that the 
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transformation from empire to Commonwealth went forward in ‘a historically 
determined order’. 325 According to Gordon Walker, ‘the movement towards 
independence inevitably started first in the settler Dominions’ and the emergence of 
these new nations ‘set a process in train that could not be halted’.326 He thus 
characterised the expansion of the Commonwealth as a teleological process, with 
the move towards a multi-racial association seen as ‘a measured and cumulative 
march of events’ as the non-white countries ‘grew into membership’.327 
  Crucially, Gordon Walker claimed that the inclusion of the non-white 
countries did not destroy the Commonwealth because ‘a multi-racial Commonwealth 
was a fulfilment of its inherent nature’.328 He therefore challenged the view that the 
Commonwealth had lost its original purpose as the non-white members became a 
majority. As he put it, ‘the evolution of the multi-racial Commonwealth did not destroy 
a community of ‘kith and kin’, for this had never existed’.329 He cited Britain’s 
relationship with French-speaking Canadians and Afrikaners in South Africa as 
examples of how the Commonwealth was never restricted solely to people of ‘British 
stock’. His account epitomised the self-congratulatory narrative supported by many 
senior Labour figures in this period—namely, that Commonwealth membership was 
a natural outcome of a long civilising process in which first the white Dominions, and 
then the Asian and African colonies, grew towards political maturity. This narrative 
was based on the assumption that the end of empire was a planned, peaceful and 
Anglocentric process. This assumption was typified by Attlee’s complacent assertion 
in 1961 that the British Empire was the only empire in the history of the world:  
‘where, without external pressure or weariness at the burden of 
ruling, the ruling people has voluntarily surrendered its hegemony 
over subject peoples and has given them their freedom, where 
also the majority of the people so liberated have continued in 
political association with their former rulers’.330    
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However, this narrative overlooked the influence of nationalist movements 
and eschewed the significant moments during the decolonisation process when 
British policy was far from benign. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting of 1964, Duncan Sandys, the Conservative Commonwealth Secretary, gave 
a speech that commended Britain’s record of bringing its colonies to independence. 
According to Arnold Smith, a Canadian diplomat who became the first Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth in 1965, the speech was ‘pure Britannia nutrix, the 
proud mother who had nursed her infants to strength and independence’.331 
Following this speech, Hastings Banda, the leader of Malawi, countered that 
although Britain may have in time recognised what is inevitable, ‘it has not been all 
voluntary’. Banda argued that ‘there has been a significant element of persuasion, 
and many of us have been among the persuaders’.332 He then went around the table 
listing the prison sentences of himself and his fellow leaders.333 This moment 
exemplified the tendency of British statesmen to overlook the less savoury aspects 
of British decolonisation. This narrative of a benign transition has been largely 
discredited in recent historiography. Howe has criticised this narrative for being 
‘Whiggish, teleological, Anglocentric’, and ‘imbued with the mystique of a stillborn 
dream of Commonwealth’.334 John Darwin has described this narrative as ‘Whig 
history large as life and twice as shameless’.335 For Darwin, ‘far from there being a 
considered transformation from empire to Commonwealth, what actually occurred 
was the unpredictable erosion of position after position and foothold after foothold’.336    
While British withdrawal may not have been as protracted as some of the 
other imperial powers, this should not mask the numerous instances where British 
policy was far from peaceful. The most notable case of violence during Britain’s 
withdrawal from empire was Kenya, where up to 20,000 Kenyans were killed in the 
colonial government’s detention camps during the Mau Mau uprising.337 In 2011, 
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following a High Court case brought by four survivors of the detention camps, the 
Foreign Office was forced to reveal the existence of a vast archive of files that had 
been secretly ‘migrated’ to Britain from several colonies prior to independence.338 
These files at Hanslope Park exposed numerous cases of official violence in 
colonies such as Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya.339 The discovery of these files thus 
serves to further undermine the myth of a benign disengagement. 
This narrative also fails to account for the alternative forms of colonial 
governance considered by British governments in this period. This narrative asserted 
that it was always the intention of British statesmen to lead the colonies towards 
political maturity as independent nation-states. However, during this period, British 
governments explored alternatives to the nation-state as a means of sustaining and 
revitalising empire. At the same time as the Attlee government granted 
independence to the South Asian colonies, Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, 
formulated a plan in which Britain would pool its colonial resources with France to 
create a ‘Third Force’ or ‘Euro-Africa’ through the middle of the planet.340 Ryan Irwin 
has argued that after the Second World War ‘Europeans tried to recast empires as 
power-sharing modernization projects’.341 He notes how the Attlee government 
‘introduced power-sharing constitutions in the Gold Coast, among other locales, and 
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worked to balance relations among traditional collaborators and urban elites who 
wanted better wages, fairer trade policies, and greater autonomy’.342  
As a recent work by Michael Collins has shown, the most notable alternative 
to the nation-state considered by British governments in this period was federation.343 
In the 1950s, Britain experimented with or planned federations for Central Africa, 
East Africa, the West Indies, Malaysia and South Arabia.344 Although out of office 
during most of this period, the Labour Party still helped contribute to this ‘federal 
moment’. Collins has argued that there is a ‘misperception of Labour’s approach to 
and support for decolonisation’.345 He argues that the Labour elite’s tacit support for 
federation in Central Africa, in particular, ‘ran counter to a broad if loosely deﬁned 
acceptance of the emergence of African nationalism by senior Labour ﬁgures’.346     
An underlying factor behind the creation of the Central African Federation was 
the apparent threat of South Africa. Ronald Hyam has claimed that the explanation 
for the creation of federation was ‘as nearly monocausal as any historical 
explanation can ever be’: ‘to erect a counterpoise to the expansion of South 
Africa’.347 The National Party’s victory in the South African General Election of 1948 
under the mandate of apartheid heightened the fear among British statesman that 
Southern Rhodesia could be incorporated into this racialist regime. This concern was 
evident in the Attlee government’s deliberations on federation. In March 1951, 
Gordon Walker visited Southern Rhodesia in his capacity as Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations. Following the visit, he told cabinet of ‘his surprise at the 
extent of pro-Union feeling’ and estimated that one-third of the white settlers would 
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vote to unite with South Africa.348 He argued that the need to ‘contain South Africa’ 
and to ‘prevent the spread of its influence northwards’ meant that Britain could not 
regard ‘the emancipation and political advancement of the African’ as its ‘sole 
objective’.349  
The extent to which South Africa would influence Labour’s African policy was 
further illustrated by the Seretse Khama affair.350 In 1947, Seretse Khama, the heir to 
the Chieftainship of the Bangwato, the largest tribe in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate–-one of Britain’s three High Commission territories in Southern Africa–-
married a white English girl, Ruth Williams. The South African government, which 
had outlawed interracial marriages under its apartheid system, strongly opposed an 
interracial couple ruling across its border. General Byers, the Chief of the South 
African General Staff, warned the British government that recognition of Khama 
would ‘light a ﬁre through all the British colonial territories in Africa which would not 
soon be quenched’.351 Fearing the possible costs of a confrontation with South Africa, 
the Attlee government decided to expel Khama from the Protectorate in 1951. 
Initially, Gordon Walker denied that this decision was influenced by South African 
pressure. However, he later acknowledged that if the British government had ‘put its 
official seal upon a mixed marriage in the midst of South African territory, there 
would be such a wave of insensate rage that co-operation would be withdrawn, and 
we would lose the three territories’.352 This affair thus highlighted how the spectre of 
South Africa would compromise Labour’s supposed commitment to African political 
emancipation. 
Although the fear of a confrontation with South Africa undoubtedly influenced 
the Attlee government’s policy, it does not on its own explain the indifferent attitude 
of senior Labour figures towards political change in the African colonies. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, while the Attlee government granted independence 
to the South Asian colonies and accepted their inclusion in an expanded 
Commonwealth, the future of the African empire was seen in a different light. The 
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non-white African peoples were still regarded as uncivilised and in need of continued 
imperial tutelage. Irwin claims that ‘having been brought into the modern 
international system by the slave trade, the African continent was cast as a uniquely 
backward place—a region supposedly devoid of the heritage that marked the Levant 
and South and East Asia’.353 This attitude was epitomised by Gordon Walker who 
argued in 1953 that independence in Africa would be ‘a greater turning point even 
than the independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon; for these were ancient states 
and civilisations that could be helped by British rule to renew and revive themselves 
as nations’.354 
Crucially, Gordon Walker supported the Central African Federation not just 
because he thought that it would act as a bulwark against South African expansion, 
but also because he believed that there was a ‘time-gulf’ between the white settler 
and African native and, therefore, a period of ‘partnership’ was needed before the 
African majority could gain independence.355 He argued that the black African was 
‘contemporary on two different planes’. According to Gordon Walker, ‘he is 
contemporary with the white African of today’ and, therefore, ‘must possess the 
rights and claims that appertain to all human beings’. However, he claimed that the 
black African was also ‘contemporary with the remote ancestors of these same white 
Africans, say in the epoch before the Roman conquest of Britain’.356 Although Gordon 
Walker believed that the ultimate objective of federation was ‘to create democratic 
states in which the majority rules’, he warned that ‘progress towards this goal must 
be practical and empirical’.357 He argued that ‘for a considerable time to come the 
whites will clearly be the dominant race’.358  
These comments typified the persistence of a civilisational doctrine that 
divided the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ peoples of the empire along racial lines. In as 
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late as 1961, Attlee still cautioned against a swift withdrawal from Africa. He argued 
that ‘one must regard Africa as still in the stage of experiment’ as, unlike Asia, it 
lacked ‘any background of indigenous civilisation’.359 He claimed that ‘it would be 
optimistic to expect any easy transference from a tribal organisation to a democracy 
on the Westminster model’. 360 Hence, far from advocating independence, senior 
figures such as Gordon Walker and Attlee believed that Britain still had a senior role 
to play in Africa. Africa represented for these Labour figures a physical and 
discursive space in which the fires of the civilising mission still burned. However, five 
years after Attlee’s speech, all of Britain’s African colonies with the exception of 
Rhodesia gained their independence and joined the Commonwealth. This 
development clearly did not fit the narrative of a planned withdrawal. It is, therefore, 
important to consider other factors that explain the transformation of the 
Commonwealth in the 1960s, in particular the influence of the non-white leaders.361    
Asian and African Assertiveness 
While senior Labour figures often cast Asia and Africa as separate 
genealogies, the leaders of the newly independent Asian nations believed that it was 
their duty to extend their struggle for independence to other territories. This attitude 
was epitomised by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who argued in 
1946 that ‘the kernel of our policy is the ending of colonialism all over Asia, or for that 
matter, in Africa and elsewhere’.362 This desire to end colonialism was manifested in 
the historic Bandung Conference of 1955. The conference saw representatives from 
29 Asian and African nations meet to discuss a range of issues, including economic 
cooperation, the Cold War and decolonisation.363 The conference signified the new 
nations’ determination to hold a separate identity from the West by steering a ‘third 
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way’ through the Cold War.364 This conference was a key moment in the later 
development of the Non-Aligned Movement.365 At the conference, Nehru asked, ‘are 
we, the countries of Asia and Africa, devoid of any positive position except being pro-
communist or pro-capitalist? Has it come to this that the leaders of thought who have 
given religion and all kinds of things to the world have to tag on to this group or that, 
and be hangers-on of this party or the other’?366 The conference issued a final 
communique that declared an array of objectives, including the end of ‘colonialism in 
all its manifestations’.367 Although colonialism was only one of many issues that were 
discussed, the conference signified the non-white leaders’ determination to assert 
their values on the world stage. 
This growing assertiveness was evident in the workings of a number of 
international institutions that were formed after the Second World War, including the 
UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. According to Ryan Irwin, 
these new institutions were the brainchild of American planners who after the war 
sought to create a ‘liberal world order’ in which nation states would be linked 
together in an economic and political network based on international 
interdependence.368 Crucially, the leaders of these new nations perceived these 
institutions to be ‘an agent of empowerment rather than as a vehicle of imperialist 
exploitation’.369 According to K.M. Munshi, an Indian writer and political activist, ‘the 
United Nations gave members a chance to mobilise incalculable moral opinion and 
form the conventions of world self-rule’.370  
This notion was put into practice when the Indian delegation attempted to put 
South Africa in the dock at the UN because of its racial policy.371 Although the Indian 
government was concerned about racial discrimination worldwide, the apartheid 
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system in South Africa was particularly emotive. After all, it was in South Africa 
where Gandhi began his campaign of civil disobedience.372 In 1949, Nehru argued 
that if the kind of inequality practised in South Africa was allowed to continue, ‘then 
there is bound to be a conflict on a big scale’.373 At the first sitting of the UN General 
Assembly in 1946, the Indian delegation asked that the treatment of Indians in South 
Africa be placed on the agenda. South Africa responded that it was a domestic 
matter and, therefore, contravened Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, which decreed that 
the UN should ‘not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state’.374 The British government supported the South African 
regime on the basis of this principle. However, despite the objections of Britain and 
South Africa, the General Assembly agreed to discuss the issue of the treatment of 
Indians in South Africa.375 According to Nehru, India had made ‘a most auspicious 
beginning on the stage of international politics’ and the UN’s decision was a 
‘convincing demonstration that the UN will be a real force for peace and for the 
improvement of human relations’.376 
Following the National Party government’s implementation of apartheid, the 
Indian government broadened its campaign to include all victims of racial 
discrimination in South Africa. In 1952, India put forward the first motion concerning 
the issue of apartheid.377 This campaign eventually resulted in the UN General 
Assembly’s adoption of Resolution 1598 following the Sharpeville massacre in 
1960.378 Resolution 1598 decreed that the apartheid regime was ‘reprehensible and 
repugnant to human dignity’.379 The Indian government’s campaign against South 
Africa thus demonstrated how these new nations could use international institutions 
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to pressurise the older, more established countries and force their values onto the 
international agenda.    
Significantly, these non-white leaders also used the UN to promote anti-
colonialism. In numerous sittings of the General Assembly, the representatives of the 
African and Asian nations pressed for an official declaration that would call for an 
end to colonialism. This pressure culminated in the ‘Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, which was adopted by the 
General Assembly in December 1960.380 The declaration proclaimed ‘the necessity of 
bringing, to a speedy and unconditional end, colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations’.381 The declaration also asserted that ‘inadequacy of political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence’.382 The UN thus not only declared its official opposition to 
colonialism, it also rejected the notion that certain colonies required a continued 
period of imperial rule before they could gain independence. This declaration thus 
confounded the view taken by senior Labour figures such as Gordon Walker who 
insisted that Britain’s remaining African colonies were not yet ready for 
independence.383  
A key figure in the implementation of this declaration was Kwame Nkrumah, 
the leader of Ghana, whose country became the first African colony to gain its 
independence from Britain in 1957. Similar to Nehru, Nkrumah saw his country’s 
independence as part of a wider struggle. In his Autobiography, he acknowledged 
that he ‘never regarded the struggle for independence as an isolated objective but 
always as part of a general historical pattern’.384 According to Nkrumah, ‘our task is 
not done and our own safety is not assured until the last vestiges of colonialism have 
been swept from Africa’.385 He identified the UN, above all, as a platform to advance 
this cause. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1960, he described the UN 
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‘as the only organisation that holds out any hope for the future of mankind’ and 
warned that ‘possession of colonies is now quite incompatible with membership of 
the United Nations’.386 By participating in institutions such as the UN that tied 
sovereign nations together, these leaders helped establish nationhood as an almost 
universal value. While British governments toyed with alternative forms of 
governance such as federation, the success that these non-white leaders had in the 
UN set a benchmark for other nationalists to follow. As a result, it quickly became an 
accepted norm, internationally, that the end result of empire would be the creation of 
independent nation-states. As Irwin put it, ‘decolonisation could now be 
contextualised as United Nations membership’.387   
The assertiveness displayed by these new leaders was not just confined to 
the international institutions that made up the ‘liberal world order’. The 
Commonwealth was also seen by leaders such as Nehru as a platform for the former 
colonised to promote wider causes. Nehru justified India’s membership of the 
Commonwealth not just because of the domestic benefits for India, but also because 
of the opportunity it gave Indian leaders to assert their values on the world stage. He 
argued that ‘we join the Commonwealth obviously because we think it is beneficial to 
us and to certain causes in the world we wish to advance’ and ‘it offers the possibility 
that we may also greatly influence others in the right direction’.388 This theme was 
touched on by Mansergh, who claimed that after the inclusion of the South Asian 
countries, ‘the voice of anti-colonialism was henceforward to be heard in the 
innermost councils of the Commonwealth, both persistently and powerfully’.389 
According to Mansergh, ‘it was that, rather than events in Africa itself, which 
predisposed British and other Commonwealth statesmen to rethink their attitudes to 
the dependent empire’.390    
Initially, though, these new leaders promoted anti-colonialism within the 
contours of the Commonwealth only to a limited degree. Miller, writing in 1969, 
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looked back kindly on what he labelled the ‘Nehru Commonwealth’.391 According to 
Miller, the ‘Nehru Commonwealth’, which existed from 1947 to 1960, was a ‘relatively 
cosy arrangement’ in which ‘the principle of respect for domestic jurisdiction was 
closely preserved’.392 However, one issue in which these new leaders were clearly 
determined to assert themselves was South Africa. Just as it had been at the UN, 
the apartheid regime was a constant source of friction for the non-white nations. This 
issue came to a head at the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, when 
the non-white leaders along with John Diefenbaker of Canada rejected South 
Africa’s application for continued membership as a republic due to its policy of 
apartheid. Although South Africa’s racial policy was abhorrent to most members, this 
decision broke the principle that members should not interfere in the domestic affairs 
of another country. As a result, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in 
1961 and did not return until the end of apartheid in 1994.   
The rejection of South Africa was a momentous moment as it marked the first 
time the Commonwealth had directly censured one of its own members and the first 
time in which British policy had not prevailed on a key matter of significance, the 
Macmillan government having endorsed South Africa’s application prior to the 
conference.393 This rejection also signified that the assertiveness displayed by the 
non-white leaders at the UN was now spilling over into Commonwealth meetings. 
The potential ramifications of this were not lost on Gordon Walker. Although he 
accepted the decision because of ‘the abhorrence felt by all other members at South 
Africa’s policy of apartheid’, he argued that ‘from a constitutional point of view, this 
case should be considered as wholly exceptional’.394 Gordon Walker claimed that the 
exclusion of South Africa on the grounds of her domestic policy meant that the 
Commonwealth had ‘turned itself into a sort of court that sat in judgement upon 
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another member’.395 He warned that if this kind of interference became a precedent, 
‘the nature of the Commonwealth would be undermined’.396   
While Gordon Walker acknowledged that the exceptionally brutal nature of 
apartheid justified a break from the tradition of non-interference, he feared the 
potential ramifications, particularly for Britain, if such censure became a norm. This 
concern would later come to bear when Britain faced criticism from other 
Commonwealth nations over its Rhodesia policy. Consequently, while senior Labour 
figures lauded the expansion of the Commonwealth into a multi-racial association, 
there were changes taking place under the surface—namely, the growing 
assertiveness of the non-white members—that would later force senior Labour 
figures to rethink their commitment to the Commonwealth. This new generation of 
Commonwealth leaders, inspired by the success they had at the UN, sought to 
redefine the Commonwealth as a platform for the new members to influence their 
past ‘colonial master’ rather than a platform for Britain to retain an influence over its 
former colonial subjects. As Philip Murphy has put it, ‘in so far as the rapid expansion 
of the Commonwealth had created something of a moral vacuum at its heart, this 
was ultimately ﬁlled not by Britain but by an extraordinary generation of 
independence leaders’.397 According to Murphy, ‘their notion of the role of the 
Commonwealth was clear: it was to complete the liberation struggle they had begun 
in their own territories’.398 These changes, though, seemingly went unbeknownst to 
senior Labour figures who continued to endorse the Anglocentric narrative when 
Labour returned to power in 1964. The persistence of this narrative among Labour 
figures in part explains the Wilson government’s indignation when faced with political 
challenges from the Commonwealth.   
The Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Crisis   
The Labour Party’s commitment to the Commonwealth was outlined in its 
election manifesto of 1964, which avowed that ‘though we shall seek to achieve 
closer links with our European neighbours, the Labour Party is convinced that the 
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first responsibility of a British government is still to the Commonwealth’.399 The 
manifesto included a sub-section titled ‘The End of Colonialism’, which lauded the 
Attlee government’s ‘act of creative statesmanship’ in granting independence to the 
South Asian countries; an act which the manifesto claimed ‘began the process of 
transforming a white colonial empire into a multi-racial Commonwealth’.400 The 
manifesto cast the incoming Wilson government as heirs to the Attlee administration 
and believed its task was to complete this ‘noble transformation’.401 After all, many of 
the new ministers including Wilson had served in the Attlee government.402 Wilson 
himself held a strong personal attachment to the Commonwealth.403 In 1963, he put 
forward a ten-point plan for the Commonwealth, which included ‘a Commonwealth 
programme of higher education; exchanges of scientiﬁc information between 
countries; a Commonwealth youth programme dedicated to aiding Commonwealth 
economic and social development and guaranteed markets in Britain for 
Commonwealth primary products’.404   
Wilson’s commitment to the Commonwealth was reflected in his decision to 
appoint Arthur Bottomley, a vocal enthusiast for the Commonwealth, as Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations. Bottomley had a long history of association with 
Commonwealth affairs and was particularly renowned for his knowledge of India.405 
As Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions (1946-1947), he suggested that the 
Dominions Office be renamed the Commonwealth Relations Office, thus reflecting 
his commitment to the Commonwealth.406 Bottomley believed that the 
Commonwealth, with its broad scope across many continents, could play a key role 
as a progressive force throughout the world. In 1963, he argued that ‘when 
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discussing the future of the Commonwealth, it is as well to remember that it covers a 
quarter of the world’s land surface and contains a quarter of its population. These 
people are to be found in every one of the five continents of the world, and they 
represent every colour, race and creed’.407 He claimed that ‘if the Commonwealth 
countries co-operated to the full and spoke with one voice, they could be the most 
powerful unit and influence for good in the world today’.408 In his memoirs, 
Commonwealth, Comrades, and Friends, he declared that ‘while its members differ 
in race, religion and language, the Commonwealth is accepted by all as a valuable 
and proven instrument for international co-operation and an agency for social and 
economic progress’.409 Bottomley thus epitomised the optimistic view of the 
Commonwealth held by senior Labour figures in this period—namely, that it provided 
an institutional mechanism for Britain to continue its civilising mission. 
However, Bottomley’s high hopes for the Commonwealth would be tested by 
the Rhodesia crisis. In a speech in 1965, he commended Britain’s ‘enlightened 
policy’ of ‘bringing peoples of all races and colour to independence, and in creating 
peaceful multi-racial societies’.410 He warned that Britain ‘cannot allow this mission to 
be frustrated by a handful of intolerant fanatics believing in a discredited doctrine of 
white supremacy and living in a world that is fifty years out of date’.411 According to 
Bottomley, Britain’s ‘fine record’ would be tarnished if it disregarded the rights of the 
African majority and handed them over to ‘a small group of white racialists who have 
no sympathy with the aims of our great Commonwealth’.412 Above all, he feared that 
if Britain appeared to be sympathetic to its white ‘kith and kin’ in Rhodesia, it would 
undermine all the work done by the Attlee administration and would potentially mean 
the end of the Commonwealth. As he put it, ‘Smith and his friends want a complete 
capitulation by Britain, to continue to build up white supremacy, and blatantly to 
discriminate against the non-white citizens of Rhodesia. To concede their right to do 
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this would mean the end of the Commonwealth and the loss of our moral leadership 
in world affairs’. 413 
Consequently, when Bottomley visited Rhodesia with Gerald Gardiner, the 
Lord Chancellor, in February 1965 for talks with the Smith regime, he was partly on a 
mission, so he believed, to save the Commonwealth. When he touched down at 
Salisbury Airport, Bottomley was met by thousands of Africans, who displayed 
banners and chanted, ‘Bottomley, our saviour’.414 During this visit, Bottomley met with 
some of the imprisoned African nationalist leaders, including Joshua Nkomo, the 
leader of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union which was banned by the Smith 
regime. He assured the African leaders that Britain would only grant independence 
to Rhodesia ‘if there were constitutional guarantees of majority rule’.415 However, the 
high expectations that greeted Bottomley at Salisbury Airport were stillborn as the 
Smith regime announced its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11th 
November 1965.  
In a speech to parliament the next day, Bottomley stated that when he first 
met with Smith he realised how fundamental the differences were between the 
British and Rhodesian positions. Still, he claimed that throughout these talks ‘Smith 
stood out as a man of character and integrity’.416 Bottomley also noted that during the 
visit, he met with ‘all shades of opinion’ to get their views on the independence issue. 
According to Bottomley, ‘we had, sadly, to recognise that the broad masses of 
people supported the Rhodesian Front government and the policy of UDI’.417 In 
unison, several MPs corrected Bottomley by saying the white people. Bottomley 
replied: ‘Yes, the white people’.418 While Bottomley’s claim that the broad masses of 
people supported UDI was clearly a slip of the tongue, his description of Smith as a 
man of character and integrity made him appear naively sympathetic to the settler 
regime. Tam Dalyell claimed that this speech signed his death warrant as a Cabinet 
minister.419 In August 1966, Bottomley was demoted to the post of Minister of 
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Overseas Development and in August 1967 Wilson demanded Bottomley’s 
resignation from government on the grounds of a ‘retirement at sixty’ policy.420  
Although Bottomley was just one of many notable Commonwealth supporters 
in the Wilson government, his demotion so soon after coming to office was 
undoubtedly a setback for Labour’s commitment to the Commonwealth. This was 
evidenced by the more indifferent attitude towards the Commonwealth adopted by 
Bottomley’s successor Herbert Bowden in the new post of Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs. Bottomley had warned of the grave implications for the 
Commonwealth if Britain failed to resolve the Rhodesia crisis, yet he appeared 
powerless to stop the Smith regime from issuing its UDI. Just one year after 
Bottomley was proclaimed as ‘our saviour’ by thousands of Africans at Salisbury 
Airport, he was out of office, and the Rhodesia crisis was no closer to being 
resolved. The grave implications forecast by Bottomley would be put to the test when 
Britain faced two tumultuous Commonwealth meetings in 1966.    
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings of 1966  
In January 1966, a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting was held in 
Lagos, Nigeria to discuss the Rhodesia crisis. This was the first meeting held outside 
of Britain and the first organised by the new Commonwealth Secretariat, thus 
reflecting Britain’s diminishing authority over the association.421 According to James 
Barber, ‘the conference took on the air of a trial, with Mr Wilson in the dock facing his 
Commonwealth accusers’.422 Wilson was criticised for not using military force to end 
the rebellion and was accused of allowing ‘kith and kin’ sympathies to influence his 
decision. Two African members, Tanzania and Ghana, broke off diplomatic relations 
with Britain prior to the conference. In September 1966, another meeting was held, 
this time in London, and Britain’s Rhodesia policy again came under fire. Oliver 
Wright, Wilson’s Private Secretary, claimed that ‘each Prime Minister, when he 
spoke, seemed to feel that he had to outdo his predecessor in abuse. It was quite 
sickening to me; it must have been far worse for Wilson’.423 The Zambian Minister, 
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Simon Kapwepwe, walked out on the meeting and said before leaving London that 
‘this conference makes us know that Mr Wilson is coming to be a racialist’.424 Wilson 
described the meeting as a ‘nightmare’ and admitted that he ‘feared for the future of 
the Commonwealth’ following both tumultuous meetings in 1966.425 
The September 1966 meeting, in particular, exposed a growing division 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ members. At the end of the conference, two separate 
groups of countries sat down to write their final statements. Representatives from 
seventeen countries, mostly the non-white nations, called for Wilson to make an 
unconditional acceptance of the NIBMAR principle; while representatives from five 
countries, mostly the Dominions with the exception of Canada, issued a more 
watered-down statement.426 Ultimately, Wilson agreed to a final communique that 
reaffirmed Britain’s support for NIBMAR and declared that Britain would seek 
mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia at the UN unless the Smith regime took steps 
to end the rebellion by the end of the year.427 This communique thus symbolised the 
growing power of the non-white nations. 
Senior Labour figures, though, sought to play down the wider implications of 
these meetings. Although Bottomley acknowledged that Tanzania and Ghana’s 
decision to break off diplomatic relations with Britain was ‘very sad and 
unnecessary’, he claimed that ‘the heartening thing is that so many African countries 
have refused to follow them and break diplomatic relations with us’.428 According to 
Bottomley, ‘this reaffirms the strength of the Commonwealth relationship and 
confounds those who consider the Commonwealth nothing but a farce’.429 In 
response to the strong criticism that Britain faced, he countered that ‘it is a merit, and 
strength, of the Commonwealth that franker criticism of each other can be made than 
would be tolerable outside the circle’.430 Gordon Walker also looked to put a positive 
spin on the heated exchanges. According to Gordon Walker, while the meetings 
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were deplorable, ‘they were at least an unanswerable demonstration and proof of the 
sovereign equality of all members’.431 Despite these attempts to play it down, the 
perception of Britain in the dock at the Commonwealth did not sit well with senior 
Labour figures. During the London meeting, Wilson complained that Britain was 
being treated as if it were ‘a bloody colony’.432 Although Wilson accepted that the new 
members wished to assert their newly-found independence, he argued that ‘Britain, 
too, was independent and had a right to ask for the support of the whole 
Commonwealth on this issue’.433 Wilson thus feared that British authority was being 
undermined at these Commonwealth meetings. 
This view was echoed by Bottomley who argued that ‘in an association as 
varied and far-flung as this, there are bound to be differing approaches to world 
problems. It is, therefore, inevitable that Britain should from time to time pursue 
policies of which some of our Commonwealth friends disapprove’.434 By emphasising 
Britain’s decision-making independence, and dismissing its impact on other 
members, Bottomley arguably undermined the idea of the Commonwealth as an 
influential organisation. While senior Labour figures such as Bottomley often spoke 
of the opportunity that the Commonwealth gave Britain to maintain an influence over 
its former colonies, the idea that this influence could work the other way round was 
clearly not so appealing. Significantly, it was three years till the next Commonwealth 
meeting was arranged in 1969, thus signifying the Labour elite’s disillusionment 
following the heated exchanges in 1966. In terms of Labour’s Rhodesia policy, the 
supposed grave consequences for the Commonwealth were seemingly outweighed 
by the graver consequences for Britain if the British government appeared to be 
dictated to by the Commonwealth. This concern was further reflected in the Wilson 
government’s attitude towards the Commonwealth Secretariat.  
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The Commonwealth Secretariat 
The Commonwealth Secretariat was established at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting of June 1965.435 It became the main intergovernmental agency of 
the Commonwealth, facilitating consultation and cooperation among members and 
organising, amongst other things, the Prime Ministers’ meetings. A new position of 
Secretary-General was also created in order to head the Secretariat and, in effect, 
become the leader of the Commonwealth. The creation of the Secretariat was 
therefore a significant step in reducing Britain’s administrative control over the 
association. In 1964, Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, warned that the 
creation of the Secretariat would be ‘the first formal step of an administrative kind 
along the road which leads away from the concept of the United Kingdom as the 
mother country and towards the new concept that all the members are entitled to an 
equal say in matters of Commonwealth concern’.436 The idea of a secretariat was 
initially put forward by Nkrumah at the July 1964 meeting. Nkrumah criticised the 
older members for their preoccupation with the Cold War and claimed that ‘the real 
problem was the gap between the Haves and the Have-Nots’.437 He proposed a 
‘central clearing house’ for the Commonwealth, with a primary function of preparing 
plans for trade, aid and development.438 This idea was supported by the Prime 
Minister of Trinidad, Eric Williams, who formally recommended the formation of a 
secretariat.439 
While the idea of the Secretariat was accepted in principle by most 
Commonwealth members, there was much debate concerning its precise role and 
function. The ‘old’ Commonwealth countries, including Britain, were lukewarm to the 
idea and sought to limit its power.440 Arnold Smith, the Secretary-General, claimed 
that there was a resentful feeling among British officials who feared that the 
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Secretariat would ‘undermine the Commonwealth Relations Office’s raison d’être as 
a separate department from the Foreign Office’.441 These fears had substance as the 
Commonwealth Relations Office was merged with the Foreign Office in 1968. This 
indifference was also evident among senior Labour figures. Bottomley warned that 
the Secretariat could leave Britain open to attack as it could act as ‘a focus for 
pressure-group activity’ on issues such as Rhodesia.442 Although the Wilson 
government accepted the idea of a secretariat, it tried to restrict its role, and, above 
all, prevent it from serving an executive function. The precise role of the Secretariat 
was outlined in an ‘Agreed Memorandum’ that was published after the 1965 Prime 
Ministers’ meeting.443 The memorandum declared that ‘the Secretariat should not 
arrogate to itself executive functions’ and stated that though the Secretariat ‘should 
have a constructive role to play’, ‘it should operate initially on a modest footing, and 
its staff and functions should be left to expand pragmatically in the light of 
experience, subject always to the approval of governments’.444  
Despite these limitations, Arnold Smith believed that it was part of his duty as 
Secretary-General to influence British policy, particularly with regards to Rhodesia. 
According to Smith, when some African countries, most notably Tanzania, 
threatened to leave the Commonwealth over the Rhodesia crisis, he helped 
persuade them to remain in the association. He told Tanzania’s leader, Julius 
Nyerere, that the African leaders ‘should use the Commonwealth to help rally 
international action to deal with the Rhodesian situation rather than putting on an act, 
in their revulsion against British inaction, by withdrawing from the Commonwealth’.445 
Smith, therefore, defied his purely administrative function by persuading African 
leaders to utilise the institutional mechanisms of the Commonwealth to influence 
British policy. He claimed that ‘although we lacked direct authority and had to work 
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always by persuading Britain to act, our collective voice was established as the most 
powerful influence on Britain in favour of securing majority rule’.446   
One of the ways in which Smith sought to influence British policy was through 
his involvement in the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee. Before the Lagos 
meeting, Smith and Lester Pearson, the Canadian Prime Minister, considered the 
idea of a committee that would review the progress of sanctions against Rhodesia. 
Pearson put this idea forward at the meeting and the Sanctions Committee was 
established soon after.447 The Sanctions Committee appointed a working party of 
seven Commonwealth representatives who met with Smith to consider ways in which 
sanctions could be made more effective. In 1967, the working party issued a report 
which concluded that ‘the existing sanctions were only being partially applied (and in 
some cases not applied at all) by some countries, and that they could and should be 
tightened’.448 The idea of British policy being monitored by the Commonwealth did 
not sit well with senior Labour figures. The Secretary-General’s role in this 
committee, in particular, was a source of tension. Although the Wilson government 
accepted the proposal of a sanctions committee, it disagreed with Smith over who 
would act as chairman. Bottomley insisted that as Commonwealth Secretary he 
should be chairman, while Smith believed that as Secretary-General he should chair 
the committee.449 Savile Garner, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, claimed that the Wilson government feared the 
effects of an ‘unfriendly’ chairman if the policy of sanctions proved to be 
unsuccessful.450 Eventually, a compromise was reached as Lionel Chevrier, the 
Canadian High Commissioner in London, was made chairman.  
Despite his failed bid to become chairman, Smith still played a prominent role 
in the committee. During a meeting in May 1966, he proposed that the 
Commonwealth members of the UN Security Council co-sponsor a resolution, which 
would call on the Portuguese government to stop the passage of oil from 
Mozambique to Rhodesia.451 Following the meeting, Smith had what he described as 
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a ‘stormy meeting’ with Bottomley, who complained that he had become less happy 
about the whole idea of the Secretariat and claimed that Smith was putting ideas into 
the heads of some of the African representatives.452 This moment typified the fear 
among senior Labour figures that Britain was beginning to be dictated to by its 
former colonial subjects. Just as India had used the UN to put South Africa in the 
dock after the war, the non-white Commonwealth leaders, together with the 
Secretary-General, utilised the institutional mechanisms of the Commonwealth to put 
Britain in the dock over Rhodesia.  
The Commonwealth and Economic Constraints  
 Along with these political challenges, the Wilson government’s commitment to 
the Commonwealth was also undermined by economic constraints. Within his first 
100 minutes in office in 1964, Wilson was exposed to what he described as the 
‘grimmest of news’.453 The Treasury informed Wilson that Britain faced an 
£800million deficit on its Balance of Payments.454 This deficit would have serious 
implications for Labour’s Commonwealth policy, and in particular Wilson’s own ideas 
regarding trade, originally outlined in his ten-point plan for the Commonwealth. In 
October 1964, James Callaghan, the Chancellor, introduced a 15 per cent surcharge 
on all ‘non-essential’ imports despite requests from Commonwealth countries such 
as Pakistan and India that their exports be exempted.455 Anthony Greenwood, the 
Colonial Secretary, noted that Britain’s remaining colonies were equally shocked to 
ﬁnd themselves included in the surcharge as it ‘represented the ﬁrst time in history 
that a British government had applied sweeping measures of this kind to dependent 
territories’.456  
The Ministry of Overseas Development was especially affected by these 
economic limitations. In her memoir, Fighting All the Way, Castle referred to her 
department’s long battle with the Treasury over its budget. She claimed that ‘only 
one form of reckoning was used in drawing up the budget; that of the accountant 
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with his short-term arithmetical calculations and short-sighted decisions on public 
expenditure’.457 According to Castle, ‘we were all prisoners to the government’s 
commitment to maintain the value of the Sterling at all costs’.458 In January 1965, 
Callaghan suggested that the government may have to abandon its objective of 
increasing the proportion of national income devoted to overseas aid. He argued that 
‘this expenditure bears directly and heavily on the balance of payments, and the rate 
at which it will be possible in practice to increase aid expenditure over its present 
level during the next five years will be dependent on the position of the balance of 
payments’.459 In August 1965, Sir Andrew Cohen, the Permanent Secretary of the 
Overseas Development Ministry, informed the Colonial Office that the aid budget 
would have to be reduced by £2million a year following the Sterling crisis in the 
summer of 1965.460 These decisions thus reveal how Labour’s Commonwealth 
vision, particularly in regards to development, was checked by the seemingly more 
pressing problem of Britain’s fiscal situation.   
Alongside these budgetary constraints, the Overseas Development Ministry 
also clashed with other departments over the purpose of aid. In East of Suez and the 
Commonwealth, Stephen Ashton and William Roger Louis argue that the Overseas 
Development Ministry ‘found itself increasingly isolated’ as other departments such 
as the Commonwealth Office and the Board of Trade believed that the purpose of 
aid was ‘not simply development for its own sake, but the promotion of British 
interests’.461 In July 1968, the Commonwealth Office issued a survey in which 
recipients of aid were assessed upon the basis of actions they had taken that were 
beneficial or harmful to British interests. The survey cited, for example, Zambia’s 
strong criticism of Britain’s Rhodesia policy and, in particular, Ali Simbule, the 
Zambian High Commissioner in London, who described Britain as a ‘toothless 
bulldog’.462 Thus, just as it had been under the Attlee administration, Labour’s 
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development plans were judged by the extent to which they were beneficial to British 
interests, particularly with regards to the domestic economy.  
This balance between Commonwealth and British interests was reflected in 
the Wilson government’s controversial decision to sell arms to the Nigerian 
government during the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970. The war began in July 1967 
when the south-eastern province of Biafra declared its secession from Nigeria. The 
war became notorious for the mass starvation of around one million civilians, 
primarily the Igbo people of the Biafra region.463 As reports of the humanitarian crisis 
emerged in Britain, strong pressure was put on the Wilson government to halt its 
supply of arms to Nigeria. However, the government stood firm. In a parliamentary 
debate, George Thomson, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 
acknowledged that ‘against this sombre background’, he can understand the clamour 
against the decision to supply arms.464 Nevertheless, he avowed that Britain was 
obliged to protect a fellow Commonwealth country that was facing a so-called 
‘internal revolt’.465  
This view was echoed by Wilson, who argued that he ‘cannot accept the 
doctrine of neutrality in this matter because here we have a Commonwealth country 
facing a secessionist revolt’.466 Although Wilson admitted ‘there were one or two 
unfortunate incidents on which we have had reports from the observers’, he denied 
that the weapons supplied by Britain in any way contributed to the list of civilian 
casualties. As he put it, these ‘unfortunate incidents’ were ‘not affected either way by 
the traditional role of Her Majesty’s government in supplying to the Federal 
government’.467 Significantly, Thomson defended Labour’s policy by citing the 
possible ramifications for the rest of the African Commonwealth if Nigeria was 
broken up. Above all, Thomson feared that the secession of Biafra could set a 
precedent for other African states with similar ‘tribal divisions’.468 Thomson asked, 
                                                          
             463 See Raph Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future (Victoria, B.C.: 
Trafford, 2004) and Alfred Obiora Uzokwe, Surviving in Biafra: The Story of the Nigerian Civil War: 
Over Two Million Died (New York: Writers Advantage, 2003); Brian Edward McNeil, Frontiers of Need: 
Humanitarianism and the American Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, (PhD, 
University of Texas, 2014). 
464 ‘Nigeria’, HC Debate 27th August 1968, vol. 769 cc.1443-1446, Hansard. 
465 Ibid. 
466 ‘Nigeria (Supply of Arms)’, HC Debate, 24th October 1968, vol. 770 cc1587-9, Hansard. 
467 Ibid. 
468 ‘Nigeria’, HC Debate 27th August 1968, vol. 769 cc.1443-1446, Hansard. 
88 
 
‘what effect would our action have had on the rest of Africa, struggling to create 
modern nation states in the face of traditional tribal rivalries and fears’?469 This quote 
highlighted the enduing stereotype of Africa as uncivilised, backward and tribal 
among senior Labour figures. 
Along with these political concerns, there were key economic considerations 
that also influenced Labour’s policy. Nigeria, with its large oil reserves, was of vital 
economic interest to Britain. During this period, Nigeria contributed a tenth of all oil 
imports into Britain.470 It was thus economically imperative for Britain that Nigeria 
remained united. The decision to supply arms to Nigeria was also commercially 
beneficial to Britain. Following independence in 1961, the new Nigerian government 
cancelled an agreement to receive military supplies from Britain.471 However, when 
the Nigerian government required an increase in military supplies for the war in 
1967, it turned back to Britain. The obvious commercial benefits of this deal were not 
lost on Thomson, who noted that ‘a favourable response to this request ought to give 
us every chance of establishing ourselves again as the main suppliers of the 
Nigerian forces after the war and more generally, should help our commercial and 
political relationship with post-war Nigeria’.472 The idea of arms sales as a possible 
remedy to Britain’s economic problems was not just restricted to Nigeria. In 1964, the 
Wilson government pledged to end arms sales to the South African government. 
However, following the devaluation of the Sterling in 1967, the Cabinet considered 
resuming arms sales to the apartheid regime.473 Although the proposal was rejected, 
the fact that such a policy was even considered, despite the obvious disapproval it 
would have met from other Commonwealth members, indicates how far economic 
interest dictated Labour’s policy.   
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The Value of the Commonwealth 
 Within this context of economic problems and political challenges, the Wilson 
government looked to reassess its commitment to the Commonwealth. This was 
demonstrated by the more indifferent approach adopted by Herbert Bowden as 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs. In April 1967, Bowden presented a 
memorandum to Cabinet titled ‘The Value of the Commonwealth’. According to 
Bowden, the report was prompted by the tumultuous Commonwealth meetings of 
1966, after which he claimed many senior Labour figures ‘were worried about 
whether the value of the Commonwealth association to us might be outweighed by 
the extent to which it affects adversely our own policies and interests’.474 The report 
argued that ‘the Commonwealth can no longer be regarded as an association in 
which Britain could count on getting her own way’.475 The report stated that all but 
five Commonwealth nations now fall within the ‘Afro-Asian world’ and many of these 
members ‘seek to exert pressure-group tactics’ on Britain, particularly on issues such 
as Rhodesia that had ‘racial connotations and aroused strong emotions’.476 
 Bowden’s report thus recognised that the ‘new’ Commonwealth nations had 
undermined Britain’s assumed role as the ‘mother country’. The report especially 
lamented the changing atmosphere at the Prime Ministers’ Meetings. The report 
claimed that ‘Britain had for long benefited from the ability largely to stage-manage 
Commonwealth meetings ourselves’. However, in recent years, ‘the meetings have 
contained examples of Britain clutching vipers to her bosom—and paying for it’.477 
This metaphor was in reference to the Aesop fable in which a kindly farmer helped 
revive a viper in his chest only to be bitten and killed. This reference symbolised the 
enduring narrative of Britain as a paternal figure that had supposedly been betrayed 
by those it had ‘nurtured’.   
Bowden’s report described the Commonwealth as ‘a ready-made forum for 
pressures to be brought to bear on the British government to make concessions’ and 
criticised Arnold Smith, in particular, for ‘giving this concept support and publicity’.478 
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The report claimed that ‘it will be to our advantage if there are fewer Commonwealth 
meetings on policy issues’ and urged the government ‘not to initiate proposals for 
Commonwealth-wide meetings on high policy matters and on occasion if necessary 
to oppose them’.479 Hence, the Wilson government’s refusal of further meetings until 
1969. Bowden’s report concluded that ‘while the Commonwealth was still considered 
“a good thing”, Britain should not be forced to maintain the association at all costs, 
especially if it was seen to be detrimental to British interests’. Bowden claimed that 
‘in calculating our interests, the maintenance of the Commonwealth association is an 
important factor to be weighed, but not the only one’.480  
European Economic Community 
Bowden’s report coincided with Britain’s second failed application to join the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967.481 Britain first applied to join the EEC 
under the Macmillan government in 1961. However, both applications were vetoed 
by the French President, Charles De Gaulle, who was concerned, amongst other 
things, with Britain’s close links with the United States and its preferential trade 
agreements with Commonwealth countries.482 Edward Heath’s Conservative 
government submitted Britain’s third application after De Gaulle left office, and 
Britain finally became a member of the EEC in 1973. The potential ramifications of 
European membership on Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth were not 
lost on Bowden. Bowden argued that ‘Britain’s membership of EEC is likely to lead to 
a diminution of our function as the lynch-pin of the Commonwealth, and the 
Commonwealth’s continued vitality will depend, more than in the past, on the 
importance which other Commonwealth Members attach to it’.483 
Significantly, it was on this basis that the Labour Party under Gaitskell’s 
leadership opposed Britain’s first application in 1961. E.J.B. Rose argued that the 
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1961 debate on the Common Market marked ‘the apogee of the Labour Party’s 
commitment to the Commonwealth’.484 In his speech against British membership, 
Gaitskell declared that Britain was ‘not just a part of Europe’; it also had ‘ties and 
links which run across the whole world’.485 Above all, Gaitskell cited the modern 
Commonwealth, which he claimed ‘owed its creation fundamentally to those vital 
historic decisions of the post-war Labour government’, as something he wanted to 
‘cherish’.486 Gaitskell thus saw British membership of the EEC as incompatible with 
its commitment to the Commonwealth. As he put it, ‘we cannot associate ourselves 
with the other states in Western Europe with our links with the Commonwealth fully 
maintained, if at the beginning you sell the Commonwealth down the river’.487 The 
language used by Gaitskell epitomised the kinship that many senior Labour figures 
felt towards other Commonwealth members, particularly in the Dominions. Gaitskell 
referred to the contribution made by New Zealand, Australia and Canada in two 
world wars and declared that ‘we do not intend to forget Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli’.488 
This sentiment was echoed by Wilson, who cited the New Zealand 
government’s generous trade agreement with Britain after the Second World War 
when Britain looked to obtain the food and raw materials it needed with little to offer 
in return. Wilson quoted Walter Nash, the leader of the New Zealand delegation, who 
opened trade proceedings with Britain by declaring: 'We have not come to ask you 
“what can you give?” but simply “what do you need?” When you stood alone you 
preserved our freedom for us. Whatever the sacrifice may be for the New Zealand 
people we will supply it’.489 Wilson argued that ‘we cannot with the honour of this 
country take any action now that would betray friends such as those’.490 As he put it, 
                                                          
484 E.J.B. Rose, Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 222. 
485 Speech by Hugh Gaitskell against UK membership of the Common Market, 3rd October 1962 in 
Britain and the Common Market, Texts of speeches made at the 1962 Labour Party Conference by 
the Rt. Hon Hugh Gaitskell M.P. and the Rt. Hon. George Brown M.P. together with the policy 
statement accepted by Conference. (London: Labour Party, 1962), 3-23. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Ibid. 
488 Ibid. Vimy Ridge was a battle fought in France in 1917 during the First World War in which the 
main combatants were the Canadian Corps. Gallipoli was a battle that took place in the Ottoman 
Empire in 1915-1916 during the First World War, which involved a significant number of combatants 
from Australia and New Zealand. 
489 European Economic Community, HC Deb, 3rd August 1961, vol. 645 cc1664-1665, Hansard. 
490 Ibid. 
92 
 
‘we are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical 
and marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf’.491 
However, the idea that EEC membership would undermine the 
Commonwealth relationship was not shared by all senior Labour figures. Bottomley 
believed that the Commonwealth could co-exist with and indeed be enriched by 
British membership of the EEC. In 1959 he wrote a pamphlet titled ‘Why Britain 
Should Join the Common Market’, which argued that EEC membership was 
essential in order to provide further investment for the Commonwealth.492 According 
to Bottomley, ‘our weak economy prevented us from meeting this traditional role on 
our own’ and these fellow European powers would help assist ‘our obligations to the 
developing world’.493 His vision of the Commonwealth and Europe working together, 
though, was largely discredited.494 Wilson, who by 1967 had changed his mind on the 
issue of European integration, claimed that Bottomley’s ‘idealism went too far’ on this 
matter as ‘not all European statesmen shared his high ideals’.495   
The EEC application also coincided with a revision of Britain’s defence plans. 
Although the Wilson government was initially committed to maintaining Britain’s 
military bases ‘East of Suez’, the economic difficulties that beset Britain in this period 
eventually led to a rethink. In July 1967, Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, 
submitted a white paper that announced Britain’s intention to withdraw from its ‘East 
of Suez’ bases by the mid-1970s.496 The paper declared that ‘Britain will cease to 
play a worldwide military role’ and will ‘increasingly become a European power’.497 
The devaluation of the Sterling in 1967 forced Healey to bring this deadline forward 
and in January 1968 he announced that Britain would withdraw from all its existing 
military bases ‘East of Suez’ by 1971 despite pleas from Commonwealth members 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and Australia for Britain to maintain its bases.498 The 
Wilson government’s disillusionment with the Commonwealth can, therefore, be 
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located within the broader context of Britain’s shift away from a world role and 
towards Europe in this period. This connection has been touched on by Murphy who 
argues that the battering that Britain received over Rhodesia ‘convinced Wilson and 
his colleagues that the Commonwealth could not provide an effective basis for British 
global power, and helped to reconcile them to a second application for membership 
of the EEC’.499  
This chapter has demonstrated that, while the Wilson government came to 
power in 1964 with high hopes for the Commonwealth, this was soon quashed by the 
reality of an £800million Balance of Payments deficit. Within this context, economic 
interests often took priority over Labour’s plans for the Commonwealth. This was 
reflected in the decision to introduce an import surcharge to help reduce the deficit, 
despite the potential adverse impact it would have on other member nations. This 
chapter has shown that these economic constraints, together with political 
challenges, led to a decline in the Labour Party’s commitment to the Commonwealth. 
Crucially, this chapter has argued that this support for the Commonwealth was in the 
first place contingent on Britain playing a special role as the ‘mother country’. This 
condition stemmed from a misguided narrative of the development of the 
Commonwealth as an Anglocentric process, which was popular with senior Labour 
figures in this period. This narrative was in many ways an extension of the 
civilisational doctrine advanced by nineteenth century liberal thinkers and Labour 
statesmen in the early twentieth century. Despite the end of formal empire, senior 
Labour figures still believed that Britain had a duty to help ‘civilise’ the supposedly 
backward races, particularly in Africa. The chapter has shown that this vision of the 
Commonwealth failed to account for the changes that were taking place both inside 
and outside the association as the new non-white nations looked to assert 
themselves on the world stage. As a result, once it became clear Britain could no 
longer control its former non-white colonial subjects, the Wilson government’s 
interest in the Commonwealth quickly diminished.    
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Chapter Three: ‘From Equality to Integration’: The Labour Party’s Changing 
Approach towards Commonwealth Immigration, 1964-1968 
The Labour Party returned to power in 1964 facing the difficult question of 
Britain’s role in the world following the relinquishment of most of its empire. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, the Labour policy-making elite responded to this 
problem by championing the Commonwealth, an institution they believed would 
ensure Britain’s continued status as a world power. Many senior Labour figures 
including Wilson had a strong personal attachment to the Commonwealth. For these 
figures, the Commonwealth, particularly after its expansion into a multi-racial 
association, provided an institutional mechanism for the Labour Party to continue to 
promote social and economic progress on an international scale. However, one 
difficulty that emanated from this commitment to the Commonwealth was the issue of 
non-white immigration. Since the end of the Second World War, thousands of so-
called ‘coloured’ migrants had arrived in Britain from the ‘New’ Commonwealth. 
These migrants were granted unrestricted entry into Britain through the British 
Nationality Act of 1948, which established a common Commonwealth citizenship. 
The 1960s, though, saw the introduction of legislation to curtail this migration. The 
Macmillan government introduced the inaugural Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 
1962, which limited the number of Commonwealth migrants arriving each year 
through an employment voucher system.  
The Labour Party led by Gaitskell strongly opposed this new measure. 
Gaitskell described the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill as ‘a plain anti-
Commonwealth measure in theory and a plain anti-colour measure in practice’.500 
However, shortly after taking office, the Wilson government renewed the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act and then introduced tougher controls through the 
1965 White Paper, Immigration from the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act of 1968.501 This U-turn has commonly been explained by scholars as 
a response to the pressures of a supposedly hostile British public. Richard 
Crossman, a senior minister in the Wilson government, justified Labour’s rethink on 
immigration by claiming that ‘if we hadn’t done this we would be faced with certain 
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electoral defeat in the West Midlands and the South-East’.502 The most notorious 
example of such public pressure was the 1964 Smethwick election, where Patrick 
Gordon Walker, the incoming Foreign Secretary, lost his traditionally safe Labour 
seat following a controversial campaign by the Conservative candidate, Peter 
Griffiths, which focused almost exclusively on immigration. The campaign was 
epitomised by the slogan, ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Liberal or 
Labour’, which was unofficially used in support of Griffiths.503      
This chapter will examine Labour’s changing approach to immigration in the 
period 1964-1968. The chapter will survey the policies introduced by the Wilson 
government that affected non-white migrants, specifically the tightening of 
immigration controls and the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation. The 
chapter will explore the main motives behind these policies. The chapter will argue 
that the electoral pressures that allegedly drove this policy change have been 
overstated by scholars. The chapter will cite opinion polls and electoral surveys 
during this period which indicate that the immigration issue featured strongly in only 
a few constituencies and seemingly had little impact on the British electorate as a 
whole. The chapter will focus on other factors that were equally if not more important 
such as the broader context of declining interest in the Commonwealth among senior 
Labour figures as well as the enduring influence of the civilisational doctrine. Above 
all, the chapter will argue that, even prior to the 1960s, Labour leaders were worried 
about the possible implications of non-white immigration to Britain. These anxieties 
were shaped by an imperial ideology that cast non-white peoples as uncivilised, 
backward and, therefore, ill-suited to British society. This was even evident in the 
Attlee government’s response to the first wave of non-white migrants to Britain after 
the Second World War. 
The chapter will show that while senior Labour figures initially defended non-
white immigration as part of their broader ideological commitment to the 
Commonwealth, the practicalities that emerged from this—namely, the problems that 
supposedly emanated from integrating these former colonial peoples into British 
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society—forced Labour policy-makers to introduce measures that they would have 
rebuked only a few years previously. This changing approach was epitomised by 
Bottomley, who argued in 1966 that the issue ‘is not one of equality, it is one of 
integration’.504 This chapter will argue that the issue of immigration was symptomatic 
of a wider problem concerning the meaning of Britishness in the 1960s. While the 
Wilson government sought to promote a ‘new’ vision of Britain that was multi-racial 
and inclusive, in reality its approach to immigration suggested the enduring sway of 
an older, more restrictive idea of Britain based on ‘whiteness’, which drew heavily on 
the legacies of empire. Before exploring these themes, the chapter will briefly survey 
the wider literature on immigration and race in British politics.     
‘A Surrender to Racism’? Immigration and Race in British Politics  
Within the historiography on race in British politics, there is a dominant view 
that the Conservative and Labour governments of the 1960s were provoked into 
introducing controls on non-white immigrants by the pressures of a racist and hostile 
British public.505 In John Bull’s Island, Colin Holmes argued that ‘when discussing 
official responses to immigration it is insufficient to concentrate solely upon a political 
elite operating in an independent and arbitrary fashion as they responded to 
pressures which influenced official responses’.506 Scholars have cited the 1958 race 
riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham, in particular, as a key moment in convincing a 
supposedly reluctant Conservative administration to introduce immigration 
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controls.507 E.J.B. Rose claimed in Colour and Citizenship that the display of racial 
violence during these riots forced the Macmillan government to ‘relinquish its grip on 
the principle of free entry to Commonwealth citizens’.508 In Staying Power, Peter 
Fryer argued that the race riots acted as a ‘wake-up call’ to the British governing 
elite.509 He described the introduction of immigration legislation as ‘a surrender to 
racism’.510  
In terms of the Labour Party, the Smethwick result has traditionally been seen 
by scholars as the decisive moment in convincing the party to rethink its policy on 
immigration. Fryer described the Smethwick result as a ‘turning point’ as ‘Labour was 
not going to let itself be outflanked’ by the Conservatives.511 The realisation that 
Labour could lose significant electoral support over this issue, especially from within 
its traditional working class base, allegedly forced the Labour elite to abandon its 
official opposition to controls. As Evan Smith has observed, ‘the notion of the Labour 
Party yielding in the face of racist public opinion has been well documented in the 
history of race relations in Britain’.512 Kathleen Paul argued that ‘if, according to the 
traditional historiography, the riots of Notting Hill provided the contextual tinder for 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, then the Smethwick result seems 
concrete proof that popular anger at rising immigration shaped subsequent official 
immigration policy’.513 This argument is seemingly validated by Crossman, who 
claimed that ‘ever since the Smethwick election it has been quite clear that 
immigration can be the greatest potential vote-loser for Labour’.514 Crossman 
believed that the Labour elite should respond to such public fervour, however 
distasteful, by altering its position on immigration. As Crossman put it, ‘racialism is 
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endemic and one has to deal with it by controlling immigration when it gets beyond a 
certain level’.515 
However, the notion that the British public was mostly hostile towards 
immigrants has been questioned by some scholars. Mica Nava argues that although 
in the 1950s and 1960s there existed ‘a relatively small group of xenophobes and 
outright racists of all classes, their extremely prejudiced views did not constitute a 
majority’.516 Tony Kushner claimed in We Europeans that ‘when public opinion is 
cited by governments, it has tended to be represented as negative, with the focus 
primarily on the minority of the population that is violently opposed to newcomers’.517 
Kushner has criticised academics, in particular, for reinforcing this approach. He 
noted that while ‘there is an extensive literature on racism and discrimination in 
Britain’, there has been ‘a dearth of material on those who have fought prejudice or 
worked systematically with immigrant and minority groups’.518 Nava has cited the 
‘ardently sympathetic’ responses to non-white newcomers, which were evident in 
numerous cinematic and fictional accounts of the period.519 She thus suggested a 
wider spectrum of responses to immigrants during this period, which ranged from 
outright hostility at one end, to hospitality and identification at the other.520  
This argument is supported by the 1966 Survey of Race Relations in Britain, 
which sought to measure ‘the incidence of colour prejudice in the white population’.521 
The survey interviewed about 2,500 people within five local government areas 
known to contain a sizable population of non-white immigrants.522 The survey 
included four attitudinal questions and, based on the responses to these questions, 
the interviewees were divided into four groups: tolerant (non-hostile answers to all 
four questions); tolerant-inclined (only one hostile reply); prejudiced-inclined (two 
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hostile replies) and prejudiced (three or four hostile replies). The survey found that 
just 10 per cent of those interviewed were outright prejudiced, while 35 per cent were 
tolerant and 38 per cent were tolerant-inclined.523 Thus, in these areas with sizable 
immigrant populations, over one-third of respondents expressed views with 
practically no trace of racial prejudice, and another two-fifths seemed to be strongly 
disposed in the direction of tolerance.524 This survey thus undermined the view that 
racist attitudes were prevalent in British society during this period.  
Moreover, some scholars have challenged the narrative of a hostile British 
public pushing an otherwise liberal British political elite into enforcing immigration 
controls. In Whitewashing Britain, Paul claims that ‘the increasingly harsh restrictions 
on immigrants were driven, not by the explosion of race and immigration into the 
electoral arena, but by imperatives internal to the governing elite’ and that the racism 
of British ministers ‘led rather than followed public opinion’.525 Paul argues that even 
before the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, British governments were ‘never 
liberal with regard to immigration and, in fact, tried very hard to prevent it’.526 Ian 
Spencer suggests in British Immigration Policy that British governments did not 
welcome non-white immigration at any stage, but they ‘were both unwilling and 
unable to prevent’ it.527 Spencer noted how successive governments sought to 
restrict immigration through non-legislative means, for example by persuading 
Commonwealth countries such as India and Pakistan to introduce higher passport 
application fees.528 According to Spencer, it was only when these unofficial attempts 
at controlling migration failed that the British government felt the need to legislate.529  
Paul contends that even the post-war Attlee government, which oversaw the 
arrival of the first significant wave of non-white migrants to Britain on Empire 
Windrush in 1948, ‘did all in their power to prevent further arrivals’ but were 
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‘hamstrung by the dictates of formal nationality policy’.530 The formal nationality policy 
that Paul referred to was the British Nationality Act of 1948, which introduced a 
common citizenship to all citizens of the United Kingdom and its colonies. This Act 
thus allowed all Commonwealth citizens the theoretical right of ‘free entry’ to Britain. 
Nevertheless, as Rieko Karatani argues in Defining British Citizenship, it was never 
the intention of the Attlee government that those citizenship rights be enforced freely 
by Commonwealth citizens outside Britain.531 One month after the arrival of 
Windrush, George Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, stated, 'I hope no 
encouragement will be given to others to follow their example’.532 Creech Jones 
claimed in response to a parliamentary question regarding the Windrush inflow that 
‘it is very unlikely that a similar event to this will occur again in the West Indies’.533 
These quotes therefore highlight the conflict between the Attlee government’s formal 
immigration policy and its informal view of who should be allowed into Britain. 
The internal imperatives that influenced the Attlee government’s immigration 
policy have been touched on by some scholars. Shirley Joshi and Bob Carter argued 
that ‘race as a “problem” had already been essentially structured by the post-war 
Labour government, which undertook policies and propounded ideas that 
significantly influenced the creation of a racist Britain’.534 They claimed that ‘the 
Labour Party, steeped in traditions of colonialism and its accompanying racism, saw 
only “problems” caused by the importation of numbers of “uncivilised”, culturally 
“backward” coloured colonials’.535 Although Britain required a significant amount of 
migrant labour to help rebuild its economy after the war, the Attlee government was 
reluctant to recruit non-white immigrants and preferred, instead, to attract white 
European workers. According to Joshi and Carter, this ‘partly reflected ethnocentric 
assumptions about the alleged similarities of “white” cultures and the difficulties of 
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assimilating other cultures’.536 In 1946, James Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary, 
argued that ‘he would be much happier if the intake could be limited to entrants from 
the Western Countries, whose traditions and social background were more nearly 
equal to our own’.537 Nevertheless, according to Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo, 
‘concerns about the supposed social upheaval that “coloured” migrants would cause 
were offset by the economic requirements that needed a steady inﬂux of migrants to 
ﬁll gaps in the labour market’.538 
This balance between the economic beneﬁts and the supposed social 
problems of non-white migrant labour was manifested in a review arranged by the 
Attlee government in 1950. The review was tasked with considering ‘the means 
which might be adopted to check the immigration of coloured peoples into this 
country’.539 The review concluded that ‘in view of the comparatively small scale of 
coloured immigration into this country and the important and controversial issues of 
policy involved in legislation to control it, we consider that no such legislation should 
at present be introduced’.540 Although it rejected controls at the present time, the 
review did not rule out future legislation. It claimed that ‘a very large increase in such 
migration in the future might produce a situation in Britain rendering legislation for its 
control essential, despite the very strong opposing considerations’.541 This Cabinet 
document, therefore, supports Paul’s assertion that it was internal considerations 
rather than public pressure that primarily dictated British policy. As Joshi and Carter 
put it, ‘this was a question of expediency rather than principle; control of non-white 
immigration was not rejected, but laid aside until it was deemed politically 
appropriate’.542 Although this view arguably underplays the impact of events such as 
the Smethwick election on British policy-making, it nevertheless exposes the myth 
that racism was a phenomenon exclusive to the British public and alien to a liberal 
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political elite. Labour and Conservative statesmen were also susceptible to racist 
assumptions regarding non-white immigrants, despite their official pro-immigration 
stance until the 1960s. 
Another recurrent theme in the literature is to situate the issue of immigration 
within the wider context of decolonisation. In The Afterlife of Empire, Jordanna 
Bailkin has explored the numerous ways in which decolonisation transformed British 
society in the 1950s and 1960s, most notably in terms of its impact on the welfare 
state.543 She has argued that official approaches towards non-white immigrants were 
shaped by what she termed ‘the life cycle concept’—namely, the idea that nations, 
families or individuals ‘pass through irreversible stages of development in which 
progression is made with age’.544 According to Bailkin, this life cycle concept had a 
specific grounding in imperial history as ‘colonial authorities routinely depicted 
colonised societies as childlike in order to naturalise situations of conquest and rule’. 
She claims that in the 1950s and 1960s this concept was ‘galvanised and 
transformed into the postcolonial metropole’ as it served to govern ‘high-stake issues 
such as when people could leave or enter countries’.545    
Consequently, just as many of Britain’s non-white colonies were considered 
too ‘backward’ to be granted independence, non-white migrants were deemed to be 
too immature to be properly integrated into British society. Bailkin has cited, for 
example, how British migration experts drew on their colonial experiences as 
anthropologists in Africa.546 Kenneth Little, a British anthropologist, argued that the 
techniques he used in Africa could be redeployed to study ‘enclaves of coloured 
people in this country, who provide a special kind of problem in the impact, culturally 
and socially, between colonial peoples and our western society’.547 Chris Waters’ 
“Dark Strangers” in Our Midst has also addressed this theme, examining the race 
relations discourse that emerged in Britain in the 1950s, pioneered by 
anthropologists and sociologists such as Little, Michael Banton and Sheila 
Patterson.548 Although these scholars outwardly opposed racial discrimination, they 
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often employed racial stereotypes, especially regarding sex. Patterson’s Dark 
Strangers, for example, argued that real differences emerged strongly in the matter 
of values and norms associated with sex and family life.549 Waters argues that by 
consistently depicting black migrants as ‘dark strangers’, these race relations experts 
helped ‘consolidate apparently common-sense notions of race and, as a 
consequence, the post-war boundaries of national belonging’.550 This approach 
towards non-white immigrants thus drew on a nineteenth century imperial ideology, 
which divided the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ parts of the empire along racial lines. As 
Michael Kearney claimed, ‘Victorian notions of progress and the dichotomisation of 
the world into ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ zones live on in orthodox approaches to 
migration and development’.551 
Some scholars have claimed that this backdrop of decolonisation also shaped 
the British public’s attitude towards immigrants. Paul Foot claimed that non-white 
migrants were specifically targeted because they were ‘symbols not only of 
strangeness but also of failure’.552 By failure, Foot referred to the impact of the loss of 
empire on how ordinary Britons responded to immigrants. He argued that when ‘the 
British working class felt anger at unemployment and poverty, they were drugged 
with stories of conquest in foreign lands, where the subjects were uncivilised and 
backward coloured people and all great men, they were led to believe, were white’.553 
According to Foot, if the end of empire ‘was not cruel enough for those imaginations, 
the stream of former subjects into the mother country as equals before the law was a 
final insult’.554 He thus locates the British public’s attitude towards immigration within 
the framework of a long-standing imperial ideology, which cast white men as 
inherently superior to others, an ideology that supposedly resurfaced as former non-
white colonial subjects became a sizable presence in the metropole.   
In “There’ll Always Be an England”, Wendy Webster has explored the ways in 
which colonial wars, particularly the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Mau 
                                                          
549 Sheila Patterson, Dark Strangers: A Sociological Study of the Absorption of a Recent West Indian 
Migrant Group in Brixton, South London (Penguin Books, 1965). Quoted in Waters, ‘“Dark Strangers” 
in Our Midst,  156–159. 
550 Waters, ‘“Dark Strangers” in Our Midst, 209. 
551 Michael Kearney, ‘From the Invisible Hand to Visible Feet: Anthropological Studies of Migration 
and Development’, Annual Review of Anthropology 15 (1986): 335. 
552 Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, 229-232. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Ibid. 
104 
 
Mau Uprising in Kenya (1952-1960), were documented in the mainstream British 
media in the 1950s.555 According to Webster, these wars were widely reported in 
British newspapers during the 1950s and represented in a range of films, including 
The Planter's Wife (1952), set in Malaya, and Simba (1955), set in Kenya. She 
argues that the images used in films such as Simba of Mau Mau ‘ransacking and 
burning white farms, and butchering farmers’, fitted with the narrative at home of 
‘black men invading white territory’ and threatening British ‘domestic order’.556 In 
‘‘Daddy Wouldn't Buy Me a Mau Mau”, Joanna Lewis has similarly studied the 
sensationalist reporting of the Mau Mau uprising in newspapers such as the Daily 
Mail.557 She claims that the narrative of Mau Mau as a ‘racial terror of black men 
wielding carving knives to mutilate domestic pets and close family members’ was a 
source of the twentieth century West’s representation of Africa as a ‘dark continent’ 
engulfed in ‘savage barbarism’.558 
However, the idea that empire was the main prism through which Britons 
responded to non-white immigration has been challenged by some scholars. Bernard 
Porter argues in The Absent-Minded Imperialists that ‘decolonisation—like the 
original empire it was dismantling—did not have much of an impact on British society 
and culture’.559 According to Porter, ‘the majority of Britons seemed uninterested’ in 
its demise, which was ‘borne out by the equanimity with which most Britons 
appeared to accept this fate in the post-war period’.560 He has also questioned the 
extent to which empire influenced the racism that supposedly manifested itself in 
Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. For Porter, ‘the beginnings of that racism coincided 
with the new phenomenon of mass immigration from the West Indies, which would 
seem to offer an adequate explanation for ‘poor white’ resentment on its own’.561 
Kushner argued that ‘a simplistic focus on empire alone obscures other factors which 
both created and provided the context for debates about race and immigration’.562 He 
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has explored the range of influences affecting ordinary people’s racial attitudes as 
evidenced by the findings of the Mass-Observation project. Mass-Observation was 
a social research organisation that ran, initially, from 1937 to the early 1950s. It 
aimed to record everyday life in Britain through a panel of around 500 volunteer 
observers who replied to questionnaires, which were known as directives.563 
According to Kushner, Mass-Observation put immense energy into ‘racial research’ 
through these directives. From 1937 to 1951, eight directives were carried out with a 
specific focus on attitudes to Jewish and black people.564  
Kushner claimed that whilst much has been made of the impact of colonial 
mentalities, the responses to these directives suggest ‘the equal if not greater 
importance of America on contemporary race thinking’.565 In the June 1939 directive, 
Paul Robeson, the black American film actor, was frequently mentioned by 
respondents. One observer wrote that ‘whenever I think of negroes I always think 
first of Paul Robeson, whom I admire and respect very much’. Another wrote: ‘the 
first thing that comes into my head is Paul Robeson. He’s alright—therefore I’m 
alright with negroes’.566 For Kushner, Robeson, in particular, was used ‘as an 
exception to the “rule” of black inferiority’ and as ‘an indication of what the non-white 
races could achieve if given the chance’.567 Kushner also cited the 1943 race 
directive which coincided with the US military's controversial attempt to segregate 
black American troops who were stationed in Britain during the Second World War. 
Mass-Observation reported widespread animosity against such a blatant example of 
the ‘colour bar’ operating in Britain. Three-quarters of the sample said that they 
disapproved and ‘there was a very real feeling of displeasure that this sort of thing 
should be allowed to happen in this country’.568 
While Kushner, importantly, points out other factors that informed the attitudes 
of ordinary Britons towards race, his analysis extends only up to the end of the war. 
Unfortunately, the Mass-Observation project, from which Kushner derives his 
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analysis, was discontinued in the early 1950s and, therefore, missed the crucial 
period of the 1950s and 1960s when Britain faced a sustained inflow of non-white 
immigrants. Despite these important alternative influences, an examination of race in 
1960s Britain would be incomplete without taking into account the legacy of Britain’s 
imperial past. As Dominic Sandbrook put it in his general account of Britain in the 
1960s, White Heat: ‘Racism did not exist in a vacuum: it was based on old ideas of 
British imperial predominance and by the late 1960s it had become interwoven with 
broader anxieties about cultural change and national decline’.569 Before addressing 
this imperial connection, the chapter will examine the specific policies introduced by 
the Wilson government in response to the issue of immigration.    
A ‘Package Deal’: The Wilson Government’s Immigration Policy 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 limited the number of migrants 
arriving from the Commonwealth through a voucher system that divided applicant 
migrants into three groups: Category ‘A’ for people requested by employers, 
Category ‘B’ for special skilled workers and Category ‘C’ for unskilled workers. 
Although the Act, in theory, dealt with all Commonwealth citizens irrespective of 
colour, the voucher system that formed the basis of the controls was clearly aimed at 
non-white immigrants. In the period 1962-1965, there was a 91 per cent application 
success rate for Category ‘A’ Vouchers from the predominantly white, ‘old’ 
Commonwealth countries compared to a 47 per cent success rate from the 
predominantly non-white, ‘new’ Commonwealth nations.570 A note by the Ministry of 
Labour recognised that the voucher system, in practice, ‘would interfere to the 
minimum extent with the entry of persons from the old Commonwealth’.571 In 1968, 
William Deedes, a minister in the Macmillan government, admitted that ‘the Bill’s real 
purpose was to restrict the influx of coloured immigrants’ and that the government 
was ‘reluctant to say as much openly’.572    
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Although Labour under Gaitskell’s leadership strongly opposed the measure, 
when the Act came up for renewal in November 1963, the party, now led by Wilson, 
moved towards a more compromised position. Wilson stated that Labour ‘does not 
contest the need for control of immigration into this country’ but that if it were in 
power it would ‘enter into negotiations with Commonwealth countries to work out 
agreed quotas and arrangements for their implementation’.573 Hence, while the 
Labour Party still opposed the Act on the basis that it was introduced without 
consulting other Commonwealth nations, the principle of controls was finally 
conceded.574 Shortly after taking office, the Wilson government renewed the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act through the 1964 Expiring Laws Continuance Bill.575 
The Wilson government was not just content with maintaining controls, though. In 
January 1965, Frank Soskice, the Home Secretary, issued a memorandum, which 
urged the government to tighten the existing measures.576 Soskice used immigration 
statistics for the period 1962-1964 that separated Commonwealth countries into ‘old’ 
and ‘new’. According to Soskice, by ‘old’, he meant Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, and by ‘new’, he meant ‘broadly those countries in which the populations 
are coloured’.577 This differentiation thus exposed the façade that immigration 
controls were aimed at Commonwealth citizens as a whole. 
Soskice noted that there were around 800,000 non-white immigrants in Britain 
and this figure would soon rise as ‘the majority of the breadwinners who enter may 
be expected in due course to bring dependants’.578 Soskice argued that if this figure 
continued to rise then ‘great harm will be done to the government’. Soskice accepted 
that it was ‘an extremely invidious position for a Labour Home Secretary as one of 
the government’s first steps is to ask for additional powers to tighten up the 
immigration control’ and that some of his Cabinet colleagues were ‘very uneasy’ 
about the proposal.579 This move towards even tighter controls was manifested in the 
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August 1965 White Paper, Immigration from the Commonwealth. The white paper 
discontinued the Category ‘C’ Voucher for unskilled workers and reduced the total 
number of vouchers issued to 8,500 per year, with a condition that only 15 per cent 
of vouchers issued could be given to one Commonwealth country. This meant that a 
country such as Australia could receive as many vouchers as India, even though the 
Indian population was 40 times greater.580 
The white paper also included a special provision of 1,000 vouchers for Malta. 
In June 1965, Borg Olivier, the Maltese Prime Minister, urged the Commonwealth 
Secretary, Bottomley, to consider a special exemption for Malta because of Britain’s 
role in ‘disrupting her economy through the drastic rundown of its Defence 
establishments’.581 The Mountbatten mission, whose recommendations would form 
the basis of the white paper, also advocated a special provision for Malta because ‘9 
per cent of the Maltese working population were unemployed, a direct result of the 
run-down of Malta’s dockyards brought about by Britain’.582 The Mountbatten mission 
also justified this provision ‘with the fact that the Maltese are Europeans’, thus 
reflecting enduring ethnocentric assumptions regarding the similarities of white 
cultures.583 The Jamaican government criticised the provision for being ‘based on 
colour rather than economic considerations’.584 A Commonwealth Relations Office 
note recognised that Jamaica was just as dependent on emigration as 
unemployment in Jamaica stood at 14 per cent of the working population, compared 
to only 9 per cent in Malta.585 This concern was also expressed by Dalton Murray, the 
British High Commissioner to Jamaica, who suggested that Britain offer a technical 
aid programme to help mitigate the effect of the new measure on the Jamaican 
economy.586 However, this proposal was rejected by the Commonwealth Relations 
Office because it was deemed ‘politically undesirable’.587   
                                                          
580 Harry Bourne, Racialism; Cause and Cure, Communist Party Pamphlet, 1965, 11, Labour Party 
Archive (LAB), People’s History Museum, Manchester. 
581 DO 175/195, Letter from Borg Olivier to Arthur Bottomley, 29th June 1965, NA. 
582 HO 344/175, July 1965, Report of the Mountbatten Mission, 7-8, NA. 
583 Ibid. 
584 HO 344/295, 12th August 1965, Commonwealth Relations Office Background Note on Visit of 
Jamaican Government Delegation, NA. 
585 Ibid. 
586 DO 200/181, Letter from Dalton Murray to Commonwealth Relations Office, 6th Sept 1965, NA. 
587 Ibid. 
109 
 
This measure was followed three years later by an even more controversial 
piece of legislation. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 extended controls to 
citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies without a ‘close connection’ with Britain. 
This Act was introduced in response to the Kenyan Asians crisis, where increasing 
numbers of migrants of Asian origin fled to Britain due to the Kenyan government’s 
policy of ‘Africanisation’, which made it increasingly difficult for Asians to obtain 
employment in certain professions.588 Randall Hansen argues that the passage of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1968 was ‘among the most divisive and 
controversial decisions taken by any British government’ and it was seen by some as 
‘the ultimate appeasement of racist hysteria’.589 According to Hansen, the Act 
‘marked the end of any credible claim on Labour's part to be the party of the 
Commonwealth’.590 As he puts it, ‘a party that had claimed a profound commitment to 
the Commonwealth ideal of multi-racialism effectively stripped British citizens, whose 
entry was controversial only because of their skin colour, of one of citizenship's basic 
rights’.591 
The Act stipulated that only Commonwealth citizens with at least a 
grandparent who was born, naturalised or adopted in Britain could be exempted from 
controls. This meant that Kenyan Asians, who previously had the right of free entry 
as British passport holders, were restricted, while Commonwealth immigrants with a 
proven familial connection to Britain remained exempt from controls. The Act thus 
created an official distinction between white Commonwealth citizens who could claim 
lineage with Britain and non-white Commonwealth citizens who could no longer 
claim to be ‘British’.592 The Wilson administration was well aware of this racialised 
differentiation of Commonwealth citizens. In 1967, government officials 
acknowledged the belief in Britain that ‘Canada, Australia and New Zealand suffer 
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because of the need for the British government to erect a barrier to a flood of 
coloured immigrants seeking permanent settlement here’.593  
Although the Bill was rushed through Parliament in three days, the idea of 
extending controls to Kenyan Asian migrants was actually considered three years 
earlier. In April 1965, Soskice recommended that a Bill should be introduced that 
would ‘deprive East African Asians of their exemption from control’.594 The General 
and Migration Department of the Commonwealth Relations Office, though, argued 
that such a restriction ‘cannot be contemplated as it would be clearly seen for what it 
was, a move on purely racial grounds’.595 However, when the proposed measure 
reached Cabinet in 1968, only George Thomson, the Commonwealth Secretary, 
registered protest. Although Thomson recognised the potential problems that a 
continued influx of Kenyan Asians might cause, he argued that ‘such legislation 
would be wrong in principle, clearly discriminatory on grounds of colour, and contrary 
to everything that Labour stood for’.596  
Together with tougher immigration controls, the Wilson government 
introduced the first official measures to outlaw racial discrimination in Britain. The 
Race Relations Act of 1965 prohibited racial discrimination in public places and set 
up the Race Relations Board to ensure the compliance of the new provisions. This 
Act was followed by the Race Relations Act of 1968, which extended the provisions 
to include discrimination in housing and employment.597 The fact that these Acts were 
both introduced in the same year as immigration legislation suggested that the 
Wilson government saw these two issues as interlinked. In his 1965 memorandum, 
Soskice argued that the best way to handle the issue of immigration is by 
implementing what he described as a ‘package deal’.598 Soskice defined this 
‘package deal’ as ‘the more or less simultaneous announcement of a number of 
measures, designed not merely to make control more effective, but also to integrate 
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the coloured immigrants in a genuine sense into the community’.599 This ‘package 
deal’ thus meant tougher measures to curtail further immigration to Britain and 
legislation to help integrate migrants who were already here. 
In 1966, Bottomley claimed that ‘probably the most important principle on 
which the Commonwealth rests is the principle of complete racial equality’.600 
However, he claimed that ‘this question of racial equality has clouded the issue of 
immigration’ as the issue here ‘is not one of equality, it is one of integration’.601 
Bottomley noted that there was ‘a national shortage of housing and severe pressure 
on hospitals, schools and other services’. He believed that ‘it would be the height of 
folly to exacerbate the effect of these shortages by opening the floodgates to 
unrestricted immigration’.602 This ‘package deal’ was thus based on the assumption 
that race relations in Britain would only improve if the number of immigrants arriving 
was significantly reduced. As Evan Smith observed, ‘the emphasis of the Labour 
government’s platform on immigration during this period was on the notions of 
“integration” and “absorption”, but the government believed that integration could not 
occur without immigration controls’.603 As Roy Hattersley, the Labour MP for 
Birmingham Sparkbrook, put it in 1965, ‘without limitation, integration is 
impossible’.604 This assumption was evident in the Cabinet’s deliberations on the 
Kenyan Asians crisis. The Cabinet concluded that unless the inflow of migrants was 
greatly reduced, ‘there was a very real risk that our efforts to create a multi-racial 
society in this country would fail’.605 The Cabinet argued that the passage of the Race 
Relations Bill, in particular, ‘would be jeopardised if nothing were done to reduce the 
present inflow’.606 David Ennals, the Home Office Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
claimed that the main motive behind the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 
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‘was to avoid a worsening situation for race relations in Britain’ as the continued 
inflow of Kenyan Asians would have ‘stimulated racial prejudice’.607  
However, the notion that tougher immigration controls would help reduce 
racism in Britain was challenged by some. David Winnick, a Labour MP, claimed that 
‘by constantly raising the question whether or not we want more Commonwealth 
immigrants here, we tend to make it all the more difficult to integrate those 
immigrants who have been in our country for some years’.608 Rose contended that 
‘the emphasis on the need for control helped to create the anxieties it was intended 
to calm, with the curious result that public concern was eventually prayed in aid of 
policies that had helped to create it’.609 Thus, despite its apparently benign motives, 
this ‘package deal’ of limitation and integration represented a marked departure from 
Labour’s principled position on immigration while in opposition. In order to 
understand the reasons for this changing approach, we must, first of all, examine the 
precise basis on which the Labour Party opposed controls in 1961—namely, the 
importance that senior figures attached to the Commonwealth ideal. 
Immigration and the ‘Commonwealth Ideal’  
One of the striking aspects of Labour’s original opposition to immigration 
controls was the emphasis given to its ramifications for the Commonwealth. The idea 
of immigration control was first discussed in Parliament following the race riots of 
1958, when Cyril Osborne, a right-wing Conservative MP, introduced a motion 
calling for restrictions.610 Bottomley, leading Labour’s opposition to the motion, 
claimed that such legislation would violate the principle of free movement, which he 
believed lay at the heart of the Commonwealth ideal since the British Nationality Act 
of 1948. As he put it, ‘the central principle on which our status in the Commonwealth 
is largely dependent is the “open door” to all Commonwealth citizens… If we believe 
in the importance of our great Commonwealth, we should do nothing in the slightest 
degree to undermine that principle’.611  
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Bottomley repeated this argument in a speech to the new Ghanaian 
parliament in 1959. Bottomley declared, ‘in my parliament last year I had the 
opportunity of supporting the British Nationality Act. By that Act, we recognise the 
citizenship of Ghana and Commonwealth citizenship at the same time’.612 He recited 
the Calvin Case of 1608, which proclaimed that ‘anyone from within the King’s 
allegiance, wheresoever and whensoever, should enjoy all the legal rights of a free-
born denizen of England’.613 The Calvin Case that Bottomley referred to addressed 
the question of whether people born in Scotland following the succession of the 
Scottish King James VI to the English crown in 1603 would be considered ‘subjects’ 
in England. This case resulted in the declaration that all persons born within any 
territory held by the King of England were subjects.614 The fact that Bottomley cited 
this famous case demonstrated the importance that he ascribed to the ‘open door’ 
principle as well as the long lifespan of Britain’s imperial citizenry.   
The potential impact of immigration controls on the Commonwealth 
relationship remained a central concern for senior Labour figures when the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was brought to Parliament in 1961. Foot argued that 
‘the fundamental argument which ran through every speech in opposition to the Bill 
from all sections of the Parliamentary Labour Party heralded Bottomley’s rallying cry 
about “our great Commonwealth”’.615 Rose claimed that the Bill was debated ‘almost 
exclusively by reference to its impact on the Commonwealth’ and that other 
criticisms of the Bill ‘were not developed at any length’.616 Gaitskell described the 
Bill’s introduction as a ‘tragic and very sad day for the Commonwealth’ as it was 
‘saying to the world that we cannot absorb or integrate into our community more than 
1 per cent of the population’.617 Gordon Walker argued that the more he studied the 
Bill, the more he came to the conclusion that ‘it is ill-conceived and that it will do 
irreparable damage to the Commonwealth’.618  
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However, this devotion to the Commonwealth and the principle of free 
movement was not shared by all senior Labour figures. In a broadcast on the BBC 
Hebrew Service, Crossman recognised that ‘one of the proudest claims of our 
Commonwealth was the assertion that everyone who could claim citizenship of a 
British colony was a British citizen’, and, therefore, ‘had the right to live in the most 
overpopulated island in the world’.619 Yet, Crossman noted that prior to 1948 this 
privilege was only used by ‘a minuscule minority’ and ‘we were able to boast that the 
motherland was open to everyone, precisely because so few came’.620 He argued 
that since the war the situation had changed and non-white immigration posed an 
especial problem as migrants ‘tended to concentrate in areas where labour and 
housing are in shortest supply’.621 Crossman also challenged Gaitskell’s view that the 
Bill would do irreparable damage to the Commonwealth, at a time when he believed 
‘its future was anyway in doubt’.622 Significantly, 1961 was also the year of Britain’s 
first application to join the EEC. Although Crossman’s argument was at odds with the 
official Labour position at this time, his approach to immigration would later come to 
the fore when Labour returned to power in 1964.   
Another recurrent aspect of Labour’s opposition to controls was the argument 
that Britain had a moral obligation to allow the free entry of non-white 
Commonwealth citizens because of the historical legacy of empire. In his response 
to Osborne’s motion, Bottomley declared that Britain has ‘a special place’ in the 
Commonwealth ‘as the most industrialised community’ and, therefore, has a direct 
responsibility for its former colonial subjects ‘when they are poor, badly housed or 
unemployed’.623 He claimed that since ‘a great deal of our standard of living is 
possible because of our association with these backward people, we cannot shirk 
our responsibility towards them when they, in their turn, ask for some help’.624 This 
argument was echoed by Lord Royle, a Labour peer, who opposed the renewal of 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act because he believed that Britain ‘cannot be very 
proud of the economic and social conditions that it left, for example, in Jamaica after 
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300 years’.625 Fenner Brockway similarly claimed in 1965 that ‘these immigrants are 
economic refugees, driven here by a poverty which our forefathers had a great 
responsibility for’.626   
However, this argument was criticised by other politicians, particularly on the 
Conservative right. Norman Pannell, a Conservative MP and critic of immigration, 
condemned what he termed the ‘guilt complex’ that was displayed by Labour 
politicians—namely, the idea that ‘because during the colonial era Britain grossly 
exploited the countries from which the immigrants come, it is poetic justice that this 
country should endure them in retribution for the sins of the past’.627 He posited that 
‘without colonisation, these countries would have remained backward and under-
developed’.628 Griffiths also touched on this ‘guilt complex’ in his personal account of 
the Smethwick election. Griffiths claimed that Britain owed no special debt to its 
former colonial subjects and if anything, ‘the debt owed is one of gratitude to the men 
and women who brought prosperity in place of poverty, education in place of 
ignorance and health in place of disease’.629 He argued that now these countries 
have their independence, ‘we too demand independence’.630 Griffiths thus implied 
that Britain’s ties with its former colonies through the Commonwealth association 
was undermining British decision-making sovereignty, in this case by influencing the 
way policy-makers approached the question of immigration. 
Significantly, Bottomley also drew on this notion of ‘independence’ to justify 
Labour's immigration policy. Although Bottomley recognised that Britain’s 
immigration policy had been ‘frequently criticised by those to whom we have recently 
handed over political power’, he played down the implications of this criticism.631 
Bottomley claimed that it was ‘inevitable that Britain should from time to time pursue 
policies of which some of our Commonwealth friends disapprove’.632 The language 
used by Bottomley in this speech also symbolised his declining commitment to the 
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Commonwealth. Bottomley argued that ‘we are criticised for not fully opening our 
doors to all who wish to crowd into our tiny island’.633 Hence, for Bottomley, Britain 
was no longer ‘a special place’ at the heart of the Commonwealth, rather a ‘tiny 
island’ that could no longer admit non-white citizens without restraint. The ‘our’ in 
‘our tiny island’, in particular, signified a narrower definition of British citizenship 
compared to the one that Bottomley had defended so passionately just a few years 
earlier. 
Bottomley was not the only senior Labour figure to seemingly relinquish his 
support for the Commonwealth after 1964. As the previous chapter demonstrated, 
the Wilson government’s enthusiasm for the Commonwealth quickly waned once it 
became clear that Britain could no longer retain a special role as the ‘mother 
country’. The criticism that Britain faced by the non-white countries, especially over 
the Rhodesia crisis, convinced the Wilson government to lessen its ties with the 
Commonwealth. Crucially, this rupture in the Commonwealth relationship coincided 
with Britain’s second application to join the EEC in 1967.634 Consequently, in this 
context, concerns about the possible impact of immigration controls on the 
Commonwealth arguably became less important to Labour policy-makers. This issue 
has been touched on by some scholars. Hansen argued that the passage of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1968 ‘pointed to the declining role of the 
Commonwealth in post-war British politics’.635 According to Hansen, the fact that the 
Bill was passed within a year of Britain's unsuccessful application to join the EEC, 
‘confirms the importance of 1968 as a landmark year in the attenuation of Labour's 
commitment to the Commonwealth’.636 Foot claimed that one of the main reasons 
why Labour’s opposition to immigration controls collapsed was ‘the inevitable decline 
of the “Commonwealth ideal’’’.637 For Foot, its ‘irrelevance to modern politics was one 
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of the main reasons why Labour’s opposition to controls fell off and never 
recovered’.638  
The British Public and the Commonwealth 
This supposed ambivalence towards the Commonwealth was reflected in a 
1969 Gallup poll, in which just 32 per cent of respondents said that it would be 
serious for Britain if the Commonwealth were to break up and 28 per cent said it 
would not be serious at all.639 Although it would be difficult to attach too much 
significance to this one poll, the fact that such a question was even asked suggests 
the growing sense among some Britons in this period that the Commonwealth was 
becoming less important to Britain’s standing in the world. Not only was the 
Commonwealth seemingly diminishing in value, it was also perceived by some 
commentators as a potentially harmful electoral issue for Labour, especially as it 
became associated with non-white immigration. In July 1964, an article in Socialist 
Commentary claimed that ‘there was one issue on which the Labour Party and the 
electorate are far from seeing eye to eye’.640 The article cited a recent poll in which 
over half of respondents put immigration at the top of a list of important issues. The 
article also remarked that ‘polls have been unable to reveal any particular animosity 
to apartheid’ yet Labour had made the issue of racism in South Africa ‘one of the 
most easily discernible differences between the two parties’.641 The article questioned 
whether Labour has considered ‘the possible electoral cost of its protestations’ and 
projected that ‘a number of seats may be involved’.642 This article thus forecasted an 
electoral backlash against a Labour elite that supposedly prioritised Commonwealth 
affairs above the domestic concerns of their constituents. 
This theme has been addressed by some scholars. Howe argued that 
‘specialisation in colonial affairs was far from advantageous to the MPs concerned in 
terms of their electoral popularity’.643 According to Howe, ‘when domestic race 
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relations became an electoral issue in the 1960s those who had devoted much of 
their time and energy to campaigning for racial equality both in the colonies and in 
Britain often seemed to suffer for it’.644 This problem was alluded to by John Strachey 
who claimed that while Britain has given, through its democratic institutions, ‘under-
privileged sections of our population fairly effective means of insisting that we come 
to their assistance, this has been far less true of its relationship with the peoples of 
the undeveloped world’.645 According to Strachey, ‘their fate has not really been 
considered our concern as they have had no votes in our communities’.646 He 
claimed that while Labour MPs ‘may be good, humanitarianly-minded men, 
professionally, they cannot go beyond what is sanctioned by the state of mind of 
their peoples’, otherwise ‘they will simply cease to represent their electorate and 
others will replace them’.647 Strachey thus implied that the more Labour politicians 
spoke out on colonial issues, the more likely that they would be rejected by their 
constituents.  
This problem was arguably manifested in Brockway’s defeat at the Eton and 
Slough election in 1964.648 Brockway was well-known for campaigning on colonial 
affairs throughout the post-war period. From 1954, he was chairman of the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom and was nicknamed the ‘Member for Africa’ by 
some MPs as he frequently raised African issues in parliament.649 Brockway also 
applied his activism to domestic causes as in nine successive years he introduced a 
Bill to prohibit racial discrimination in Britain.650 In his autobiography, Towards 
Tomorrow, Brockway claimed that his association with anti-racialism at home and 
abroad ‘aroused vicious antagonism from people obsessed by colour prejudice’.651 
He frequently received abusive letters and telephone calls. On one occasion, the 
front of his house was covered with swastikas and the slogan, ‘Keep Britain White’.652 
Although Brockway recognised that the people who went to those extremes were ‘a 
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lunatic fringe’, he nevertheless believed that in their racialist views, they represented 
‘a much wider section of the community who resent the presence of coloured 
persons’.653 He noted that during his period as MP, ‘feeling was bitter’ against 
immigrant workers in Slough and ‘he became disturbed by the prejudice against 
them’.654 Brockway argued that ‘undoubtedly the determining issue’ in his defeat was 
what he described as ‘the invasion of Slough by Commonwealth immigrants’.655 
Significantly, Brockway was criticised by his opponents for allegedly devoting 
all his time to colonial affairs.656 Brockway was critical of Henry Brooke, the 
Conservative Home Secretary, who was reported in the Slough press as saying that 
he had never heard Brockway speak in the Commons except on colonial issues.657 
Brockway’s defeat thus suggested that the British public was not only indifferent 
towards Commonwealth matters, they were also becoming frustrated with Labour 
politicians harking on about empire, especially in the context of domestic problems 
supposedly caused by non-white immigration. However, it was not just the electorate 
that was seemingly irritated with Brockway’s activism. According to Brockway, on 
polling day he learned that in one of Slough’s biggest wards, with a large Labour 
vote, no Labour election committee had functioned because the local secretary did 
not like his views on race.658  
Initially, though, many senior Labour figures considered these electoral 
concerns as secondary to the party’s commitment to the Commonwealth. Gaitskell 
claimed in 1959 that ‘if you were to say to me, “we've got to accept the colour bar, 
because you'll never get into power if you don't”, I should say in not very polite 
language, “Go to hell” as that's absolutely against my principles’.659 Castle similarly 
declared in 1962, ‘I do not care whether or not fighting this Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill will lose me my seat, for I am sure that the Bill will lose this country 
the Commonwealth’.660 Interestingly, Castle reportedly fell asleep during the Cabinet 
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meeting on the Kenyan Asians crisis on 22nd February 1968.661 This one moment 
thus captured the speed with which senior Labour figures lost interest in the 
Commonwealth. While Castle and Gaitskell were prepared to lose their seats over 
this issue, the Labour Party soon changed its position on immigration once it 
returned to power in 1964. The Commonwealth ideal and the ‘open door’ principle 
were apparently disposed of once it seemed that Labour could lose significant 
electoral support over this issue. As Foot put it, ‘the mere possibility of losing votes 
because of the “glorious Commonwealth ideal” was enough to make most former 
Commonwealth enthusiasts forget all about it’.662  
However, the extent to which Labour’s opposition to immigration controls was 
electorally disadvantageous for Labour politicians is questionable. In Eton and 
Slough, for example, Brockway lost by just eleven votes on a minute swing of 0.1 per 
cent against Labour. In such circumstances, it is difficult to determine how far the 
issue of immigration was really decisive.663 Brockway himself acknowledged after the 
election that ‘a downpour of rain in the last hours of voting may have hurt him more 
than his opponent’.664 In any case, the constituency soon returned to Labour in 1966 
as Joan Lestor won with a majority of 4,663.665 The next section will assess the 
extent to which race represented a salient electoral issue in this period and ask 
whether Labour politicians were unnecessarily anxious about the political 
consequences of their policy towards immigration. 
A ‘Vote Loser?’: Electoral Pressures 
As mentioned earlier, the traditional narrative asserts that popular hostility 
towards non-white newcomers drove the Labour elite to change its immigration 
policy. This argument was most notably put forward by Crossman, who argued that 
the 1964 election and Smethwick, in particular, signified a ‘pro-Tory undertow 
against Labour on the ground that we were soft on immigration’ and so Labour ‘had 
to out-trump the Tories’ by rethinking its policy.666 According to Crossman, ‘it is a sad 
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fact that when the Conservative government introduced the recent Immigration Act 
most of the electorate saw this as a welcome attempt to keep out the West Indians, 
Pakistani and Indians who have been pouring into the country in the last few 
years’.667 This view is supported by a 1961 Gallup poll, in which 76 per cent of 
respondents approved of the measures the Macmillan government planned to take in 
controlling immigration from the Commonwealth.668  
Although Soskice was officially the minister responsible for immigration, 
Crossman claimed to have played an active role in Labour’s policy-making. In his 
diary accounts, Crossman noted that he was involved in many sittings of the Cabinet 
Committee on Immigration. He wrote in one entry, ‘as the committee has proceeded 
under Soskice’s chairmanship he has been gradually dragged out of his purely 
liberalistic attitude to a recognition that we have to combine tight immigration controls 
with a constructive policy for integrating immigrants who are here already’.669 
Crossman mentioned that on more than one occasion Wilson made it clear that he 
wanted to transfer control of immigration over to the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, which was at the time headed by Crossman.670 He refused, though, on 
the grounds that he did not like being given the job because the government had 
what he described as an ‘incompetent’ Home Secretary.671 Although Crossman 
turned down the chance to take charge of immigration policy, the fact that Wilson 
offered him this role indicated Labour’s shift towards the tougher approach long 
advocated by Crossman.   
This new approach was manifested in the 1965 White Paper, Immigration 
from the Commonwealth. Crossman claimed that ‘the white paper had taken the 
poison out of politics so that in the 1966 election immigration was no longer a 
political issue’.672 Emanuel Shinwell, the chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 
also cited the apparent electoral benefits of the new measure. In a 1965 debate, 
Shinwell questioned whether Soskice was aware that by introducing proposed 
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modifications to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act ‘he is making it impossible for 
the Leader of the Opposition to fight the next election on the subject of 
immigration’.673    
Opinion polls and surveys during this period, though, present a different 
picture regarding the impact of the immigration issue on the British electorate. 
Certainly, opinion polls indicate that the British public were generally supportive of 
immigration controls. David Butler and Donald Stokes’ post-election surveys reveal 
‘an undeviating opposition’ to non-white immigration throughout the 1960s.674 In 
Butler and Stokes’ surveys of 1964, 1966 and 1970, never less than 80 per cent of 
those polled believed that too many immigrants had been let into Britain.675 Gallup 
polls also suggest popular public support for restrictions. In a 1961 poll, 76 per cent 
of respondents approved of the Conservative government’s planned immigration 
restrictions; in a 1965 poll, 87 per cent approved of the Wilson government’s stricter 
controls and, in a 1968 poll, 90 per cent believed that the government was right to 
place further restrictions on immigrants following the Kenyan Asians crisis.676    
However, this popular approval of restrictions does not necessarily prove that 
immigration was a significant issue for the electorate. In a 1961 Gallup poll, 94 per 
cent of respondents claimed that the debate over the Immigration Bill had no 
influence on the way they intended to vote at the next election, and only 2 per cent 
said it had caused them to switch from Labour.677 Equally, in the 1966 Survey of 
Race Relations in Britain, only 14 per cent of those polled said that they regarded 
coloured immigration as a very important part of their problems, and over two-thirds 
said that it was of no importance.678 Hence, while the majority of the British public 
may have disapproved of Labour’s position on immigration, there were arguably 
other more pressing issues that influenced voting behaviour during this period. Butler 
and Stokes argued that ‘although it lost Labour three seats against the tide in 1964, 
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and probably prevented them from winning several others, the immigration issue 
never exercised anything like its potential electoral impact at the 1964 election’.679 
They attribute the supposed marginal impact of the immigration issue to the British 
public’s failure to differentiate between the positions of the two main parties. In their 
1964 survey, 26 per cent said that they thought that the Conservatives were more 
likely to keep immigrants out compared to 19 per cent who thought Labour, while 41 
per cent believed that there was no difference between the two parties.680 According 
to Butler and Stokes, ‘in such circumstances, the issue can hardly have had great 
influence on the strength of the parties across the country as a whole’.681   
In their analysis of the 1964 election, David Butler and Anthony King claimed 
that while the ‘issue of immigration was much talked about in the West Midlands, as 
well as in one or two London constituencies, it seemed to have had little influence on 
voting in most affected areas’.682 They noted that in the London constituencies with a 
high concentration of West Indian immigrants, the swing to Labour tended to be 
above the national average.683 According to Butler and King, the issue of immigration 
was rarely debated at the national level, with the exception of one speech by the 
Conservative Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, in which he claimed that Britain 
would have been flooded with immigrants but for the passage of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act.684 Butler and King argued that ‘the leadership of the main parties 
were expressly determined not to exploit the immigration issue’.685  
One notable exception to this was Duncan Sandys, the Conservative 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1960-1962) and Colonial Secretary 
(1962-1964), who from the mid-1960s onwards launched a vociferous attack on the 
Wilson government’s race relations and immigration policies.686 In a parliamentary 
debate in 1966, Sandys called for the House to ‘examine our whole attitude towards 
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immigration’ and, in particular, discuss what he described as ‘the most delicate 
aspect of the question—the racial aspect’.687 In a speech the previous year, he 
argued that there had been ‘too much woolly talk on the question of immigration’, 
criticising the assumption that ‘this is not a racial problem’ and simply one of 
numbers. ‘We all know’, Sandys remarked, that if the immigrants were ‘Australians it 
would be quite easy to absorb, but when they are people of different races, 
sometimes of different religions, and speak different languages, the problem of 
integration is very much more difficult’.688 Going beyond the official Conservative 
line, he called for a ‘complete stop on all immigration’ and demanded that the 
government should ‘reduce the number’ already living in Britain.689 Sandys’ views 
though were a departure from the discourse at the national level during this period, 
at least until Powell’s speech in 1968.  
One constituency where the immigration issue undoubtedly affected Labour 
adversely in 1964 was Smethwick. Smethwick, a provincial town on the outskirts of 
Birmingham, was a predominantly working class constituency, which had voted 
solidly for Labour since 1945. However, it also contained a growing population of 
non-white immigrants, which by 1964 represented around 6 per cent of the 
population.690 A Labour majority of 3,544 at the 1959 election was transformed into a 
Conservative majority of 1,744 in 1964.691 This result represented a swing of 7.2 per 
cent, the largest swing against Labour in any constituency during the election.692 
Michael Hartley-Brewer argued in his case study of the Smethwick election that ‘the 
result was an anomaly, and can only be explained by anomalous circumstances— it 
was clear that Gordon Walker’s defeat was due to the immigration issue’.693 He cited 
a small survey of Smethwick voters, in which over half of the respondents stated that 
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they felt immigration, race or colour was the single most important issue of the 
election.694  
Gordon Walker was subject to a considerable amount of criticism during the 
campaign. At a pre-election rally, he acknowledged that it had been ‘a dirty, rough 
campaign’ and that a lot of lies had been spread about him.695 These included 
rumours that his daughter had married a black man and that he had sold his house 
in Smethwick to immigrants.696 This dirty campaign was epitomised by the slogan, ‘If 
you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour’.697 Although Griffiths 
denied responsibility for the slogan, he refused to criticise those who expressed their 
feelings in what he described as ‘earthy language’.698 According to Griffiths, this 
‘strong popular feeling should be channelled into positive action’ and that was one of 
the main functions of the Smethwick Conservative Party.699 Thus, while Griffiths 
distanced himself from such racialist language, he nevertheless believed that it was 
his duty to provide a political channel for this supposed popular resentment about 
immigration. The Griffiths campaign thus focused almost exclusively on immigration. 
According to Hartley-Brewer, immigration ‘received more attention from Griffiths both 
in his election literature and at his meetings than any other issue’.700 
In his personal account of the election, Griffiths touched on the idea that 
Labour leaders were preoccupied with Commonwealth affairs and out of touch with 
the problems of their traditional working class constituents. Griffiths questioned why 
Labour MPs, who have known ‘full well the misery being created in their areas’ by 
immigration, have not spoken up ‘for the working class that they claimed to 
represent’.701 For Griffiths, the answer lay in Labour’s belief in ‘the solidarity of the 
workers of every race and nationality’.702 He claimed that this made the exclusion of 
non-white immigrants ‘anathema to the doctrinaire socialist’.703 Griffiths cited the fact 
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that many senior Labour figures were committed members of groups opposing 
apartheid in South Africa. He argued that ‘this great mass of opinion within the 
Labour Party made its attitude to immigration control inevitable’.704 This argument 
thus echoed the Socialist Commentary article, which suggested that Labour’s pro-
Commonwealth and anti-racialist rhetoric would have negative repercussions, 
particularly in areas affected by immigration. 
As Labour’s leading Commonwealth spokesman, Gordon Walker arguably felt 
the force of this apparent backlash in his defeat at Smethwick. Robert Pearce argued 
in his introduction to Gordon Walker's diaries that though Gordon Walker expressed 
his support for the Commonwealth with ‘cogency and passion’, ‘to put it bluntly, he 
backed a loser’.705 Pearce claimed that the Commonwealth failed to evoke much 
public interest, and when Commonwealth issues did hit the headlines—namely, on 
immigration—his ‘pro-Commonwealth stance won him only unpopularity’.706 
According to Pearce, ‘few positive reputations could be built on a Commonwealth 
scaffolding’.707    
Ironically, Gordon Walker had a rather chequered history on Commonwealth 
issues. As alluded to earlier, in 1950 Gordon Walker authorised the controversial 
exile of Seretse Khama from the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Also, Gordon Walker 
supported the idea of federation in Central Africa, which came to fruition under the 
Conservative government in 1953. The irony that Gordon Walker, a man who was 
condemned for his apparent bow to racism on these colonial issues, lost at the 
hands of a racialist campaign in 1964 was not lost on some scholars. Foot argued 
that ‘one of the most ironic aspects of the racialist campaign by the Smethwick 
Conservatives was its target’.708 According to Foot, ‘the man who bore the brunt of 
the attack, the man they painted in the most lurid colours, was perhaps the most 
reactionary of all Labour’s old guard’.709 Pearce similarly noted that with his defeat at 
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Smethwick, ‘the Seretse Khama issue had finally been forgotten—with a 
vengeance’.710  
Furthermore, while Gordon Walker was criticised for opposing the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in 1961, his views on immigration were actually far 
less liberal than his critics suggested.711 In as early as 1957, he argued that ‘it is 
conceivable that the inflow from other parts of the Commonwealth, including Asia 
and the West Indies, could become so great that it could not be left wholly 
uncontrolled’.712 He was certainly not averse to putting this view forward during the 
election campaign. In July 1964, the Smethwick Labour Party issued 20,000 copies 
of a leaflet titled, Labour’s Point of View on Immigration. It pledged that Labour would 
maintain immigration controls and introduce stricter health controls and powers to 
deport criminals.713 In a pre-election speech, Gordon Walker admitted that the current 
rate of immigration ‘might be too high’ and that the present controls ‘may be letting 
too many people in at a time when social problems are being created’.714 
The Labour campaign in Smethwick sometimes exploited the immigration 
issue itself for political ends. Shortly before the election, the Smethwick Labour Party 
issued a pamphlet which stated that ‘immigrants only arrived in Smethwick in large 
numbers during the past ten years–while the Tory government was in power’.715 The 
pamphlet exclaimed, ‘you can’t blame Labour or Gordon Walker for that’.716 In 
another leaflet, Gordon Walker wrote that ‘a lie has been spread that I was in some 
way responsible for the coming of Commonwealth immigrants to Britain’.717 He 
claimed that this was ‘sheer nonsense’ as ‘the main flow of immigrants happened to 
come in the thirteen years during which the Conservatives were in office’.718 Foot 
argued that ‘without gaining more than a handful of votes, Labour’s tactics at 
Smethwick lost what was far more important—a hard core of principled opposition to 
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racialist propaganda’.719 For Foot, by employing such tactics, ‘Gordon Walker allowed 
anti-immigrant slander to gain credence and respectability by default’.720 
Consequently, while immigration was undoubtedly the decisive factor in 
Gordon Walker’s defeat, the campaign was nevertheless far more complex than the 
traditional narrative suggests. The Smethwick Labour Party were also susceptible to 
exploiting the race issue, albeit not to the same abhorrent extent as the 
Conservatives. Moreover, the extent to which the Smethwick result was indicative of 
a broader problem that Labour had on immigration is doubtful. This result was not 
replicated in other West Midland or South-East constituencies with similar 
immigration ‘problems’ and the constituency soon returned to Labour in 1966 as 
Andrew Faulds won with a majority of 3,490.721 In their analysis of the 1966 election, 
Butler and King claimed that since 1964 ‘Griffiths’ position in Smethwick had 
weakened considerably’.722 According to Butler and King, ‘the immigration issue had 
lost some of its novelty’, especially after Gordon Walker had disappeared from the 
scene.723  
Unlike Gordon Walker, Faulds refused to exploit the immigration issue for 
electoral purposes. Faulds declared upon his selection as Labour candidate that he 
believed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was ‘largely racialist’.724 A Guardian 
article noted that this view brought him into ‘direct conflict with the point of view that 
is credited with clinching Griffiths’ election victory’.725 The article remarked that 
Faulds is ‘obviously determined not to go to any artificial lengths to curry favour, and 
thinks the next election will be won without it’.726 Faulds adhered to this approach as 
he opposed the Wilson government’s new immigration measures. He argued that the 
1965 white paper was ‘racialist’ and represented ‘a sad retreat from the principles of 
the Labour Party’.727 Although Faulds admitted that he ‘could coast home in 
Smethwick on this white paper’, he avowed that he did not ‘take on that seat to win it 
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by pandering to the racialist element’.728 Faulds’ victory in 1966 thus seemed to 
confound the notion that Labour politicians had to adopt a tough line on immigration 
in order to avoid electoral defeat in places such as Smethwick. Butler and King 
claimed that with Faulds’ success at Smethwick, ‘immigration as an election-winning 
issue was dead—possibly for all time’.729 While this claim is undoubtedly an 
overstatement, the fact that Faulds won in spite of his pro-immigration stance still 
brings into question the salience of race as an electoral issue during this period. The 
next section will return to the imperial theme by examining how the Rhodesia crisis, 
in particular, became interlinked with the domestic issue of immigration, thus 
reflecting a broader debate regarding the meaning of Britishness in the 1960s. 
Rhodesia, Immigration and ‘Britishness’ 
An intriguing aspect of Faulds’ approach towards immigration was his 
frequent references to the Rhodesia crisis. Butler and King noted that during the 
1966 election campaign Faulds was ‘always on the offensive’ as he sought to ‘define 
Griffiths as a candidate of the extreme right and supporter of Ian Smith’.730 Faulds 
most notably alluded to Rhodesia during the parliamentary debate on the 
Commonwealth Immigration Bill of 1968. Faulds argued that the Bill was ‘racialist’ as 
the exemption of people with familial connections to Britain was clearly aimed at 
‘white emigrants who might want to return’.731 He claimed that fairly soon Rhodesia 
would declare itself a republic, which would mean that the white settlers with British 
heritage would relinquish their British citizenry.732 Faulds asked, ‘what will happen to 
these people when, as is inevitable, the Africans liberate themselves and establish 
the State of Zimbabwe? Shall we then adopt a measure of similar discrimination 
against a quarter of a million Europeans scrambling to get on our drawbridge’?733 He 
thus used the hypothetical scenario of a white exodus from Rhodesia to expose the 
racial bias at the heart of Britain’s immigration policy.   
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Faulds also argued that ‘it will be interesting to see the reaction of certain 
honourable members sitting opposite’ to this potential situation.734 This comment was 
aimed at the small group of Conservative MPs who were sympathetic towards their 
white ‘kith and kin’ in Rhodesia and hostile to non-white immigrants in Britain. This 
connection was often used by Labour politicians to attack opponents of immigration. 
In 1965, Brockway claimed that there was ‘one extraordinary contradiction in the 
advocates of “Keep Britain White”. They do not want to keep Africa black’.735 
According to Brockway, ‘they are the foremost champions of white minority privileges 
in Rhodesia and South Africa’.736 In 1968, Gerald Gardiner remarked that it was 
‘rather curious that the right-wing of the Conservative Party, who tend here to say, 
“immigrants go home” do not make a similar noise in regard to the British in 
Rhodesia’.737 In 1969, Joan Lestor, a Labour MP, asked Michael Stewart, the Foreign 
Secretary, if he found it ‘curious that those people who are so hostile to immigrants 
in this country are so “pro” and sympathetic to white immigrants in Rhodesia’.738   
 This link between the Rhodesia crisis and the immigration issue has been 
addressed by some scholars. Schwarz argued that the coincidence of this colonial 
crisis at the same time as a domestic crisis triggered by non-white immigration 
‘created circumstances in which symbolically and politically, the two became 
superimposed’.739 He claimed that in Britain, the Rhodesia crisis ‘took on the 
appearance of a battle between two irreconcilable Englands’.740 On the one hand, 
there was a ‘New Britain’— interestingly, the title of Labour’s 1964 election 
manifesto—which was personified by Wilson, a man who Schwarz claimed was 
‘barely touched by the older trappings of empire’.741 On the other hand, there was an 
older, imperial conception of Britain based on white racial kinship, which was 
supposedly embodied by the Smith regime.742 According to Schwarz, the notion of a 
‘temporal divide between an old Rhodesia, still locked into the romantic imperial 
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past, and a modern Britain, which had apparently broken free from the detritus of 
empire, was a common perception of the time’.743 He noted that even Wilson 
occasionally thought in these terms. In a television address before UDI, Wilson said 
that Britain and Rhodesia were ‘living in almost different centuries’.744 However, for 
Schwarz, with non-white immigration to Britain, this supposedly archaic vision of 
Britain ‘came home’.745    
The Smith regime frequently drew on this notion of ‘Britishness’ to justify its 
rebellion. By issuing UDI on Remembrance Day, thereby reminding Britons of 
Rhodesia’s contribution to the Second World War, and signing off the UDI 
proclamation with the message, ‘God Save the Queen’, the Smith regime sought to 
preserve its British identity despite officially rebelling against the crown. In 1966, 
Smith claimed that ‘if Churchill were alive today, I believe he would probably 
emigrate to Rhodesia’.746 According to Smith, this was because ‘all those admirable 
qualities and characteristics of the British that we believed in, loved and preached to 
our children, no longer exist in Britain’.747 He thus used Churchill as a symbol of the 
‘British’ values that had lost sway at home and were apparently upheld by Rhodesia. 
Webster argued that by claiming Rhodesia as a place to which Churchill would now 
emigrate, ‘Smith constructed white Rhodesians as bearers of true Britishness, and 
true defenders of the nation, against a metropolis that they accused of betraying the 
cause of empire’.748  
In Englishness and Empire, Webster claimed that Smith’s verdict that the 
imperial identity associated with Churchill no longer had much currency among the 
British political establishment was ‘one that was widely articulated in the 1960s’.749 
Webster cites Guns at Batasi (1964) as an example of a film that ‘drew on a familiar 
analysis made by the white settler community in Rhodesia’.750 In Guns at Batasi, a 
group of British soldiers, led by the strict Regimental Sergeant Major Lauderdale, are 
faced with a coup in a fictional country in post-colonial Africa. The film pits 
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Lauderdale, a defender of the old imperial British values, against Miss Barker-Wise, 
a female MP, who symbolised the ‘new’ Britain supposedly divorced from empire. 
Barker-Wise supports the African nationalists and the mutinous officer, Lieutenant 
Boniface, while Lauderdale dismisses her views as ‘liberal’ and ‘bloody half-
baked’.751 The film endorses Lauderdale’s verdict by showing Boniface to be cruel 
and untrustworthy. Webster claimed that ‘in its portrayal of Barker-Wise, the film 
suggests Smith’s verdict on contemporary Britain and its politicians’—namely, ‘they 
betray the values of empire and, far from supporting a racial community of Britons, 
are enthusiasts for granting independence to Africans, putting at risk the livelihoods 
of whites’.752  
Significantly, this language of the beleaguered white settler was often utilised 
by critics of non-white immigration in Britain. This is evidenced in a series of letters 
from members of the public to Bottomley, who as Commonwealth Secretary played a 
key role in Labour’s Rhodesia policy. Through a close examination of these letters, it 
is evident that for many of the correspondents the colonial crisis in Rhodesia and the 
problem of immigration at home were synonymous. Although these letters are by no 
means representative of the British public as a whole, they nevertheless provide a 
sense of how some Britons thought about immigration and the meaning of 
Britishness in the 1960s. One letter argued that Bottomley was ‘in no position to 
criticise the living conditions of Africans in Rhodesia when you consider that 
thousands of decent working class English families are living in similar conditions 
thanks to this government’s policy of overcrowding our small country with 
foreigners’.753 This letter claimed that ‘minority rule in Rhodesia is unthinkable, but we 
seem to be getting black minority rule in this country’.754 This person thus saw a 
contradiction between Bottomley’s insistence on majority rule in Rhodesia and his 
support for non-white immigration to Britain; a policy that was supposedly imposed 
on an unwilling British public by politicians in Westminster. 
A recurrent theme in these letters is the number of correspondents who 
challenge the portrayal of Smith as a traitor for illegally declaring independence from 
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Britain. This characterisation was often employed by Bottomley. In a 1968 debate, 
Bottomley declared, ‘I hope that for the sake of parliament there will be no attempt to 
deal with a man whom I regard as a traitor’.755 In response, one letter argued, ‘I 
always thought that traitors were people who helped to hand over their own country 
to foreigners as your Labour government has done’.756 Another letter claimed that ‘if 
anyone deserves the tag of traitor, you undoubtedly fit the bill and not Smith’.757 
According to this correspondent, Bottomley’s first duty should be to his constituency 
and not to the black Rhodesians. The letter exclaimed, ‘where your pride of race and 
colour is, God alone knows’.758 Hence, for these correspondents, it was the Labour 
elite who were the real traitors to a white vision of Britain that was apparently being 
destroyed by immigration. 
Another common theme in these letters is the number of correspondents who 
express contempt towards the Commonwealth. In many letters, the non-white 
Commonwealth countries were disparagingly labelled as dictatorships. One letter 
argued, ‘you should remember that not one country given independence by Wilson 
has kept the agreement to govern by democratic law. All are dictators’.759 Another 
letter claimed, ‘you are partly responsible for the dislike of immigrants, and I will tell 
you why. Without exception, the Commonwealth countries which are coloured are 
one party dictatorships’.760 Thus, for this person, the apparent tendency of non-white 
countries to veer towards dictatorship somehow contributed to the hostility faced by 
non-white immigrants in Britain. In contrast, this letter described Rhodesia as ‘a fine 
country’ and claimed that ‘the natives have a better standard of living there than in 
any of the other African states so why not leave well alone’.761  
While senior Labour figures such as Bottomley portrayed the Commonwealth 
as a multi-racial ‘family of nations’, these correspondents, instead, subscribed to an 
older, more restrictive notion of the Commonwealth as a ‘white man’s club’, an 
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association that had seemingly become defunct as the non-white members became 
a majority. These competing visions of the Commonwealth were reflected in a 1969 
Gallup poll, in which 45 per cent said that the Commonwealth should combine all 
colours and creeds and 40 per cent said that they would prefer if the Commonwealth 
were confined to countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand with whom 
Britain ‘had a lot in common’.762 Interestingly, in the same poll, 34 per cent said that 
the Commonwealth hindered Britain’s negotiations with Rhodesia while 22 per cent 
thought that the Commonwealth helped the discussions.763 Although it would be 
difficult to attach too much meaning to this poll, the fact that these questions were 
put forward suggests a growing sense of the British public’s discontent with the 
Commonwealth as the non-white members began challenge British authority, most 
notably through their interventions on Rhodesia.    
This connection with the plight of the white settler in Africa was sometimes 
employed by Conservative campaigners in Smethwick. Two weeks before the 
election, Don Finney, a Conservative councillor and close aide of Griffiths, denied 
claims that the Conservatives had provoked racial hostilities in their campaign. 
Finney argued that ‘the term racialist now appears to be applied to anyone who tries 
to help English people who have problems caused by immigrants’.764 He countered 
that the only racialists he knew were ‘the new leaders and their friends in Africa, 
under whose rule people with white skins have had their livelihoods taken away’.765 
According to Finney, ‘people here shout their heads off if a coloured man says he 
has been refused service in a pub, but they don’t say a word when white people in 
Kenya are sacked or deported because of the colour of their skins’.766 Finney thus 
drew a parallel between the white settler communities in Africa and the white man in 
Britain, both supposedly beleaguered.       
Crucially, Griffiths himself drew on this connection to justify his opposition to 
immigration. In A Question of Colour Griffiths used the examples of Rhodesia and 
South Africa to support his racist assertion that non-white peoples could not be 
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integrated into European societies. Griffiths argued that ‘those who call for the 
integration of coloured immigrants into our society are muddled in their thinking’ as 
‘historical evidence’ indicated that ‘urban civilisation is most certainly not the natural 
environment for Negroes’.767 In the case of South Africa, he claimed that ‘white urban 
society was completely alien to the Bantu’, and apartheid made ‘special provision for 
the self-government of the Bantu peoples in their homeland’.768 In the case of 
Rhodesia, he asserted that its ‘great economic progress’ was ‘entirely due to 
European initiative’ as before the arrival of the Europeans in the 1890s, ‘the King’s 
kraal at Bulawayo was a hut of mud and wood floored with cow-dung’.769  
Griffiths believed that through these examples ‘we come to see the germ of 
the solution to racial tension’.770 He claimed that ‘the lesson for us in Britain is that 
relations between white and coloured races can be perfectly amicable as long as the 
social structure of each society is retained’.771 Consequently, in his opposition to 
immigration, Griffiths was well aware of the wider context of the decline of empire in 
the 1960s and, in particular, the demise of white imperial rule over supposedly 
uncivilised races. Griffiths and his supporters were arguably protesting not only 
about the single issue of immigration, but also the broader decline of whiteness both, 
domestically, as Britain became a more multi-racial society, and internationally, as 
the non-white countries became a more dominant presence in the Commonwealth. 
In this context, it is not surprising that Griffiths looked to Rhodesia and South Africa 
as the last bastions of white supremacy.772 
The Labour Party and the ‘British World’ 
Crucially for this thesis, although the Wilson government, in theory, endorsed 
a ‘new’ vision of Britain that was multi-racial and inclusive, in practise, its immigration 
policy suggested the enduring sway of this older vision of Britishness. As the chapter 
has demonstrated, Labour’s immigration policy was not only influenced by public 
pressures, it was also shaped by the way in which senior policy-makers viewed, at 
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least privately, the boundaries of British belonging in the 1960s. Interestingly, at the 
same time as tougher restrictions were placed on non-white immigrants, the Wilson 
government continued to endorse a racialised ‘British World’ that comprised the old 
Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Although Britain 
faced a skilled labour shortage in the early 1960s, Labour figures still encouraged 
emigration to the former settler empire. This migration was given official legislative 
approval through the renewal of the Commonwealth Settlement Act in 1967.773 This 
Act authorised an annual expenditure of £1.5million a year on assisted migration 
schemes for British emigrants to the Commonwealth.774 In May 1964, Bottomley 
claimed that ‘we want to retain the closest possible relations with Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. Emigration keeps our four countries bound together with those 
ties of blood which, I feel, will always be more important than legal institutions’.775 
According to Bottomley, ‘the whole history of this island and our place in the world 
has been based on the remarkable dispersal of the British people to other lands’.776  
This political endorsement of white emigration has been touched on by some 
scholars.777 Kathleen Paul argued that ‘British policy makers’ acquiescence in the 
loss of one of post-war Britain’s scarcest resources– labour–highlights the 
significance that post-war governments attached to the imperial ideal’.778 According 
to Paul, successive administrations were convinced that the emigrating ‘British stock’ 
would ‘retain allegiance to Britain and membership in the imperial and familial 
communities of Britishness’.779 Schwarz has claimed that this support for emigration 
‘derived from high imperial reasoning’.780 According to Schwarz, throughout the post-
war period ‘politicians from both parties advocated the peopling of Britain's erstwhile 
possessions with “British stock” in order to strengthen the ties between the mother 
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country and Commonwealth’.781 This sentiment was reflected in an article by Gordon 
Walker in 1956. Whilst acknowledging the costs of emigration—namely, ‘the loss of 
skilled and vigorous people and their replacement by lower-quality labour’—Gordon 
Walker declared that there were other important considerations.782 He argued that 
‘migrants are more than mere sources of economic power. They carry with them 
habits of mind and ways of life’.783 Gordon Walker claimed that ‘migration from Britain 
has been the formative and creative factor in the Commonwealth. It virtually peopled 
Australia and New Zealand, and it made a vital contribution to the populations of 
Canada and South Africa’.784 
Despite gaining official legislative independence as Dominions in 1931, 
Britain’s former settler colonies continued to attract migrants from the metropole. In 
the period 1946 to 1960, about 1.5million Britons moved to Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and South Africa and the self-governing colony of Rhodesia.785 This 
migration was actively encouraged by the receiving countries, who all introduced 
assisted passage schemes in some form after the war. In 1946, the Rhodesian 
government signed an agreement with Britain on assisted passages.786 In 1948, the 
New Zealand government introduced an assisted passages scheme that lasted until 
1976.787 The Canadian government also granted preferred immigration status to 
Britons after the war and introduced an assisted passages scheme in 1951.788 The 
most extensive scheme by far was introduced by Australia. In 1946, the Australian 
government began subsidising the travel costs for British migrants who paid just £10 
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for their fare, the so-called ‘Ten Pound Pom’ scheme.789 In total, 1,011,985 Britons 
benefited from this scheme until it was abandoned in 1972.790 
This vision of an expanded Britain, though, was undermined by the changing 
ethnic composition of migrants to the Dominions in the post-war period. As the 
demand for new settlers outweighed the supply of ‘British stock’, the Dominions 
increasingly recruited white migrants from non-British sources.791 In the period 1946 
to 1960, Britons accounted for only 35 per cent of immigrants into Australia; 29 per 
cent of immigrants to Canada and 53 per cent of immigrants to New Zealand.792 This 
phenomenon has been addressed by some scholars. Tony Hopkins claimed that 
‘imperial patriotism, which provided a measure of the strength of informal ties 
between Britain and the old Dominions, began to ebb from the 1960s’.793 According 
to Hopkins, the Commonwealth, long considered a ‘British club’, ‘came to be seen as 
a threat to British identity as non-white immigrants made their appearance in 
numbers that could readily be seen’.794 Moreover, ‘the ethnic basis of “Greater 
Britain” began to disintegrate, when it became clear that the number of “race 
patriots” emigrating to the empire was insufficient to maintain the required levels of 
“British stock’'’.795  
By viewing the domestic issue of immigration in conjunction with the decline of 
the ‘British World’, Hopkins offers a new way of thinking about the end of empire. 
Decolonisation could be defined, not merely as the loss of Britain’s non-settler 
colonies, but the decline of Britishness, both domestically, as non-white migrants 
arrived in the metropole, and internationally, as ties between Britain and the former 
settler empire diminished. This argument is echoed by James Belich who described 
the Dominion government’s recruitment of immigrants from non-British sources as ‘a 
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sign of decolonisation’.796 He pinpoints Britain’s first bid to join the European 
Economic Community in 1961, above all, as ‘a clear declaration of intent to apply 
euthanasia to Greater Britain’.797 Significantly, it was on this basis that the Labour 
Party initially opposed membership of the EEC. However, six years later, the Labour 
elite itself turned towards Europe with the vision of a ‘British World’ seemingly in 
tatters.  
The decline of the ‘British World’ together with the issue of non-white 
immigration was symptomatic of a broader problem regarding the meaning of 
Britishness in the 1960s. This chapter has shown that despite the multi-racial rhetoric 
expressed by many senior Labour figures, the Wilson government’s approach to 
immigration signified the endurance of an older, white conception of Britishness, 
which drew heavily on the legacies of imperial racism and, in particular, a 
civilisational doctrine that divided the advanced and backward peoples of the empire 
along racial lines. Just as Britain’s non-white colonies were seen as too primitive to 
be granted independence, non-white immigrants to Britain were deemed too 
culturally different to be integrated into British society. Labour leaders, having grown 
up in a world where the white imperial powers ruled over other races, saw only 
problems posed by the inflow of former non-white colonial subjects into the 
metropole. Crucially, this changing approach to immigration coincided with the 
Labour elite’s broader disillusionment with the Commonwealth in this period as 
Britain’s assumed leadership role was challenged by the non-white nations. It was 
this, rather than the influence of public pressures, that underpinned the Wilson 
government’s shift from the ideal of equality to the apparent necessity of integration. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the Wilson government’s approach to race and 
decolonisation in the period 1964-1970. Although most of Britain’s colonies gained 
their independence before Labour returned to power in 1964, the Wilson government 
was still faced with the question of Britain’s imperial role East of Suez and the 
seemingly intractable problem of Rhodesia. Moreover, the Wilson government had to 
address the social, economic and cultural effects of the end of the empire, both at 
home and abroad. Internationally, senior Labour figures had to outline the role that 
Britain would play with regards to its former colonies. This was evident in the Wilson 
government’s commitment to the Commonwealth and overseas development. 
Domestically, senior Labour figures were faced with another legacy of empire—the 
migration of former non-white colonial subjects to the metropole. Drawing on the 
claims of the New Imperial History, this thesis has explored the links between the 
Wilson government’s approach to these two issues. 
The first chapter provided a historical background to the Wilson government 
by exploring how senior Labour figures approached the issues of race and empire 
earlier in the twentieth century. Although senior Labour figures mostly rejected the 
overt racial ideologies typified by ‘scientific’ racism, they nevertheless drew on a 
long-standing liberal approach to empire that justified the continued subjugation of 
non-white peoples. The characterisation of empire as a ‘civilising mission’, above all, 
underpinned the Labour leadership’s approach towards empire throughout the 
twentieth century from Ramsay MacDonald’s notion of an ‘imperial standard’ to 
Arthur Creech Jones’ idea of colonial development as a prerequisite to 
independence. Africa, in particular, represented for these senior Labour figures a 
physical and discursive space in which the fires of this civilising mission still burned. 
The chapter argued that the Wilson government’s policy towards the former empire, 
particularly its vision of development, was a legacy of these earlier approaches.  
The second chapter traced the Wilson government’s growing disillusionment 
with the Commonwealth in the period 1964-1967. While the Wilson government 
entered office in 1964 with a firm commitment to the Commonwealth, this was 
contingent on Britain retaining a special role as the ‘mother country’. This condition 
stemmed from a narrative, which was popular among senior Labour figures, that cast 
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British statesmen, particularly in the post-war Attlee government, as the catalysts 
behind the creation of the multi-racial Commonwealth. This narrative, though, 
masked the reality in which the non-white nations had to assert themselves in order 
to force the pace of decolonisation and reshape the Commonwealth association. The 
chapter argued that the prevalence of this narrative among Labour leaders in part 
explains the Wilson government’s indignation at the political challenges it faced from 
the Commonwealth, especially the criticism that the non-white members levelled at 
Britain’s Rhodesia policy at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meetings of 1966. 
This was epitomised by Wilson’s complaint that Britain was being treated as if it were 
‘a bloody colony’. Consequently, once it became clear that Britain could no longer 
control the association and dominate its former colonies, the Wilson government’s 
interest in the Commonwealth soon diminished. 
The third chapter looked at the Labour Party’s changing approach to 
immigration in the period 1964-1968. While scholars have traditionally focused on 
the impact of events such as the Smethwick election, this chapter has instead 
situated Labour’s immigration policy within the broader context of the party’s shift 
away from the Commonwealth in this period. Although senior Labour figures initially 
defended non-white immigration as part of their broader ideological commitment to 
the Commonwealth, as Labour’s vision for the Commonwealth began to wane, 
concerns about the possible impact of immigration controls on the Commonwealth 
relationship seemingly became less important to Labour policy-makers. Crucially, the 
difficulties that supposedly emanated from integrating former colonial peoples into 
British society reflected the Labour elite’s own assumptions regarding non-white 
races, which were shaped by the legacies of empire. This chapter has also argued 
that the Wilson government’s approach to immigration was symptomatic of a deeper 
issue regarding the meaning of Britishness in the 1960s. While the Wilson 
government, in theory, promoted a vision of a ‘new’ Britain that was supposedly 
divorced from empire, in reality its approach to immigration suggested the enduring 
sway of an imperial conception of Britishness based on white racial kinship. 
Significantly, at the same time as the Wilson government introduced tougher 
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restrictions on non-white immigrants, senior Labour figures continued to support a 
racialised ‘British World’ linked together by ‘ties of blood’.798  
Thus, while the Labour Party formally endorsed the multi-racial association, 
senior Labour figures seemingly could not shake off a more archaic vision of the 
Commonwealth as a ‘white man’s club’. This was especially evident in the Wilson 
government’s immigration policy. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, by 
extending controls to citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies without a proven 
‘close connection’ to Britain, created a distinction between white Commonwealth 
citizens who could claim lineage with Britain and non-white Commonwealth citizens 
who could no longer claim to be ‘British’. This racialised separation of the 
Commonwealth later became official when the Heath government introduced the 
Immigration Act of 1971, which brought the concept of ‘patriality’ into British 
immigration law. Interestingly, this Act came into force on 1st January 1973, the same 
day in which Britain joined the European Economic Community and, in so doing, 
allowed the free movement of EEC members to Britain. Smith and Marmo argued 
that ‘it is evident from these two events that the concerns of the British government 
were not necessarily to do with labour migration as the door was opened for potential 
European workers’.799  
A key assumption at the heart of the Wilson government’s policy was that 
hostility towards non-white newcomers would only subside if the number of 
immigrants coming to Britain was significantly reduced. This was epitomised by 
Hattersley’s maxim that ‘without limitation, integration is impossible’.800 However, in 
1968, long after the Labour Party had abandoned its opposition to immigration 
controls, the issue of race in British politics again came to the fore when Enoch 
Powell delivered his ‘rivers of blood’ speech. Although Powell received a lot of 
criticism for the speech and was dismissed from the Shadow Cabinet, opinion polls 
and surveys during this period suggest that the ‘rivers of blood’ affair had an impact 
on the British electorate. In Butler and Stokes’ election survey of 1970, 57 per cent 
now believed that the Conservatives were more likely to keep immigrants out 
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compared to just 4 per cent who thought Labour.801 This represented a sizable shift 
from the 1964 survey when 26 per cent thought that the Conservatives were most 
likely to keep immigrants out compared to 19 per cent who thought Labour.  
Interestingly, this change in public perception occurred at a time when the two 
parties’ policies became more aligned following the Wilson government’s introduction 
of tougher restrictions. Butler and Stokes attribute this seeming paradox to the strong 
anti-immigrant feeling voiced by Powell. In a 1968 Gallup poll, 74 per cent said that 
they agreed with what Powell said in his speech.802 Butler and Stokes argued that 
though Powell was ‘far from the spokesman of his party, it is hard to doubt that he 
had succeeded in associating the Conservatives with opposition to immigration in the 
public mind’.803 These findings suggest that it was perception rather than policy that 
informed the British public’s attitude towards immigration and race in this period, thus 
undermining the idea that tougher restrictions would ease racial discrimination. As 
Peter Alexander put it, ‘immigration control was expected to reduce racism. The 
reverse happened. And with increased racism came further controls’.804 
Nevertheless, while Powell’s views may have garnered sympathy from significant 
sections of the British public, this does not necessarily mean that immigration was a 
major issue for the electorate. A key contention of this thesis is that such fears of 
racial tensions and electoral backlashes reflected the Labour elite’s own prejudiced 
assumptions about the difficulties supposedly posed by integrating non-white former 
colonial peoples into British society, a legacy of empire. 
In response to Powell’s speech, Wilson had declared a ‘battle against 
racialism’ that stretched from ‘Birmingham to Bulawayo’.805 However, just as the 
Wilson government seemingly failed to quell the racial bias at the heart of Britain’s 
immigration policy, it appeared powerless to stop the Smith regime from maintaining 
white minority rule in Rhodesia. The Wilson government’s sanctions campaign 
proved ineffective in bringing down the rebellion and it was not until 1980 that 
Zimbabwe finally gained independence under majority rule following a long guerrilla 
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war fought by rival nationalist groups.806 The Wilson government was criticised, 
particularly by the non-white nations, for allowing ‘kith and kin’ sympathies to 
influence their response to UDI and the issue almost caused a rupture in the 
Commonwealth relationship. Although Wilson managed to ease Commonwealth 
tensions by issuing a communique at the 1966 conference that reaffirmed Britain’s 
commitment to NIBMAR, the perception of Britain in the dock at the Commonwealth 
clearly did not sit well with a Labour elite that expected Britain to play a dominant 
role in the association. This moment, together with the creation of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, symbolised Britain’s diminishing role as the head nation.   
This notion of the Commonwealth moving away from British control was 
manifested in the Singapore Declaration issued by the assembled leaders at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 1971. The declaration outlined the 
core principles that were common to all Commonwealth members. Significantly, this 
included opposition to ‘all forms of colonial domination and racial oppression’.807 This 
declaration thus affirmed the Commonwealth’s official shift from a white-dominated 
club to a multi-racial and equal association in which Britain would no longer hold a 
special status. In later years, the Commonwealth would incorporate new members 
such as Mozambique and Rwanda with no former constitutional links to Britain.808 
Therefore, even historic ties to the British Empire were removed as a criterion of 
membership. This does not mean, however, that the Commonwealth was no longer 
an institution in which Britain could play a leading role. In 2013, Gambia quit the 
Commonwealth claiming that it will ‘never be a party to any institution that represents 
an extension of colonialism’.809 Thus, despite the significant changes that took place 
in the period covered in this thesis, the perception of the Commonwealth as a 
continuation of British influence over its former colonies still remains. This is arguably 
also evident in the enduring concept of overseas aid and development. Some 
                                                          
806 Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African 
National Union. For the Zimbabwe War of Liberation, see Paul L. Moorcraft, The Rhodesian War: A 
Military History (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2008). 
807 Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, Issued at the Heads of Government Meeting 
in Singapore on 22nd January 1971 (Commonwealth Secretariat: Pall Mall, London, 1971). 
808 Mozambique joined in 1995 and Rwanda in 2009. 
809 ‘Gambia quits the Commonwealth’, The Guardian, 3rd October 2013. 
145 
 
scholars have linked modern concepts of international security, development and 
humanitarian intervention to ‘the historical artefacts and strategies of empire’.810  
While scholars such as Ward, Webster and Schwarz have examined the 
enduring impact of empire in 1960s Britain through the prism of British society and 
culture, this thesis has instead explored this theme through the actions and attitudes 
of key figures at the high-political level of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Labour 
leaders, like the British public, had to come to terms with a world in which Britain was 
no longer an imperial power. This was especially problematic on the issue of race. 
Despite the end of formal empire, senior Labour figures still believed that Britain had 
a duty to help the social and economic development of its former colonies, 
particularly in Africa. Although grounded in apparently good intentions, this policy 
was imbued with racist assumptions of Britain as a paternal force responsible to the 
supposedly backward peoples of the world, a legacy of the ‘civilising mission’. This 
racialised discourse even manifested itself in Labour’s domestic policy as the Wilson 
government implemented a strategy of ‘limitation’ and ‘integration’ to cope with the 
‘problem’ of non-white immigration.   
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